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Abstract 
 
A confusion over local population counts and employment counts in China 
persists throughout the economic literature. The existing studies within many 
branches of economics related to China commonly use the count of people with 
local hukou registration, the GDP per capita using the hukou count as the 
population denominator, and incomplete employment counts reported in various 
Chinese statistical yearbooks as if they were appropriate measures of local 
population, local employment and local per capita income. This misunderstanding 
of China’s local population and employment counts may lead researchers astray 
and could contribute to wrong conclusions and mistaken policy implications. An 
analogous error would be to study the economic geography of, say, the United 
States using local population and employment counts that were only for citizens 
rather than for all residents; the resulting statistical pictures are likely to be biased 
since cities such as New York or Los Angeles have a much higher share of non-
citizens than do other areas. Yet there is no similar criticism of the large and 
growing literature that relies on sub-national population counts for China, despite 
the equally egregious errors that are likely to have resulted from using the wrong 
population and employment counts. 
 Five economic issues that are pertinent to modern China are studied in this 
thesis using the most reliable estimates of local resident population and 
employment from China’s 2010 population census. These issues are regional 
inequality, optimal city size, the city size distribution, the nature, location and size 
of urbanization economies, and the determinants of urban land area expansion. 
Each issue is studied in a single, self-contained, paper that in some cases has 
iii 
 
already appeared in a peer-reviewed journal, and in other cases is under review at 
such journals. In general, the findings based on the most reliable local resident 
population counts and employment counts from the 2010 census extensively 
challenge the existing evidence in the literature. In some cases the policy 
implications from this new research are the opposite of what was previously 
suggested from research that was potentially distorted by the counting errors 
described here. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The urbanization that China is experiencing is the largest and fastest in human 
history. China’s urban population and its urbanization rate were only 308 million 
and 26% in 1990 but had climbed to 758 million and 54% by 2014 (UN World 
Urbanization Prospects, 2014). This doubling of the urbanization rate and the 
addition of 450 million urban residents is due largely to hundreds of millions of 
rural-to-urban migrants. These migrants have dramatically reshaped China’s 
economic geography. However a complete understanding of this reshaping is 
currently lacking because China’s statistical system has not fully coped with this 
massive internal migration. In particular, many of the published sub-national 
population counts, and data derived from these such as per capita GDP, are not 
based on where people are actually living. Some errors likely result from 
researchers misunderstanding what the available sub-national population counts 
actually do show and these errors may affect the way in which some socio-
economic phenomena are interpreted. It is this potential for misinterpretation of 
contemporary China by the economics literature that is the subject of this thesis. 
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Practitioners who work with sub-national data for China face an important 
but largely ignored data problem.
1
 The most widely available local population 
counts for provinces, prefectures, cities and counties are not counts of residents, as 
they would be in most other countries. Instead they are counts of the people whose 
address for their household registration (hukou suozaidi) is from within that 
locality. In some cases these data tell us who once may have lived in an area or 
who had parents living there, because their household registration is still from that 
place even though they now reside somewhere else that could be hundreds of 
miles away. More broadly, this could be thought of as a de jure count of where 
people are legally registered to live rather than a de facto count of where they 
actually live. Notably, while these counts are reported in annual yearbooks put out 
by China’s statistics office, they are based on data provided by the Ministry of 
Public Security – China’s police force. 
The “counting errors” that result from treating the de jure count of the 
local hukou holders as if it shows the de facto local population have the potential 
to substantially distort economic analysis because population counts are 
fundamental to so many branches of applied economics. For example, in urban 
and regional economics the size of cities or of other spatial units is an important 
element in understanding the scope for higher productivity due to agglomeration 
effects from firms and workers locating in larger, denser environments. In 
development and welfare economics, and in studies of economic inequality, the 
interest of researchers is usually in income or output per capita since comparisons 
                                                          
1
 There is some coverage of this problem in the geography literature, particularly in papers by 
Kam-Wing Chan such as Chan (2009b) but in economics these data issues are largely ignored. 
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of totals for unequally populated areas are not very informative. In this regard, 
while there is some literature on the accuracy of China’s economic statistics (e.g. 
Holz, 2004; Chow, 2006) much less attention is paid to the errors in the 
denominator of per capita indicators, where this denominator is based on reports 
of local population counts.  
For most of the first three decades of the reform era in China since 1978, 
local GDP was divided by the count of people with local hukou registration for a 
particular sub-national area rather than by the count of the local resident 
population, whenever GDP per capita was reported. Yet it is not the de jure 
population (that includes people who don’t live there and does not include some 
who do) whose activities contribute to the production and consumption that goes 
in to the measured local GDP. Instead it is the de facto population that matters to 
local economic activity. Thus, the GDP per capita data that were reported in 
statistical publications provided a potentially misleading measure of local 
productivity and of incomes, since GDP was being attributed to the wrong people. 
Similarly, various statistical yearbooks reported the size of sub-national units, 
such as cities or counties, based mostly on their hukou registered population rather 
than on their resident population. Likewise, local employment counts in those 
yearbooks excluded most private sector workers, with the private sector being 
where most people without local hukou registration tended to work. It is only 
since China’s 2010 population census that reliable estimates of the local resident 
population and of local employment are available. This thesis relies heavily on 
these new population counts from the census to examine the errors that result from 
using the previously reported counts of local hukou holders as a measure of the 
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local population. The long form of the census (given to 10 percent of respondents) 
also provides comprehensive employment counts that cover all workers in all 
sectors. These more accurate employment counts also are used in this thesis to 
evaluate the errors that result from relying on incomplete employment counts in 
statistical yearbooks. 
 The hukou system was created in 1958 and took away the freedom of 
internal migration and residence for Chinese residents, with all internal migration 
thereafter to be subject to approval from the authorities at the destination (Chan, 
2009a). While a registration system for vital statistics already existed, a key 
feature of the hukou was the need for individual Chinese to maintain an up-to-date 
registration at local police stations and in this regard it operated like an internal 
passport system. The type of hukou one was classified as was either “agricultural” 
(nongye) or “non-agricultural” (fei nongye) hukou. In addition to type of hukou, 
each person was also categorized according to their place of hukou registration 
(hukou suozaidi). This was the individual’s official permanent residence in the 
eyes of the state and from then on, newborn Chinese were, and are largely still, 
given the same hukou as that of their mothers. In particular, switching out of the 
agricultural and into the non-agricultural hukou was (and still is) very hard; in 
each locality an annual quota for conversions set by the central government was 
usually no higher than 0.2 percent of the local non-agricultural population (Chan, 
2009a). These administrative barriers to individual Chinese changing their hukou 
persisted into the reform era. For example, from the early 1980s through to 1997 
China authorized about 18 million hukou changes per year (Au and Henderson, 
2006). But these mainly involved urban-to-urban and rural-to-rural moves (so 
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changes in hukou location) rather than the rural-to-urban moves (changes in both 
hukou location and hukou type) that were needed to underpin the urbanization of a 
country that central planning had made far too rural for its level of income and 
economic development. 
 Indeed, in the command economy era the hukou system was an important 
mechanism for the state to prevent a vast influx of peasants into cities. The 
holders of non-agricultural hukou were provided with goods and services from the 
state while the people with agricultural hukou were meant to be basically self-
reliant. Since the command economy involved extracting resources from 
agriculture to fund industrialization, and to fund benefits to urban workers, the 
social welfare system was unlikely to cope with unrestricted population 
movement from rural to urban areas, and so the hukou was strictly enforced. The 
hukou was also used to limit internal population movement due to China’s long-
term aversion to large cities and these restrictions were maintained in the early 
reform era. For example, administration regulations issued in 1982 known as 
‘custody and repatriation’ authorized police to detain Chinese living in cities who 
did not hold local non-agricultural hukou and to repatriate them to the places of 
their hukou suozaidi.  
 But despite the fact that the legal framework of the hukou system remains 
largely intact today, the enforcement of it in practice has partly broken down. The 
driving force for this breakdown is that the Chinese economic reforms have 
created pressures to encourage migration from the interior rural areas to the 
coastal urban areas in order to better facilitate the substantially increased 
economic production in coastal urban areas. This has provided incentives for 
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Chinese officials to not enforce regulations on inter-regional rural-to-urban 
migration. As a result, and given the difficulty of changing hukou status, the non-
hukou urban residents have emerged to become a major group. These non-hukou 
urban residents are those people who are working and living permanently in cities 
while their hukou registration is from elsewhere. The stock of the non-hukou 
urban residents was already around 100 million in the mid-1990s (Chan, 2012).  
 More recently, from China’s 2010 population census, the total count of 
non-hukou urban residents reached 226 million by 2010, which is one-third of 
China’s overall urban resident population. Apparently, the hukou system can no 
longer properly identify where individual Chinese are working and living in 
contemporary China. Notwithstanding this fundamental change, the hukou 
population is still commonly provided by China’s statisticians as a measure of the 
size of sub-national entities such as provinces or cities, despite it no longer being 
an appropriate count of the local population. Neither are the GDP per capita data 
that are based on the local hukou population and are reported in various statistical 
yearbooks appropriate for capturing local income levels in China since this ratio 
denominates local output by a population measure that does not correspond to the 
number of local residents who consumed or produced that output. Likewise, 
counts of the number of people in local employment reported in those yearbooks 
miss many private sector employees (the error is especially for the private sector 
since this is where most non-hukou residents work) and so are not appropriate for 
measuring the size of the local economy or the productivity of workers.  
 Yet confusion over local population counts and employment counts in 
China persists throughout the economic literature. The existing studies within 
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many branches of economics related to China commonly use the hukou population 
count, the hukou population based GDP per capita and the incomplete 
employment count reported in various Chinese statistical yearbooks as if they 
were appropriate measures of local population, local employment and per capita 
income. This misunderstanding of China’s local population and employment 
counts may lead researchers astray and could contribute to wrong conclusions and 
mistaken policy implications. An analogous error would be to study the economic 
geography of, say, the United States using local population and employment 
counts that were only for citizens rather than for all residents; the resulting 
statistical pictures would be biased since cities such as New York or Los Angeles 
have a much higher share of non-citizens, making such an analysis meaningless. 
Yet there is no similar criticism of the large and growing literature that relies on 
sub-national population counts for China, despite the equally egregious errors that 
are likely to have resulted from using the wrong population and employment 
counts.  
 Five economic issues that are pertinent to modern China are reprised in 
this thesis using the most reliable estimates of local resident population and 
employment from China’s 2010 population census. These issues are regional 
inequality, optimal city size, the city size distribution, the nature, location and size 
of urbanization economies, and the determinants of urban land area expansion. 
Each issue is studied in a single, self-contained, paper that in some cases has 
already appeared in a peer-reviewed journal, and in other cases is under review at 
such journals. In general, the findings based on the most reliable local resident 
population counts and employment counts from the 2010 census extensively 
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challenge the existing evidence in the literature. In some cases the policy 
implications from this new research are the opposite of what was previously 
suggested from research that was potentially distorted by the counting errors 
described here.                        
 The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 focuses on 
regional inequality using provincial level data on GDP per capita. Three major 
counting errors in China’s local population data are clearly described in this 
chapter. The first is the use of the local hukou registered population as a 
denominator for GDP, which leads to overstating GDP per capita in the provinces 
where non-hukou residents moved to and understating it in the provinces that they 
left. The second error is due to the sudden and uncoordinated switch to using a 
resident population denominator for GDP (that is, shifting from a de jure to a de 
facto population basis); in some provinces this switch was made as early as 1990 
and in others it was as late as 2008. The third, and related, error is the double-
count caused by the partial and inconsistent way that people were counted by each 
province in any given year; for example, in the case of someone who moved from 
a late switching province (e.g. Hubei) to an earlier switching province (e.g. 
Guangdong) there would be some years where they would show up in the 
population counts of both provinces. This double-counting problem amounted to 
almost 25 million people at its peak. The results in this chapter show that once 
these three counting errors are corrected by using retrospective resident 
population estimates that became available after the 2010 population census, 
much of the seemingly large rise in inter-provincial and inter-regional inequality 
in China that is much discussed in the literature (e.g. Fan et al, 2011) disappears. 
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Moreover, the apparent turning point in the mid-2000s where the rise in regional 
inequality seems to reverse, which happened to coincide with when China’s 
national government made multi-billion dollar investments into so-called lagging 
regions, is shown to be largely an artifact of the change from a de jure population 
basis to a de facto population basis for denominating GDP per capita. This change 
in statistical procedures makes it difficult to assess any impacts on inequality of 
the government investment into lagging regions. This chapter is published in 
World Development (Li and Gibson, 2013).
2
  
 While the research reported in Chapter 2 contributes to the literature on 
China’s regional inequality, it is by no means the end of the story. In particular, in 
order to cleanly identify the effect of counting errors on the trend in regional 
inequality without introducing auxiliary variations, there is no adjustment for 
spatial differences in prices in Chapter 2. Yet as a matter of fact, richer provinces 
in China are more expensive places to live, especially in urban areas (Brandt and 
Holz, 2006). This is a sub-national manifestation of the well-known Balassa-
Samuelson effect that the price level is higher in richer countries. Moreover, under 
the command economy, urban housing markets were absent and so reform era 
spatial cost of living differences that are due to the urban housing market, 
(reflecting the fixity of land) have likely grown from a low base. Thus, some of 
the apparent rise in inequality in China that is found by many studies is probably 
just a growth in spatial price differences. Therefore in a companion study to the 
analysis in Chapter 2, a spatial price index was calculated based on prices for new 
dwellings (both with and without hedonic adjustments for dwelling attributes) to 
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 Publisher’s permission to reproduce the paper in this thesis has been granted. 
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see what happens to the apparent inter-provincial (and also inter-city) inequality if 
the analysis is recast using spatially real prices. The results show that inter-
provincial measures of inequality are overstated by at least 15 percent if spatially 
nominal prices are used in the analysis. This result on the effects of spatial price 
deflation, in conjunction with the results on the effects of adjusting for population 
denominator errors, provides grounds for caution when interpreting evidence on 
rising regional inequality in China. This companion paper is published in the 
Asian Development Review (Li and Gibson, 2014) and since it does not address 
the central issue of counting errors it is included in the appendices to the thesis 
rather than as one of the main chapters.
3
 
 While Chapter 2 describes the origin of the population counting errors and 
highlights the effects they have on one phenomena of interest – inter-provincial 
inequality – it may not do full justice in highlighting the magnitude of these 
errors. On the one hand, the issue of inter-regional inequality is ideal for 
demonstrating the problems caused by these counting errors since using the de 
jure population as a denominator for GDP per capita means that inequality will 
mechanically rise as rural to urban and inland to coastal migration increases 
(given that the urban, coastal areas are richer). But on the other hand, the severity 
of the counting error problems is not fully highlighted at the spatial scale of 
provinces. The reason is that any of the non-hukou urban residents who stay 
within the same province (e.g. moving from rural Sichuan into Chengdu) still get 
counted in the right province for denominating GDP per capita if the count of 
local hukou holders is used as a proxy for the count of local residents. But for 
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smaller spatial units, such as cities, the scale of the error is much larger since the 
non-hukou urban residents have come from outside these city boundaries and so 
there are many more of them than there are of the non-hukou interprovincial 
migrants. Therefore the remaining chapters of the thesis consider sub-national 
spatial units that are smaller than provinces. 
 In Chapter 3 the focus of the thesis shifts to cities, or more specifically 
‘urban cores’. In China, prefectural cities (diji shi) have an urban core of districts 
(shiqu) that is equivalent to a city proper (Roberts et al, 2012) or to the urbanized 
portion of a Metropolitan Statistical Area in the U.S. (Au and Henderson, 2006). 
In the analysis in Chapter 3, as in most studies of cities in China, contiguous 
districts within the same prefectural city are merged so there is one core per 
prefecture. This chapter considers the issue of optimal city size by estimating an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between output per worker and city scale. In 
contrast to existing evidence from Au and Henderson (2006), who provide the 
theoretical framework used in the chapter, the data come from local employment 
counts recorded in the long form version of China’s 2010 population census. The 
results show that four-fifths of Chinese cities are close to the estimated 
productivity-maximizing scale and that the predicted output losses due to 
sub-optimal scale are typically below 10%. Those findings challenge the often 
repeated claim in the literature (e.g. Au and Henderson, 2006) that China has too 
many small cities and foregoes agglomeration-based productivity gains as a result. 
The contribution of the chapter to the literature on whether the city size 
distribution in China is sub-optimal is significant since existing studies (e.g. Au 
and Henderson, 2006) use wrong measures of city scale based on incomplete local 
12 
 
 
 
employment counts reported in China’s statistical yearbooks. The counting error 
in employment data comes from a failure to fully cover the private sector 
workforce. In fact, in 2010 the incomplete local employment count reported in 
China’s statistical yearbook averaged just 43% of the complete local employment 
count recorded for the same cities by China’s population census. This is a useful 
reminder for future economic analysis on China of the need for caution when 
using local employment data for sub-national areas. Chapter 3 is published in 
Economics Letters (Li and Gibson, 2015).
4
 
 Chapter 4 uses a different framework to consider the city size distribution 
in China and switches from showing the impact of counting errors in employment 
data to showing the impact of errors in local population counts. One of the most 
robust empirical facts about the relative size of cities is that they follow either 
Pareto’s or Zipf’s Law (Gabaix, 1999) which give negative relationships between 
logarithms of city size and rank within a country (with a slope of minus one for 
Zipf’s Law). Several recent studies in economics and in other disciplines estimate 
these relationships for China’s cities. A common finding (e.g., Anderson and Ge, 
2005) is that city sizes are becoming more evenly distributed over time (that is, 
the absolute value of the Pareto exponent is rising and moving further from what 
Zipf’s Law implies). But the population counts that these studies use are counts of 
the local hukou registered population, which miss the flocking of millions of 
migrants into a small number of China’s cities. In other words, non-hukou 
migrants voting with their feet seem to prefer a few, larger, cities and once their 
choices are considered by using more appropriate, residence-based, population 
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counts, the evidence is that over time, city sizes in China are becoming less even. 
On top of answering a positive question, of whether the city size distribution is 
converging or diverging, this chapter also uses Pareto’s Law to answer the 
normative question of which cities in China should accept more in-coming rural 
migrants (based on an objective function of moving the city size distribution 
closer to what Pareto’s Law predicts). This analysis shows that only the very 
largest cities in China appear to have scope to absorb more non-hukou urban 
residents, which stands in sharp contrast to official policy prescriptions for 
encouraging migrants into small cities and limiting the growth of the biggest cities.  
 In Chapter 5 the effects of city size on productivity are reconsidered by 
examining the nature, location and size of urbanization economies. These 
economies are the the positive externalities arising from the scale of an area and 
the diversity of its economy and show up in higher output per worker. Using data 
on local GDP and on the urban resident population from the 2010 census, the 
analysis shows that these positive externalities occur only for already 
agglomerated areas (the urban districts) and do not occur at all for the county-
level cities or counties. In terms of economic sectors, the positive urbanization 
externalities occur only for the tertiary (services) sector, and not for the secondary 
sector that includes manufacturing and construction. A comparison of industrial 
and spatial employment distributions in the 2000 and 2010 census shows that 
manufacturing and construction activity have been spreading towards counties. 
The results in this chapter suggest that there will be no positive externalities 
resulting from attempts to create a more dispersed form of urbanization from this 
spreading of secondary sector activity. 
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  The final notable result in this chapter is that the estimated urbanization 
economies are of a similar size to those found in other countries. In contrast, 
Combes, Demurger and Li (2015) use China’s Urban Household Survey (UHS) 
and claim that China’s urbanization economies are up to three times larger than 
those observed elsewhere, and treat this as a symptom of China’s maladjusted city 
size distribution. While the UHS data are not subject to the counting errors 
criticized here, they come from a sampling frame that ignores the non-hukou 
urban residents and so it is not clear what store can be placed on these results of 
much larger urbanization economies in China than elsewhere. If the UHS results 
are unreliable, and if the true situation is that urbanization economies in China do 
not look too unusual by international standards, then it partially corroborates the 
evidence from Chapter 3 that China is not suffering major productivity losses 
from having a malformed city size distribution. 
 In Chapter 6 the unit of analysis is still cities but the topical focus turns 
from purely economic indicators like GDP per capita or per worker to an 
economic and environmental indicator – urban land area; this attracts policy 
interest due to concern about ‘urban sprawl’. The extant literature for China uses 
satellite remote sensing to measure urban land area and finds that area expands 
3 percent for every 10 percent increase in economic output (county GDP) and that 
between 1995 and 2000, local GDP growth fully accounted for all urban area 
expansion with no independent effect of local population growth (Deng, Huang, 
Rozelle and Uchida, 2008; 2010). If rising city population does not translate into 
rising city land area, it implies that cities are becoming denser rather than more 
dispersed (that is, more sprawling). This densification is contrary to what is often 
15 
 
 
 
asserted (e.g., World Bank, 2014), and also implies that the tradeoffs between 
urbanization and food security may be less severe than thought. But this prior 
evidence may be untenable because the population with local hukou registration is 
being used to explain urban area expansion and there is no reason to believe that 
this is a suitable proxy, since the uncounted non-hukou urban residents also need 
dwellings to live in, roads to drive on, and offices, shops and factories to work in, 
and all of these require land being converted from agricultural use to urban use. 
 In order to determine if population counting errors may have caused the 
evidence on China's urban area expansion to be misinterpreted, this part of the 
thesis proceeds in two steps. The first step updates the remote sensing evidence on 
the expansion of China's urban areas; this is needed since reliable estimates of the 
local population are only available in the 2000 and 2010 census while existing 
remote sensing evidence on city area is from earlier years. An appendix to the 
thesis reports the results of using satellite-detected night time lights to measure 
city area in each year from 1993 to 2012 (for every city that meets the definitions 
used in Chapters 3 and 4). When the city-by-city expansion rates are related to 
annual changes in local GDP and in the population with local hukou registration, 
the results are very similar to what Deng et al (2008, 2010) found, which is that 
the elasticity of area with respect to city GDP is about 0.3 and that there is no 
effect of local population change on urban area. These results are published in 
Sustainability (Gibson, Li and Boe-Gibson, 2014) and are included as an appendix 
to the thesis.
5
 
                                                          
5
 Publisher’s permission to reproduce the paper in this thesis has been granted. 
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 Since the night lights provide similar evidence on urban expansion to what 
Deng et al (2008, 2010) report using Landsat data, they should provide a suitable 
testing ground for evaluating the effect of population counting errors on the prior 
conclusions in the literature about the causes of urban area expansion. This is the 
evaluation that is carried out in Chapter 6, where a statistical ‘horse race’ is 
carried out between two different models for explaining growth in urban area (as 
detected by night lights) for each city between 2000 and 2010. The first model 
uses the change in (log) GDP and the change in (log) hukou registered population 
for each city while the second model uses the change in (log) GDP and the change 
in (log) urban resident population for each city, as recorded by census. Consistent 
with the existing study by Deng et al (2008), changes in the number of people 
with local hukou registration has no effect on city area while the elasticity of city 
area with respect to local GDP is about 0.2. The results are very different when 
the urban resident population is used in the models; the elasticity of urban area 
with respect to resident population is about 0.4 and there is no significant effect of 
local GDP change. Non-nested model comparison tests conclusively favor the 
model that uses the resident population over the model that uses the local hukou 
registered population. In other words, the apparent non-effect of local population 
increase on urban area expansion that is reported by existing studies is probably 
an artifact of using the wrong population concept – there is no reason why city 
area would expand when a city has a larger hukou registered population since the 
hukou registered population do not necessarily live there. Thus, counting errors 
may distort understanding of the driving forces behind urban land area expansion 
in China. Moreover, it appears that population densities of the very largest 
17 
 
 
 
Chinese cities are lower and declining compared with those of other mega-cities 
elsewhere in the world, such as Hong Kong (Du et al, 2013). Thus, concerns in 
China about urban sprawl and threats to food security may have some justification 
after all and the revised understanding that comes from modelling urban 
expansion using changes in the appropriate resident population supports this.  
 Chapter 7 contains the conclusions of the thesis and highlights the overall 
contribution of the five main chapters. The theme that runs through all of these 
chapters is the need for researchers to be cautious when using China’s sub-
national data on employment and population, and when using any per capita or 
per worker variables derived from such data. Many of the patterns revealed by 
careful analysis of the data from the 2010 census of population suggest that some 
of the understanding in the economics literature about contemporary China may 
have been distorted by the counting errors described in this thesis. 
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Rising Regional Inequality in China: Fact or Artefact? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
China’s local populations can be counted by how many people have hukou 
household registration from each place and by how many people actually reside in 
each place. For most of the first three decades of the reform era, the hukou count 
was used to denominate per capita GDP figures, creating a systematic and time-
varying distortion in provincial GDP per capita figures. A discontinuity occurred 
when provinces switched from the hukou count to the resident count when 
reporting GDP per capita. Much of the apparent increase in inter-provincial 
inequality disappears once a consistent series of GDP per resident is used. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen recounts how, as a nine-year-old boy, he saw 
unbelievably emaciated people dying in the streets during the 1943 Bengal famine 
(Sen, 1995).  These were the rural destitute, who had trekked from the countryside 
into the cities in search of food; by one estimate they numbered at least 100,000 in 
Calcutta alone (Sen, 1981). Yet just 15 years later in the Great Leap famine in 
China, which killed at least 30 million people,
6
 there was no similar trek by 
desperately hungry villagers seeking food in the cities. Instead, the strict controls 
on mobility in China under the hukou household registration system prevented the 
mass movement of people in search of food. So limited was movement that the 
excess mortality rate in one province – Anhui – was 17 times higher than that of a 
neighboring province, adding up to a difference of over six million excess deaths 
in Anhui between 1958 and 1961.
7
 
Fast forward two decades to the beginning of China’s economic reform 
and the hukou system was largely intact. Every person in China in 1958 had been 
given either “agricultural” (nongye) or “non-agricultural” (fei nongye) hukou, to 
determine entitlements to state-provided goods and services (regardless of 
                                                          
6
Ashton et al (1984) estimate that there were about 30 million premature deaths between 1958 and 
1962 and about 33 million fewer births than would be expected in the absence of the famine. 
7
 Specifically, from 1958 to 1961 there were 6.3 million excess deaths in Anhui, equivalent to 18.4 
percent of the population, but just 0.2 million excess deaths (one percent of the population) in 
neighboring Jiangxi (Yixin, 2010), even though these provinces share a 260 mile border.  Brown 
(2010) reports evidence that urban residents even smuggled food out of cities to their nearby but 
immobilized (by inflexible hukou) rural friends and relatives. 
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location), which thereafter passed from mothers to children. In addition to hukou 
type, each person was categorized by their place of hukou registration (hukou 
suozaidi), which was their official and permanent residence in the eyes of the state 
(Chan, 2009). In the pre-reform era there was no freedom of movement, with all 
internal migration subject to approval from authorities at the destination, so the 
hukou operated much like an internal passport system (Chan and Zhang, 1999). 
But China’s population was maladjusted for the needs of a market economy, with 
too many people in the interior, and too few in the soon-to-be-booming coastal 
cities. So the non-hukou migrants emerged, people who moved to live and work 
somewhere other than their place of hukou registration – often hundreds, or even 
thousands, of miles away.  
China’s statistical system had no way to deal with the non-hukou migrants, 
so for most of the first three decades of the reform era, local GDP was divided by 
registered population rather than by resident population whenever per capita 
figures were reported. In other words, official data on provincial GDP per capita 
(and also for prefectures, counties and cities) were not based on the average 
number of residents but instead, on the household registered population. In coastal 
provinces the household registered population is many millions less than the 
resident population, while the reverse is true for migrant-sending inland provinces, 
so a systematic and time-varying distortion in provincial GDP per capita data was 
created. For example, at the time of the 2000 census, Guangdong province had a 
registered population of 75 million but residents numbered 86 million, so using 
registered population to calculate GDP per capita gives a 15 percent 
overstatement. At finer spatial scales, such as for individual counties and cities, 
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the error is much larger. The city of Shenzhen provides an outstanding example; 
its registered population was just over one million by the time of the 2000 census 
but its residents numbered seven million, so per capita GDP was overstated by 
almost 600 percent in the official data of the time (Chan, 2009a). 
Every year an avalanche of data comes out of China’s statistical system, 
with yearbooks for each province and for topics such as population, urbanization 
and the economy. The fact that these yearbooks regularly reported economic 
output of each province or sub-provincial area divided by a population concept 
that had no bearing to the actual number of people living in those areas has been 
routinely ignored by economists. As noted a decade ago by Rawski and Xiao 
(2001), few economists hesitated to utilize these standard yearbook data for their 
research. Instead, most debate by economists about economic statistics concerns 
the possible falsification of China’s GDP growth figures (Rawski, 2001, Chow, 
2006) and the threat to time series comparisons from varying rules for 
constructing consumption data (Holz, 2004). Much less attention is paid to the 
simpler issue of how to count China’s local populations, despite the systematic 
distortion of per capita data created by using the wrong population figures. 
In this paper we document these problems with China’s population data 
and highlight some implications, especially for the literature on inter-provincial 
and inter-regional (coastal-inland) inequality. A general finding is that inequality 
rose in the reform era, although not necessarily with the same patterns at all 
spatial scales (e.g. Chen and Fleisher, 1996; Huang, Kuo and Kao, 2003; Fan and 
Sun, 2008; Li and Wei, 2010). Inequality seems to be low when policy encourages 
agriculture and the rural sector generally and high when the rural sector is 
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neglected, as in the recent era of global integration dating from the 1990s (Fan, 
Kanbur and Zhang, 2011). But at least part of the apparent trend in regional 
inequality may be a statistical artefact caused by the unusual way that China has 
calculated local GDP per capita.  
We also explore two other problems related to the wrong population being 
used for per capita statistics. First, a discontinuity occurred when provinces 
switched from reporting GDP per registered population to GDP per resident. This 
discontinuity causes a spurious trend change for measures of inter-provincial 
inequality, which coincides with initiatives to reduce inequality such as the West 
China Development Project (Fan and Sun, 2008), the Northeast China 
Revitalization Campaign (Zhang, 2008) and the Rise of Central China Plan (Lai, 
2007). Second, there was a double-counting problem, since some provinces 
switched to reporting output per resident several years before others. Hence, the 
same person may have been in the denominator of GDP per capita for two 
different places at the same time; as a resident of one province and in the 
registered population of a province that was slow to switch to reporting output per 
resident. We estimate that up to 26 million people were included in this double-
count. 
These population errors have been discussed in the geography literature 
(Chan, 2007). But economists have largely ignored them, with just a single 
working paper devoted to this issue (Hoshino, 2011). In contrast to that previous 
study, we explore all of the problems with China’s local population data while 
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Hoshino just examines the problem of using GDP per registered population.
8
 
Furthermore, a common feature of much recent applied economic research on 
China has been to use data from sub-provincial levels, such as prefectures 
(Roberts et al, 2012) or counties (Banerjee, Duflo and Qian, 2012). Yet the 
problem of using the wrong population in per capita GDP statistics is much worse 
for smaller jurisdictions like counties, because many more people are defined as 
non-hukou migrants when working with smaller geographic units (Chan, 2012). 
Moreover, intercensal population figures for lower-level units only refer to the 
hukou registered population (Scharping, 2001). Consequently, there are no annual 
estimates of the resident population of small units like counties, so per capita 
GDP estimates for those small areas continue to be based on the wrong concept of 
local population. 
The analysis here uses provincial population and GDP data but we note 
that an alternative perspective on inequality in China comes from household 
survey data. Several studies with such data show inter-regional inequality to be of 
falling importance relative to interpersonal inequality over the reform period 
(Benjamin et al, 2005; Benjamin et al, 2008) while the effect of local inequality 
on growth also fades over time (Benjamin et al, 2011). For example, inequality 
decompositions by Benjamin et al (2005) show a falling contribution to total 
inequality from province of residence; down from 24 percent in 1987 to just 
15 percent in 1999. To the extent that the household survey evidence challenges 
                                                          
8
 Moreover, the procedure used by Hoshino to develop an alternative to the officially reported 
GDP per registered population can be questioned because the way that the 1990 and 2000 census 
populations are spread over intercensal years suffers from the double-counting problem. 
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the view that inequality in China is primarily a geographic phenomena, it 
corroborates a finding from this paper that most of the reform era is not 
characterized by rising regional inequality once a consistent series of GDP per 
resident is used which accounts for the non-hukou migrants. 
A feature of surveys is that they allow residency to be consistently determined 
by how long an individual has actually been living in a locality, rather than just 
relying on hukou status. But China’s lack of a national sampling frame hinders 
surveys; the urban and rural household surveys by the National Bureau of 
Statistics are based on hukou registration rather than the census and so non-hukou 
migrants are missing from the sample frame (Ravallion and Chen, 2007). Hence, 
many surveys used to study inequality in China have only partial spatial coverage; 
the Research Centre on the Rural Economy (RCRE) surveys used by Benjamin et 
al (2005, 2011) are from nine provinces while the China Household Income 
Project (CHIP) used by Khan and Riskin (2005) surveys in 21 provinces for its 
rural sample and 12 provinces for its urban sample. Partly for this reason and also 
perhaps due to the accessibility of the statistical yearbooks, the areal data continue 
to be widely used; for example, only a minority of the studies of inequality trends 
covered by Gustafsson and Li (2002) use household survey data. Moreover, the 
areal data are also widely used to test models of sub-national economic growth 
and convergence, and so we do not further consider the household survey data in 
this paper. 
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Figure 1: Trends in GDP per Registered and per Resident Population: Selected Provinces 
  
  
  
  
  
Notes: Chongqing included in Sichuan since they were one province until 1997. Values are in 2010 prices using 
the GDP deflator for China provided by the World Bank. 
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2.2 IMPACTS ON GDP PER CAPITA FROM USING THE WRONG 
POPULATION CONCEPT 
The discrepancy between registered and resident population caused by the non-
hukou migrants can only be clearly observed in years with either a microcensus or 
a full population census. The intercensal population data rely on the annual 
National Sample Survey on Population Changes, which appears to have 
understated non-hukou migrants, as we show below.  In terms of the years with 
more reliable data, China has carried out a national census in 1982, 1990, 2000 
and 2010, with a one percent microcensus in each of 1987, 1995 and 2005. But 
even the time-trend from census and microcensus data is not fully consistent since 
the duration required to be defined as a resident changed (Scharping, 2001). The 
1982 and 1990 census counted non-hukou migrants as residents at their place of 
in-migration if they had lived there for more than one year, but each microcensus 
and the census in 2000 and 2010 used a six-month stay for someone to be defined 
as a de facto resident.
9
 
This inconsistency causes the number of non-hukou migrants to be 
understated in earlier years and the gap between GDP per resident and GDP per 
registered population to be smaller than with a consistent definition. However our 
                                                          
9
 Tsui (2007) is an example of a study that (wrongly) ignores this change in the length of stay 
required to be defined as a resident. Tsui projects age-speciﬁc population cohorts forward from the 
1982 and 1990 census and uses the gap between the actual figure in the next census and the 
projected figure for that year to estimate net in-migration and then spreads these evenly over the 
intercensal years. The six-month rule in the 2000 census gives more residents than the 12-month 
rule used in 1990, so this method will wrongly overstate the number of in-migrants in the 1990s. 
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main point is not much undermined by this inconsistency, since the non-hukou 
migrants were a much smaller group in the 1980s, increasing by just 15 million 
(from 6.6 million in 1982 to 21.6 million in 1990 – both figures on a one year 
residency definition). In contrast, Chan (2012) reports that the number of non-
hukou migrants increased by almost 100 million between the 1995 microcensus 
and the 2000 census (both on a six month definition). So it is in the 1990s, and 
subsequently, that the trends in GDP per capita are most affected by the 
discrepancy between registered and resident population. 
In Figure 1 we illustrate the trends in GDP per capita for six provinces, 
three migrant-senders in the left column and three migrant-receivers in the right.
 10
 
The solid line is the ratio of provincial GDP (in 2010 prices) to the population 
with hukou for that province. The dashed line shows GDP divided by the local 
resident population, as counted in the census or microcensus (six-month residency 
criteria).
11
 The GDP per resident of the migrant-sending provinces is about seven 
percent higher than GDP per registered population in 2005, and about 15 percent 
                                                          
10
 Beijing and Shanghai are province-level municipalities, along with Tianjin and (since 1997) 
Chongqing. Each is included as a separate entity in province-level statistics. Each of these 
municipalities also includes agricultural populations. For example, Chongqing municipality had a 
registered population of 30.9 million in the 2000 census but the non-agricultural population in its 
city districts was just 3.8 million (Chan, 2007). 
11
 The resident population for 2000 and 2005 is based on revised figures for those years produced 
by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) after the 2010 census. The revisions raised the 
estimated resident population of Shanghai in 2005 by six percent and lowered the estimate for 
2000 by four percent, while for the other provinces shown in the figure there were almost no 
changes from the initial counts made in 2000 and 2005. 
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higher in 2010. The reason for the gap is that the permanent residents of the 
migrant-sending provinces are far fewer than the number of people with hukou 
registration for these provinces. In the case of Sichuan (including Chongqing) the 
difference in the two population counts is almost 15 million people by 2010, 
which is the number who left that province to live elsewhere – typically in the 
coastal cities. Yet for most of the economic reform period the officially reported 
GDP per capita figures for these inland provinces have included these missing 
people in their denominator. 
The discrepancy between GDP per resident and GDP per registered 
population is much larger for the three migrant-receiving provinces shown in the 
right column of Figure 1. This reflects the funneling of migrants from many 
source provinces into just a few destinations, along the coast between Shanghai 
and Guangdong, and into the Beijing-Tianjin conurbation. For example, the 
registered and resident populations for Shanghai were 13.2 million and 16.7 
million in the 2000 census, so dividing GDP just by the registered population 
results in a 27 percent upward bias in the per capita estimates. The gaps are even 
larger in 2010, at 55 percent for Beijing, 23 percent for Guangdong and 63 percent 
for Shanghai. In terms of annual trend growth rates in GDP per capita, wrongly 
using the GDP per registered population would overstate growth rates for Beijing 
and Shanghai by about two percentage points per year. Since there is an 
understated growth rate for all the migrant sending provinces, the scope for 
distorted findings from studies that use uncorrected provincial GDP per capita 
figures should be apparent. 
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To illustrate the situation more generally across all provinces, the 
percentage understatement or overstatement of per capita GDP at the time of the 
2005 microcensus is mapped in Figure 2. For the six provinces in the central 
interior of China with the largest understatement, on average GDP per capita was 
seven percent lower using registered rather than resident population. A group of 
six adjacent (but still interior) provinces had lower rates of understatement, 
averaging two percent. The next group of 13 provinces forms a band around the 
western, northern and northeastern periphery where a very slight upward bias, 
averaging just two percent, results from dividing GDP by the registered 
population. These provinces are neither important sources nor destinations for 
non-hukou migrants. The final six provinces are all main destinations for non-
hukou migrants, with per capita GDP overstated by at least five percent (and 
averaging 15 percent). This final group of provinces includes those on the 
southeast coast (Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong) and the Beijing-
Tianjin conurbation. 
If the map in Figure 2 was redrawn for 2010 the patterns would be the 
same but the rates of over- and under-statement would be larger. Such a map 
could be considered misleading, however, because by 2009 all provinces in China 
had, finally, switched to reporting per capita GDP on a resident basis rather than 
using the misleading hukou-registered population as the denominator. But the way 
in which this switch was implemented introduced a further set of problems with 
China’s local population data, which we describe in the next section. 
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Figure 2: Percentage Difference in GDP per Registered and per Resident Population: 2005 
 
2.3 DISCONTINUITIES AND DOUBLE-COUNTS 
The population denominator used for per capita economic statistics of many 
provinces switched abruptly from a registered to a resident population basis. This 
change occurred around 2005 for the largest migrant-senders and receivers, but 
varied for other provinces. Switching denominator for GDP per capita raises the 
apparent living standards in inland provinces while lowering it for coastal 
provinces, since it (correctly) accounts for the inter-provincial non-hukou 
migrants. But the abrupt change by provinces with the largest migrant in-flows 
and out-flows creates a discontinuity in estimates of inter-provincial inequality, 
when many government-led initiatives to reduce regional inequality were at their 
peak. It is likely that at least part of the claimed success of these initiatives in 
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reducing the coastal-inland gap (Fan et al, 2011) was simply due to the timing of 
the change in the way that China’s economic statistics counted local populations.  
We illustrate the sudden switch in the denominator of official GDP per 
capita estimates by charting time series of populations for the six provinces used 
in Figure 1. Two other features of China’s provincial population data are also 
highlighted by this exercise; first, the reports of the resident population in the 
Statistical Yearbooks appear unreliable for most years, and second, the most 
plausible time series of resident population for each province have only been 
available since 2011. Hence research using provincial population estimates 
published before 2011 and relying on a concept of resident population – as most 
per capita economic statistics should – is likely to be distorted. 
To explain each of these points fully, four time series are needed for each 
province: 
 GDP implied population - the population values underlying reported GDP 
per capita figures. We derived these annual average population estimates 
by dividing current reported provincial GDP by current reported provincial 
GDP per capita.
12
  
 Registered population - the year-end registered population (hukou suozaidi) 
for each province, as reported in China Population Statistical Yearbook 
                                                          
12
 Holz (2004) uses the same approach to derive the urban and rural populations that are implied 
by household consumption statistics. Our particular sources are the Comprehensive Statistical 
Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China, the China Statistical Yearbook for Regional 
Economy 2001-2011, and the historical sections of the 2011 edition of the Statistical Yearbook for 
each province. 
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1991-2006, China Population and Employment Statistical Yearbook 2007-
2011. 
 Resident (initial) population - the estimated year-end resident population, 
reported each year in China Population Statistical Yearbook 1991-2006, 
China Population and Employment Statistical Yearbook 2007-2011. In 
years without a census or microcensus, this resident count comes from the 
annual National Sample Survey on Population Changes and from the 
census data otherwise. 
 Resident (revised) population - the annual average of the resident 
population in previous years back to 1990 that was released by NBS in 
2011 in the statistical yearbooks for each province, derived by dividing 
reported provincial GDP by reported provincial GDP per capita. This 
revision uses the results from the 2010 census and attempts to smooth out 
discrepancies in the time series of resident population. 
For each of the six provinces shown in Figure 3, the GDP implied 
population tracks the registered population from 1990 to 2004 (Beijing and 
Shanghai) or to slightly earlier (Guangdong and Sichuan – 2003; Henan – 2002; 
Anhui – 2001). The implied population in Beijing and Shanghai then jumps, while 
dropping for the three migrant-sending provinces. For Beijing and Shanghai the 
population jump is equivalent to over 30 percent of the previous year population, 
while for the three provinces shedding population the decline is equivalent to four 
percent of the previous year population. After this abrupt change the implied 
population then tracks either or both of the two resident population time series. 
The only province where the switch from registered to resident population time 
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Figure 3: Trends in Implied, Registered and Resident Population: Selected Provinces  
  
  
  
  
  
Source: Author’s calculations from the sources described in text. For other notes see Figure 1. 
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series takes more than one year is Guangdong, where it is spread over the years 
from 2001 to 2005. 
The next feature of the provincial population data shown in Figure 3 is the 
volatility of the time series of initial estimates of the resident population. The 
three migrant-sending provinces all show sharp dips in the time series in 2000 and 
then sharp declines in 2005 that are not reversed. For the migrant-receivers, the 
estimated number of residents spikes in 2000 and rises rapidly again in 2010, and 
also in 2005 for Guangdong. For each province the year(s) that do not fit with the 
trend for the surrounding years, or that mark a shift to a different time trend all 
have either a census or microcensus. For the intercensal years the resident 
population count comes from the National Sample Survey on Population Changes, 
which is just a 0.1 percent sample. It appears that this sample is not able to 
adequately cover non-hukou migrants, compared with the more extensive efforts 
of the census and microcensus and that an adjustment was made in census years to 
align the results with the more comprehensive census count.
13
 Thus even if 
economists were concerned that official GDP per capita figures relied on the 
wrong denominator – the registered population – and had tried to adjust by 
                                                          
13
 In unreported regressions we compare 2000 census resident counts for each province with the 
resident population predicted from the trend in the yearbooks for the two surrounding years. The 
method used to form the estimates of resident population that were initially reported in the 
Statistical Yearbooks for non-census years appears to overstate the population of migrant-sending 
provinces by more than two percent and understates it for receiving provinces by five percent, 
which could only result from underestimating the number of non-hukou migrants. 
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dividing by the reported resident population, the data available would not have 
allowed correct adjustment, except in census years. 
The third feature of the provincial population data in Figure 3 is that the 
most plausible time series of resident population have only been available since 
2011. These data, shown by the dashed line labeled “Resident (revised)”, 
represent the work by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) to use the latest 
census counts to correct the initial estimates of the resident population in each 
province.
14
 The initial estimates, reported year-by-year in each province’s 
Statistical Yearbook, are quite volatile between census and non-census years but 
the revised estimates smooth the time series. Nevertheless, we must stress that it 
will never be known for certain what the annual resident population of China’s 
provinces was for most of the first three decades of economic reform.  
The final idiosyncratic feature of China’s provincial population data is not 
apparent from Figure 3. Some provinces have been reporting output per resident 
rather than output per registered population since 1990. The year in which each 
province switched to reporting GDP per resident is shown in Table 1. We 
determine this date using charts like those in Figure 1, but for all provinces, since 
there is no explicit discussion of the (changing) population basis for GDP per 
capita calculations in contemporary statistical documents. The registered and 
                                                          
14
 The 2010 population census (and the Second Economic Census, conducted in 2008) provides 
corrected endpoints for recalculating trends in GDP and GDP per capita. This “new trend” can 
then be used to revise previous annual estimates. Specifically, annual deviations from a “historical 
trend” (based on the previous Yearbook data that did not benefit from the latest census results) are 
applied to the new trend. Wu (2007) provides details for GDP revisions. 
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Table 1: Year of First Using Resident Population in Official GDP per capita Estimates 
 
 
Province 
Registered 
Population 
(2010 mil) 
Resident 
Population 
(2010 mil) 
Non-hukou 
migrants 
(2010 mil) 
Migrants as 
% of 
residents 
Year of 
GDP switch 
to residents 
 Shanghai 14.1 23.0 8.9 39% 2005 
 Beijing 12.6 19.6 7.0 36% 2005 
 Tianjin 9.9 13.0 3.1 24% 2005 
 Guangdong 85.2 104.4 19.2 18% 2001 
 Zhejiang 47.5 54.5 7.0 13% 2001 
 Jiangsu 74.7 78.7 4.0 5% 1990 
 Fujian 35.3 36.9 1.6 4% 2000 
 Shanxi 34.7 35.7 1.0 3% 1991 
 Liaoning 42.5 43.7 1.2 3% 1990 
 Qinghai 5.5 5.6 0.1 2% 1990 
 Tibet 2.9 3.0 0.1 2% 2000 
 Yunnan 45.3 46.0 0.7 2% 1991 
 Xinjiang 21.6 21.9 0.2 1% 1990 
 Jilin 27.2 27.5 0.2 1% 1997 
 Inner Mongolia 24.5 24.7 0.2 1% 1991 
 Shandong 95.4 95.9 0.5 1% 1997 
 Heilongjiang 38.4 38.3 -0.1 0% 1990 
 Hebei 73.0 71.9 -1.0 -1% 1991 
 Ningxia 6.4 6.3 -0.1 -2% 2001 
 Hainan 9.0 8.7 -0.3 -3% 2003 
 Shaanxi 38.7 37.4 -1.4 -4% 1992 
 Jiangxi 46.9 44.6 -2.3 -5% 1990 
 Gansu 27.1 25.6 -1.5 -6% 1995 
 Hubei 61.5 57.3 -4.2 -7% 2005 
 Hunan 70.7 65.7 -5.0 -8% 2001 
 Sichuan 90.0 80.4 -9.6 -12% 2004 
 Chongqing 33.0 28.8 -4.2 -15% 2004 
 Anhui 68.3 59.6 -8.7 -15% 2002 
 Henan 108.0 94.1 -13.9 -15% 2003 
 Guangxi 53.3 46.1 -7.2 -16% 2003 
 Guizhou 41.9 34.8 -7.1 -20% 2008 
Notes: Year of GDP switch to residents is the year in which official average population became 
resident population (before which it was registered population). Provinces are sorted according to 
the migrant percentage. 
 
resident population for each province, as counted in the 2010 census is also 
reported in Table 1, along with the number of non-hukou migrants (positive for in-
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migrants and negative for out-migrants) and their percentage of the resident 
population.
15
 
Figure 4 sums the population of each province for the 1990-2010 years. 
The national sum of residents should be less than the national sum of the hukou 
registered population, since the People’s Liberation Army and Chinese with 
foreign permanent residency are not counted as residents but do have household 
registration status. Yet between 1990 and 2005 the sum of the resident population 
(shown by the solid line) exceeded the registered population (shown by the dotted 
line). The excess number of people counted as residents was especially apparent 
between 2000 and 2004, when it averaged 24 million people (with a maximum of 
26 million). This excess occurs because what was called ‘resident’ in many 
provinces was, in fact, registered population, which exceeded residents. Hence, 
someone may have been in the denominator of GDP per capita for two different 
places at the same time; as a resident of one province and in the registered 
population of a province that was slow to switch to reporting output per resident – 
reducing the overall average per capita GDP. 
The final population time series shown in Figure 4 is for the sum of each 
province’s revised resident population, shown by the dashed line. These revised 
counts use the results from the 2010 census to correct the initial estimates of 
resident population in each province using the trend-deviation interpolation 
                                                          
15
 In unreported regressions we test if the switch date relates to whether provinces are migrant-
senders or receivers, to the number of their non-hukou migrants and to the size of their total 
population. No clear relationships emerge to explain why the statistical authorities in some 
provinces switched to reporting GDP per resident earlier than others. 
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approach (described in endnote 8). For all but nine provinces this revision by the 
NBS went back to 1990,
16
 and for these nine the authors use the same approach to 
backdate the revised resident counts to 1990. The sum of these revised counts is 
shown in Figure 4 and they almost completely eliminate the double-count 
problem. Nevertheless, it is only for the most recent years that there can be any 
great confidence in the estimates of the resident population of China’s provinces. 
 
Figure 4: The Double-Count in Resident Population (Summation over all Provinces) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from the sources described in text. 
 
                                                          
16
 The provinces and their earliest year with revised data are: Zhejiang (2000), Jiangxi (2000), 
Henan (2003), Hubei (2000), Hunan (2002), Guangxi (1998), Sichuan, including Chongqing 
(2000), Guizhou (2006) and Gansu (2006). 
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2.4 IMPACTS OF POPULATION ERRORS ON TRENDS IN INTER-
PROVINCIAL AND INTER-REGIONAL INEQUALITY 
Despite the shaky foundations created by China’s official data using a population 
concept that had no bearing to the actual number of people living in each province, 
a large literature that relies on reports of provincial GDP per capita has already 
emerged. In this section we show how the problems described above may have 
distorted some of the conclusions reached by one strand of this literature – that 
related to inter-provincial and inter-regional (coastal-inland) inequality. In Table 2 
we survey studies published in the last 15 years that use provincial GDP per 
capita as their economic indicator for analyzing trends in regional inequality. 
Only four of the 14 studies make any adjustment to the data from the Statistical 
Yearbooks to account for the distortions from using registered population as the 
denominator.
17
 Findings from the studies that rely on unadjusted data are 
potentially misleading, at least for the period since 1990 when the number of non-
hukou migrants greatly increased. Even when the potential bias from using GDP 
per registered population is recognized, the adjustment procedures can be 
questioned, not least because they all lacked the results from the latest 2010 
census that support the most plausible revisions of resident population estimates.
18
 
                                                          
17
 China occasionally releases compilations of data from the Statistical Yearbooks covering two or 
more decades, typically with titles of “20 years …” etc but these do not show any consistent 
adjustment to the population data initially published year-by-year so studies using these 
compilations are counted in the group using unadjusted data. 
18
 Specific concerns with the adjustments of Hoshino (2011) and Tsui (2007) are listed in footnotes 
3 and 4. The Fan and Sun (2008) adjustment is to replace census estimates of resident population 
45 
 
 
 
To illustrate the potential bias in previous studies we calculate three of the 
most commonly used statistics of inter-provincial inequality – the Theil index, the 
coefficient of variation (CoV), and the Gini coefficient.
19
 We compare the time 
series for each statistic using three different population denominators to calculate 
GDP per capita for each province: 
 GDP implied population 
 Registered population 
 Resident (revised) population 
which have been previously described in the discussion of Figures 3 and 4.
20
 The 
revisions to the resident population estimates only go back as far as 1990 (by the 
NBS for 21 provinces and by us for the remaining nine) so this comparison is 
limited to the 21 years from 1990 to 2010. To put this starting date into context, 
from the beginning of economic reform in 1978 until 1990, inter-provincial 
                                                                                                                                                               
with the surrounding year estimates from the Yearbooks. Figures 3 and 4 suggest that the opposite 
procedure should be used. The Chan and Wang (2008) paper does not adjust for the double-count 
issue shown in Figure 4. 
19
The Theil index is: )ln())((
1
 wj
m
j wjjw
yyPpT    where m=30 provinces (Sichuan and 
Chongqing merged), pj is the population of the j
th
 province, P is overall population,  ywj is the GDP 
per capita of the j
th
 province, and  is the overall population-weighted mean of GDP per capita for 
all provinces. The (weighted) coefficient of variation is: .))((
1
2   
m
j wjj
yPpVoC  The Gini 
coefficient is:   .2 2
1 1     i
m
i
m
j wjwiji
pyyppG  
20
 We do not need to use the “Resident (initial) population” as an alternative denominator for GDP 
per capita in this illustration because we have already shown that these initial estimates of the 
resident population were unreliable (Figure 4).  
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inequality in China fell rapidly, with trend annual rates of decline of 4.6 percent 
(Theil), 3.9 percent (CoV) and 0.5 percent (Gini).
21
 This falling inequality resulted 
from the early decollectivization of agriculture, which saw incomes in rural 
provinces close some of the gap with the three richest urban provinces (Shanghai, 
Beijing and Tianjin). Also, at the start of the reform period, the soon-to-be-
booming southeast coastal provinces of Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang were not 
even in the top one-third of provinces (ranking 10
th
, 23
rd
 and 16
th
 according to 
GDP per capita in 1978), so the tremendous growth that they soon experienced 
had an equalizing impact.
22
 Therefore in our illustration of the impact of 
population errors on regional inequality trends, the starting point happens to be 
the most equal year in the reform era. 
For all three of the inequality statistics shown in Figure 5, the 1990 to 
2000 trend using the GDP implied population (shown by the solid line) is almost 
identical to that using registered population (shown by the dotted line). This is 
unsurprising since most large provinces were still reporting GDP per capita on a 
registered population basis during these years (Table 1). Yet, while inequality in 
the officially reported GDP per capita was rapidly rising in the decade from 1990 
(at a three percent annual rate in the case of the Theil index) it was largely  
                                                          
21
 Trend rates are estimated from a semi-logarithmic regression on time, and are statistically 
significant at the one percent level (Theil and CoV) and the eight percent level (Gini) using 
Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors with a single 
lag. The provincial GDP per capita data underlying the inequality statistics are all based on 
registered population from 1978 to 1990. 
22
 China had only 29 provinces until 1988. 
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divorced from the (correct) trend shown when GDP per capita is calculated using 
the revised resident population estimates (the dashed line in Figure 5). In fact, the 
apparent rise in inter-provincial inequality between 1990 and 2000, when using 
the Theil index calculated from the official data of the time, is 66 percent greater 
than the actual rise, based on the revised resident series. For the CoV and the Gini, 
the overstatement created by using uncorrected Yearbook data for GDP per capita 
is 94 percent and 38 percent, as of the year 2000.  
Absent any change in the denominator for GDP per capita, the apparent 
trend in inter-provincial inequality would have carried on rising strongly (for 
example, there is a 1.4 percent per annum trend rise in the Theil index when using 
registered population over 2001-10). But, in fact, inter-provincial inequality 
returns almost exactly to its starting point by 2010 (for the Theil index; the CoV is 
slightly lower and the Gini slightly higher than their 1990 values) in the time 
series using the corrected data. Thus if GDP per registered population had 
continued to be used as the official data, all of the apparent rise in inequality 
would have been what we call “proxy measurement error” where a potentially 
accurately measured variable (the hukou count, in this case) does not match with 
the concept that it is meant to be measuring, which in this case is the resident 
count, since it is residents who contribute to (and thus, should denominate) local 
GDP. 
The other feature illustrated by Figure 5 is the apparent change in the trend 
in inter-provincial inequality, when using the GDP implied population series. 
From 1990 to 2003 the trend annual rate of increase was 2.9 percent (for the Theil 
index; 1.5 percent for the CoV and 1.6 percent for the Gini), which sharply 
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Figure 5: Inter-Provincial Inequality in GDP per capita With Various Denominators 
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reversed, to decline by 5.6 percent per year (3.8 percent using CoV and 2.3 
percent for the Gini) over 2003-2010. But rather than reflecting any major change 
in the true situation in 2003, this is an artefact resulting from the switch to 
reporting per capita GDP on a resident basis. Inequality in GDP per resident is 
lower than inequality in GDP per registered population, so this switch in statistical 
procedure mechanically reduces measured inequality in the officially reported 
GDP per capita without any underlying change necessarily occurring in the 
economy in that year. In fact, in both the registered-based and resident-based 
series in Figure 5, the turning point in the inequality trend does not occur until 
2005, which happens to be the year that the coastal provinces reached their 
maximum share of GDP. 
There are several possible causes of declining inter-provincial inequality 
after 2005. This may reflect lagged effects of the investments into western and 
inland China made as part of state-led initiatives to reduce regional inequality 
(Fan et al, 2011). Contraction in the export-oriented coastal provinces after the 
Global Financial Crisis also may have been equalizing, especially as many non-
hukou migrants left the coastal cities and began raising output in the interior 
provinces (Huang et al, 2011). But it may also be that after 2005 various 
convergent forces of market integration and catch-up growth simply begun to 
surpass opposing pressures for divergence. Despite well-known claims that 
reform-era China suffered from various inter-provincial barriers due to imperfect 
factor mobility, local protectionism and dual-track and gradual price reform 
(Young, 2000) the contemporary evidence finds China to be a relatively well 
integrated market economy. Evidence in favor of the law-of-one-price and rapid 
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price convergence is reported by Fan and Wei (2006) and Ma, et al (2009), while 
Lan and Sylwester (2010) find half-live divergences from the law-of-one-price of 
just a few months, which is faster even than the speed of adjustment found in the 
United States.
23
 This rising market integration is also apparent in the labor market; 
since 1997, urban wages in China’s interior provinces have risen at a faster rate 
than in coastal regions – although the absolute wage gap continues to grow (Li et 
al, 2012). 
A reasonable summary of the patterns in the inter-provincial inequality 
time series, based on the most plausible revised population estimates, is that there 
was a largely stable pattern of inter-provincial inequality between 1993 and 2004. 
Over those years, the average annual deviation was just four percent of the 1993-
04 mean (for the Theil index). The only two occasions of notable change in inter-
provincial inequality were from 1990-93, when there was a sharp increase in 
inequality; and from 2005-2010, when that initial increase was more than fully 
reversed. Recalling that the 12 years prior to 1990 had witnessed an almost 
continuous decline in inter-provincial inequality (reducing the Theil index from 
0.16 to 0.08), the solitary three year episode of rising inequality from 1990-93 – 
which lifted the Theil index back to just over 0.10 – hardly qualifies as strong 
support for the claim from the literature that regional inequality has risen in the 
reform era. 
Our final illustration of how apparent trends may be affected by the switch 
from reporting GDP per registered population to GDP per resident is for a 
                                                          
23
 For example, Parsley and Wei (1996) find convergence rates to purchasing power parity in the 
United States of five quarters for tradable goods and fifteen quarters for services. 
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regional decomposition of inequality. Several papers in the literature group 
China’s provinces into regions and examine the between-region inequality trends. 
We carry out a similar exercise for the coastal-inland comparison, using the Theil 
index (which decomposes exactly, unlike the Gini coefficient). In Figure 6 we 
show the time series for the between-group Theil index and it is apparent that 
inequality between the coast and inland provinces rises, by about 0.04 points, 
from 1990 to around 2005.
24
 But from 2000 to 2005, while the time series of 
inequality using the GDP implied denominator is detaching from the registered 
population series and moving toward the resident-based series, this movement 
makes it seem that there is a largely unchanged between-group component. 
Specifically, the increase from 2000 to  2005 in the GDP implied time series in 
Figure 6 is just ten percent, versus a 36 (27) percent increase when inequality is 
measured using the registered (resident) population.  
In terms of policy evaluation, the most active period of state intervention 
to close the regional gaps had already run its course by 2005, by which time more 
than 1 trillion Yuan (US$180 billion) of state-led infrastructural investment had 
been placed in western China (Yao, 2009). Some authors have suggested that a 
leveling off of the coastal-inland gap in this period reflects the good effects of 
these interventions (Fan et al, 2011). But an alternative explanation is that the 
                                                          
24
 The identical time series, but rescaled, would be shown if we examined the ratio of mean GDP 
per capita in the coastal provinces to mean GDP per capita in the inland provinces. This ratio 
starts at just over 1.6 in 1990, peaks at 2.2 in 2005 and was back below 1.9 by 2010.We group 
Hainan, Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Hebei, Tainjin and Beijing 
together as the coastal provinces. 
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apparent leveling off over those years is just an artefact created as the population 
series used to denominate GDP per capita progressively switched from one based 
on registered population to one based on resident population which involved 
switching from a higher trending inequality time series to a lower trending one, 
creating an apparently static period. 
 
Figure 6: Coastal-Inland Inequality With Various Denominators for GDP per capita 
 
 
 
Source: Decomposition of Theil index into within-group and between-group components. 
 
2.5 OTHER ADJUSTMENTS 
The analyses reported thus far only consider problems in the population 
denominator for GDP per capita, leaving possible issues with the numerator 
unchallenged. At least two adjustments to the numerator might also affect the 
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data. Second, the nominal GDP data also have problems capturing the output of 
the non-hukou migrants, many of whom are involved in the service sector (often 
self-employed) and in small-scale industry. For provinces that are major migrant 
destinations, understating the contribution to local GDP of the migrants might 
have a large enough effect that it offsets some of the overstatement caused by 
denominating output by the registered population.  
In terms of the issue of spatial price differences, Brandt and Holz (2006) 
use provincial price data from 1990 to form a spatial price index by pricing 
national rural and urban expenditure baskets (40-60 items) and a population-
weighted combined basket. Then using the annual rate of change in the CPI for 
each province they extend from the base year, back and forth in time, providing 
annual spatial deflators for each province from 1984 to 2004. This time series has 
been used by other researchers studying inequality (e.g., by Sicular et al, 2007) 
and has the advantage of allowing easy updating since it just relies on the annual 
rate of change in each province’s CPI. Data issues that potentially undermine the 
accuracy of these spatial deflators are amply discussed by Brandt and Holz (2006) 
but a conceptual problem is largely overlooked. Hill (2004) shows that both 
theoretically and empirically it may be impossible to construct such panel price 
indexes that are unbiased across space and time if the required multilateral index 
methods are not used.
25
 Also, in the particular case of China, there is concern that 
                                                          
25
 An example of such bias is given by Gluschenko (2006) using spatial price data for Russia in 
two different years to compare a direct spatial price index calculated for period t using spatial 
prices for the same period with an indirect spatial price index for period t that is extrapolated from 
a direct spatial price index for period t0 using local CPIs to update prices from t0 to t. The direct 
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the temporal CPI is a biased measure of price changes, especially in rural areas 
(Almås and Johnsen, 2012). 
 
Figure 7: Inter-Provincial Inequality After Both Numerator and Denominator Adjustments 
 
 
 
 
 Despite reservations about the Brandt and Holz deflators, we update these 
to 2010 using movements in each province’s CPI and calculate spatially real GDP 
per capita for each province for 1990-2010. The impact of this deflation on 
estimates of inter-provincial inequality is shown in Figure 7 using the Theil index, 
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for the series labeled “spatially real” (dotted line).26 To allow comparison, two 
series from Figure 5 are also included; nominal GDP denominated either by GDP 
implied population (solid line) or by the revised resident population (dashed line). 
The Thiel index is 20-40 percent higher using nominal GDP per capita compared 
with the spatially real series, with the biggest gap in the early 1990s. Since the 
Brandt and Holz deflator is based on 1990 data, the effect of spatial deflation 
should be most reliably estimated for that period. Whether the subsequent slight 
closing of the gap between the nominal and real series of inequality measures 
reflects problems of extrapolating the spatial price index forward from 1990 is 
difficult to ascertain because of the lack of other spatial deflators for China. 
 In terms of the other issue, of nominal GDP missing some of the output 
produced by the migrants, in 2006 and 2009 the National Bureau of Statistics 
retrospectively adjusted provincial GDP for 1993-2003 and 2005-2008 following 
results from China’s First and Second Economic Census in 2004 and 2009. These 
adjustments were not incorporated into the estimates shown in Figures 5 and 6, so 
as to focus just on the effects of the population errors by basing calculations on 
the originally published GDP data rather than on the recently revised series. 
However, at least one effect of these GDP adjustments is to raise the size of the 
urban service sector, where many of the non-hukou migrants are working (Park 
and Cai, 2011). We therefore incorporate the revised GDP data into the final 
series in Figure 7, labeled “revised and spatially real” (dash-dot lines), which is 
                                                          
26
 Specifically, this is unadjusted provincial GDP for each year converted into Beijing prices (Theil 
index results are the same if converting into national average prices) which is then denominated by 
the revised resident population. 
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denominated by the revised resident population and is also spatially deflated. The 
adjustments to GDP data have the largest effect between 1993 and 2004, when 
they raise inequality slightly compared with the pattern in the unrevised GDP data. 
Nevertheless, when compared with the “revised and spatially real” series, the time 
series of inequality based on data that had been published year-by-year in the 
Statistical Yearbooks (“GDP implied”) overstated inequality by an average of 
35%.  
2.6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
We have shown how changes over time in the population denominator used for 
China’s provincial GDP per capita statistics may distort understanding of recent 
trends in regional inequality. Much of the apparent trend increase, and change in 
trend in 2003, disappear once proper account is taken of non-hukou migrants, so 
that GDP per resident is calculated correctly for each province of China over 
1990-2010. Putting the corrected data for the last two decades into the context of 
the entire reform era, the changing pattern of inter-provincial inequality can be 
thought of as composing four episodes, only one of which involves rising 
inequality. From 1978 until 1990 inter-provincial inequality declined almost 
continuously; about one-third of this decline was reversed over the next three 
years; then a decade of little change in inequality was ended by a one-year rise in 
2005 but even with that rise, inequality had returned to only two-thirds of its 
starting value in 1978; finally, inter-provincial inequality fell sharply after 2005, 
so that by 2010 it was right back at the low levels previously seen in 1990. Thus 
the only sustained episode of rising inequality in the reform era was from 1990 to 
1993, representing just three out of 33 years since liberalization began.  
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The three errors in China’s local population data described here – using 
registered population as a denominator, the sudden, uncoordinated switch to using 
a resident denominator, and the double-count caused by the partial and 
inconsistent way that residents were counted by each province in any given year – 
can also be expected to bias econometric research using extant data on provincial 
GDP per capita. The proxy measurement errors from using the wrong concept 
(denominating by the hukou count rather than the resident count) are correlated 
with the levels and growth rates of GDP per capita, since the non-hukou migrants 
were moving into richer, faster growing provinces, and the errors are increasing 
over time (at least until each province switches to reporting GDP per resident). In 
contrast to random (classical) measurement errors, which cause no bias when just 
in the dependent variable and which always attenuate the coefficient on a single 
error-ridden explanatory variable, the effects of these proxy measurement errors 
will be more complex and pernicious. Moreover, the main correction used by 
economists for ameliorating error bias – instrumental variables (IV) – is 
inconsistent when errors are correlated with true values (Black, Berger and Scott, 
2000). The trend in applied research on China to use data from smaller spatial 
units is especially vulnerable to the threat posed by these errors since there are 
more non-hukou migrants when working with smaller units and also because the 
sort of correction exercise documented here of retrospectively adjusting estimates 
of the resident population is yet to be done for sub-provincial units. 
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Abstract 
 
We examine effects of city scale on output per worker in China. Existing studies 
use wrong measures of scale. Four-fifths of cities are close to the estimated 
productivity-maximizing scale. Output losses from sub-optimal scale are typically 
below 10%. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A claimed legacy of China’s command economy era, and the hukou restrictions on 
migration, is that China’s cities are too small to fully exploit gains from 
agglomeration (Au and Henderson, 2006; Xu 2009). But extant studies wrongly 
measure city scale.
27
 For example, Xu (2009) uses data from 1990-97 that only 
counts people with local hukou registration for each city, ignoring more than 100 
million city residents with hukou registration from elsewhere (Chan, 2012). Au 
and Henderson (2006) measure city scale by 1997 employment but their data 
exclude most private sector workers.
28
 It is only since China’s 2010 population 
census that reliable city-level estimates of the urban population and of total 
employment are available.  
 In this paper we use these new, more reliable data, to estimate the 
relationship between net output per worker and city scale. The flexible functional 
forms of Au and Henderson (2006) [henceforth, AH] are used, but with more 
controls for city industrial structure and more complete data on city scale 
(employment) that counts all private sector workers. Most cities are close to their 
productivity-maximizing scale, with losses from sub-optimal scale typically 
below 10%. Evidently, millions of non-hukou migrants are reshaping China’s 
                                                          
27
 Even simple descriptive claims are wrong. Au and Henderson (2006, p.557) say China had nine 
metro areas with populations over 3 million and 125 in the 1-3 million range in 2000; this ratio of 
large to small cities (0.07) was well below the global average of 0.27. But measuring cities by their 
residents in the 2000 census, China had 20 cities over 3 million and 89 cities of 1-3 million, giving 
a ratio of 0.23 – just below the global average. The 2010 census shows 38 cities with resident 
population over 3 million versus 97 cities of 1-3 million, giving a large-to-small ratio of 0.39. But 
using the local hukou registered population rather than the resident population makes the ratio just 
0.18. 
28
 Au and Henderson use City Statistical Yearbook (CSY) data, where ‘private sector’ employment 
was titled as self-employed (with a very low share of the total); private sector employees are 
apparently excluded. Long-form census data on employment by sector show that CSY substantially 
undercounts private sector employment. 
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economic geography, forming an urban system with smaller productivity losses 
than previously thought. Other studies note relaxed hukou restrictions are 
changing China’s city size distribution (Luckstead and Devadoss, 2014) but this is 
the first to report results that challenge the often repeated claim that China 
foregoes agglomeration-based productivity gains from having too many small 
cities. 
3.2 DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The sample is 286 urban cores (‘cities’) in 2010. Specifically, prefectural cities 
(diji shi) have an urban core of districts (shiqu) equivalent to a city proper 
(Roberts et al, 2012) or to the urbanized portion of a Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA) in the U.S. (AH, 2006). Contiguous districts within the same prefectural 
city are merged so there is one core per prefecture. These data are at the same 
spatial level as AH (2006) and Xu (2009) but cover more of China; the prefectures 
these cores come from are the location of 97% of China’s GDP. We use two main 
sources: the City Statistical Yearbook (CSY) (NBS, 2011), and the 2010 
Population Census (NBS, 2012).
29
 City-level GDP data are from CSY but not city 
scale estimates; CSY only counts local hukou holders so omits over 100 million 
urban residents with hukou registration from elsewhere, and also omits most 
private sector workers. Instead of using CSY, more complete population and 
employment data from the 2010 Population Census long form are used to measure 
city scale. 
                                                          
29
 To form an instrumental variable we also use the 2001 Yearbook of the Ministry of Public 
Security (MPS, 2001) which provides counts for each city of the number of people with non-
agricultural hukou registration for that city.  
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Figure 1. Rank-Size Plots using Census of Population and Statistical Yearbook Estimates of Non-Agricultural Employment in 2010 
 
Notes: N is non-agricultural employment (secondary and tertiary sectors). Number of observations is 286 cities. 
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 While we mainly follow the approach of AH (2006) to estimate how big a 
city should be to maximize predicted output per worker, other benchmarks for an 
efficient city size distribution can be used, such as the fit to Zipf’s Law (Gabaix, 
1999). We therefore start with a log-log plot of city employment against city rank, 
which shows several features of the data (Figure 1). First, the city size distribution 
is significantly (p<0.001) closer to Zipf’s Law if Census employment is used, with 
a coefficient of -0.962 compared with -0.936 for CSY employment (standard 
errors of 0.012 and 0.014), though both reject the coefficient of -1 needed for an 
exact fit to Zipf’s Law. Second, the rank-size curve shifts left if using CSY 
employment, which averages just 43% of employment recorded for the same 
cities by the Census, due to the CSY data missing many private sector workers. 
Third, the tails of very small and very large cities are where there is most 
divergence from the linear fit of log rank on log size. To confirm that results are 
not due just to cities in the tails, results weighted by city employment are reported 
in addition to using equal weights for cities (so unequal weights for workers).  
We use two flexible functional forms to relate output per worker, GDP/N 
to city scale, N, industrial structure, capital per worker, and other covariates, 
largely following AH (2006). First, 
ln⁡(
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝑁
) = 𝛼1𝑁
2 + 𝛼2𝑁 + 𝛼3𝑁 ×𝑚𝑠𝑔𝑑𝑝 + 𝛼4𝑁 × 𝑔𝑑𝑝1 + 𝛽ln⁡(
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑁
) + 𝛾𝑋        (1)                     
allows the scale that maximizes output per worker of the k
th
 city to be calculated 
as: 
𝑁𝑘
∗ = −
𝛼2̂+𝛼3̂×𝑚𝑠𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑘+𝛼4̂×𝑔𝑑𝑝1𝑘
2×𝛼1̂
.                             (2) 
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The industrial structure variables msgdp (ratio of secondary sector to tertiary 
sector GDP) and gdp1 (share of primary sector GDP) are needed since 
productivity maximizing scale is higher in service-intensive cities. The vector of 
control variables, X includes population-weighted distance to all other cities (to 
proxy for domestic market potential), distance to the ten largest ports (to proxy for 
foreign market access), average years of schooling (to proxy for labor quality), 
and the output of foreign-affiliated firms relative to domestic firms (to proxy for 
technology).  
 With equation (1), estimated peak points for some cities are negative. This 
is less of a problem with a Generalized Leontief specification, which also was 
preferred by AH (2006): 
ln⁡(
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝑁
) = 𝛼1𝑁 + 𝛼2𝑁
0.5 + 𝛼3𝑁
0.5 ×𝑚𝑠𝑔𝑑𝑝0.5 + 𝛼4𝑁
0.5 × 𝑔𝑑𝑝10.5 + 𝛽ln⁡(
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑁
) + 𝛾𝑋   (3) 
with the scale that maximizes output per worker of the k
th
 city given by: 
√𝑁𝑘
∗ = −
𝛼2̂+𝛼3̂×𝑚𝑠𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑘
0.5+𝛼4̂×𝑔𝑑𝑝1𝑘
0.5
2×𝛼1̂
.                               (4) 
When actual scale (as measured by total employment) for city k, Nk is less than 
*
kN  the city is deemed under-sized, otherwise it is considered over-sized. If Nk is 
outside the 95% confidence interval surrounding *
kN  we consider the city 
significantly under- or over-sized. 
Equations (1) and (3) assume workers are more productive in a bigger city. 
But being more productive may cause a city to grow, making scale endogenous. 
The planned size of cities from the command economy era is a valid instrumental 
variable (Li and Gibson, 2014), and is used here to test for endogeneity bias. 
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These tests are on a linear model, using either N or N  because coefficients on 
higher order terms become insignificant when instrumented. 
3.3 RESULTS 
The results in the first three columns of Table 1 consider the endogenous quantity 
of labor issue. Instrumenting for city scale makes no difference, so OLS is used 
for the remaining models.
30
 The results for equation (1) are in columns (4) and 
(5), and for the Generalized Leontief model in columns (6) to (8). In columns (1) 
to (7) each city is weighted equally while results in column (8) use employment 
weights. These models explain two-thirds of cross-city variation in GDP per 
worker, which is much higher than for the flexible functional form results of AH 
(2006). 
Including gdp1 (which AH do not use) adds explanatory power. Without 
this there is no inverted U; the 2ˆ coefficients of equations (1) and (3) are 
insignificant in columns (4) and (6). The need for both msgdp and gdp1 is shown 
by the example of the city of Huzhou, in Zhejiang Province; msgdp is 1.42 and yet 
its inverted U-shaped curve for output per worker at varying city scale matches 
Hohhot in Inner Mongolia, where msgdp is just 0.25. The gdp1 for Huzhou is four 
times that of Hohhot (0.066 versus 0.017) and the joint effect of these two 
industrial structure variables shifts the output-scale curve. Similarly, Jingzhou city 
in Hubei Province has almost the same msgdp ratio as Huzhou but its output-scale 
curve is shifted well to the left (so the productivity-maximizing total employment 
level is lower) because its gdp1 ratio is twice as high. 
                                                          
30
 The Hausman test results for the model in column (1) versus (2), and column (1) versus (3) are 
2.05 and 1.29, with p=1.00 for both. The same lack of bias due to endogeneity is seen if models 
are re-estimated using N instead of .N  
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Table 1. Determinants of Urban Productivity, Allowing for Endogenous Quantity of Labor and Flexible Functional Forms (n=286) 
 
Endogenous Quantity of Labor 
Flexible Functional Form Specifications 
 Equation (1) – variables in [ ] --------------Generalized Leontief-------------- 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 
Scale and industrial structure variables         
N  
0.151 0.196 0.186      
(0.048)*** (0.054)*** (0.053)***      
][N
2
 or N 
   -0.018 -0.039 -0.068 -0.192 -0.162 
   (0.009)** (0.010)*** (0.068) (0.070)*** (0.060)*** 
[N] or N     0.046 0.231 -0.067 0.464 0.426 
   (0.074) (0.079)*** (0.217) (0.236)* (0.221)* 
msgdpNormsgdp][N      0.106 0.094 0.401 0.340 0.216 
   (0.043)** (0.041)** (0.114)*** (0.110)*** (0.101)** 
gdp1Norgdp1][N       -5.618  -1.902 -1.168 
    (1.122)***  (0.400)*** (0.378)*** 
Control variables         
Capital/N 0.328 0.330 0.330 0.307 0.274 0.274 0.241 0.279 
 (0.023)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.028)*** 
Market Potential (Pop-Weighted Distance) 0.385 0.410 0.404 0.263 0.165 0.195 0.165 0.166 
 (0.319) (0.299) (0.299) (0.316) (0.302) (0.316) (0.303) (0.311) 
Average Distance to 10 Largest Ports -0.341 -0.334 -0.335 -0.250 -0.042 -0.178 0.015 -0.083 
 (0.281) (0.263) (0.263) (0.280) (0.270) (0.278) (0.270) (0.273) 
Average Years of Schooling 1.078 0.972 0.997 1.221 0.583 1.290 0.508 0.976 
 (0.243)*** (0.238)*** (0.237)*** (0.248)*** (0.269)** (0.249)*** (0.290)* (0.301)*** 
Foreign-Domestic Industrial Output Ratio -0.022 -0.030 -0.028 -0.016 -0.043 -0.014 -0.033 -0.035 
 (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.035) (0.031) 
Constant 0.587 0.567 0.572 1.416 2.800 0.764 1.791 1.029 
 (1.639) (1.536) (1.534) (1.670) (1.618)* (1.613) (1.562) (1.690) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.612   0.620 0.653 0.629 0.659 0.651 
Cragg-Donald Wald testa  597 318      
Sargan test p-valueb   0.161      
Notes: The dependent variable is (log) non-agricultural GDP per worker. Variables in italics are in logarithms. Each regression also includes 29 province-level fixed effects. Standard errors are 
in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. Models in columns (2) and (3) use instrumental variables (the square root of (log) number of non-agricultural hukou in 2000 for each 
city, plus in (3) a dummy for cities with higher registered non-agricultural population than resident urban population in 2010). All other models are estimated with OLS, with observations 
weighted by city employment in column (8).  
a First-stage F statistic for the instruments. b Over-identification test.  
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The results of comparing actual city scale with the productivity-
maximizing scale that is calculated from equation (4) are shown in Figure 2 
(based on the employment-weighted results in column (8) of Table 1). Nine cities 
are significantly over-sized and these are home to 29% of workers; almost as 
many as the 32% of workers in the 162 statistically significantly under-sized 
cities. While almost five-sixths of cities are below productivity-maximizing scale 
these hold just over one-half (57%) of the workers and in most cases the losses 
from sub-optimal scale are very small. The patterns are similar if using un-
weighted results from column (7) of Table 1 instead; 31% of workers are in ten 
significantly over-sized cities and 25% are in 131 significantly under-sized cities, 
with 52% of overall employment in cities below peak size. 
The percentage output loss from not being peak scale can be calculated 
as:
31
 
ln⁡(
𝑛𝑒𝑡⁡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑘
𝑁𝑘
)∗
̂
−(ln⁡(
𝑛𝑒𝑡⁡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑘
𝑁𝑘
)
̂
)𝑁=𝑁𝐾 = 
(
1
1−?̂?
) × ((𝛼2̂ + 𝛼3̂ ×𝑚𝑠𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑘
0.5 + 𝛼4̂ × 𝑔𝑑𝑝1𝑘
0.5) × (𝑁𝑘
0.5∗ − 𝑁𝑘
0.5) + 𝛼1̂ × ((𝑁𝑘
0.5∗)2 − 𝑁𝑘))  (5) 
For most cities, the slope to the left of the peak is steeper than to the right, 
implying a bigger loss for under-sized cities than for over-sized cities. For 
example, employment in Dongguan is three million over its peak point ( *
kN =3.1 
million) with a predicted output loss from being too big of just over 10% but at 
three million below the peak the predicted output loss would be almost 50%.  
                                                          
31
 This uses net output per worker, which AH (2006, p.553) note is city GDP less the rental cost of 
capital, and can be derived from GDP per worker using the transformation: ln⁡(𝑛𝑒𝑡⁡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑁𝑘⁄ )̂ =
(1 (1 − 𝛽)̂⁄ ) × ln⁡(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑘 𝑁𝑘⁄ ).̂  We compare predicted output at actual and peak scale, so model 
errors cancel (unlike comparing actual output to predicted output). These calculations exclude 3 
cities where the Generalized Leontief gives negative peak points. 
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Figure 2. Comparison of Actual City Scale and Peak Points 
 
Notes: Markers are proportional to city scale (employment reported by the 2010 Census). Significantly over-sized cities are labeled.  N=283 cities (3 cities with negative peak 
points are omitted). 
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In order to provide a complete evaluation, Table 2 reports details of using 
equation (5), with cities divided along two dimensions: scale relative to peak point 
and the size of the output loss from not being at the peak point. The modal 
category is for a 0-5% loss; this covers 37% of cities (with 45% of workers). The 
median loss from a city not being at peak point is 8%, and the mean loss is 15%. 
Being significantly under-sized causes bigger losses than being significantly over-
sized but over-sized cities have more workers. For example, 8% of workers are in 
55 cities with output losses above one-quarter, due to being significantly under-
sized, but 11% are in the two significantly over-sized cities with similar output 
losses. In contrast to the current results, AH (2006) report a median (mean) loss 
from cities not being at their peak point of 17% (30%); twice what is estimated 
here. These differences persist throughout the distribution; cities at the 75
th
, 90
th
, 
95
th
 and 100
th
 percentiles of the loss distribution have losses of 20%, 33%, 48% 
and 157%, while equivalent values from AH are 38%, 69%, 103% and 229%. 
If equation (5) is calculated using the un-weighted results from column (7) 
of Table 1, the patterns of output losses from sub-optimal scale are similar to what 
is shown in Table 2. The modal loss category is still 0-5%, and has 44% of cities 
and 42% of workers. But the tails are a little larger, with four cities (home to 17% 
of workers) with output losses exceeding one-quarter due to being significantly 
over-sized. In both weighted and un-weighted results a similar number of cities 
have output losses of more than one-quarter from being significantly under-sized 
but the losses are bigger (up to 242%) in the un-weighted results. 
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Table 2. Number of Cities and Workers in Terms of the Size of the Net Output Loss per Worker From Scale Not Being at the Peak Point 
% Loss in Net 
Output per Worker 
from being away 
from peak point  
Number of Cities (% of total)  Millions of Workers (% of total) 
Sig under-
sized 
Under-
sized 
Over-
sized 
Sig over-
sized 
Total 
 
Sig under-
sized 
Under-
sized 
Over-
sized 
Sig over-
sized 
Total 
100%-160% 
2    2  0.3    0.3 
0.7%    0.7%  0.2%    0.2% 
            
50%-100% 
10   2 12  2.8   20.9 23.6 
3.5%   0.7% 4.2%  1.5%   11.0% 12.5% 
            
25%-50% 
43    43  11.2    11.2 
15.2%    15.2%  5.9%    5.9% 
            
10%-25% 
69 1  4 74  23.3 0.3  24.3 48.0 
24.4% 0.4%  1.4% 26.1%  12.3% 0.2%  12.9% 25.4% 
            
5%-10% 
32 14 2  48  15.1 5.1 0.7  20.9 
11.3% 4.9% 0.7%  17.0%  8.0% 2.7% 0.4%  11.0% 
            
0%-5% 
6 67 28 3 104  7.2 41.6 26.4 9.9 85.1 
2.1% 23.7% 9.9% 1.1% 36.7%  3.8% 22.0% 14.0% 5.2% 45.0% 
            
Total 
162 82 30 9 283  59.9 46.9 27.1 55.1 189.0 
57.2% 29.0% 10.6% 3.2% 100%  31.7% 24.8% 14.3% 29.1% 100% 
Notes: Calculation of the net loss is based on equation (5) in the text, using results from column (8) of Table 1. Significantly under-sized and over-sized cities are those outside the 
95% confidence interval for their peak point, while under-sized and over-sized cities are above or below their peak point but within the 95% confidence interval. The sample size is 
283 because 3 cities with negative peak points are omitted. 
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3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper reappraises the claim that China foregoes agglomeration-based 
productivity gains from having too many small cities. In contrast to prior studies 
we use more complete data on city employment and also include the primary 
sector share of GDP in the regression models. We find much smaller losses in net 
output per worker from being away from the productivity-maximizing peak scale 
than is suggested by Au and Henderson (2006). Four-fifths of cities are close to 
peak scale, with net output losses of less than 25%, and these cities are home to 
over 80% of urban China’s workers. The millions of non-hukou urban residents 
seem to be reshaping China’s economic geography in ways that are reasonably 
consistent with productivity maximization. 
 
  
 82 
 
 
 
References 
Au, C. & Henderson, V. (2006). Are Chinese cities too small? Review of 
Economic Studies 73(3): 549-576. 
Chan, K.W. (2012). Internal Labor Migration in China: Trends, Geography and 
Policies. In Population Distribution, Urbanization, Internal Migration and 
Development: An International Perspective, United Nations Population 
Division, New York: pp.81-102. 
Luckstead, J. & Devadoss, S. (2014). A comparison of city size distributions for 
China and India from 1950 to 2010. Economics Letters, 124(1), 290-295. 
Gabaix, X. (1999). Zipf’s law for cities: an explanation. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 114(3), 739-767. 
Li, C. & Gibson, J. (2014). Agglomeration Economies in China: Locations and 
Effects. Working Paper 02/14. Department of Economics, University of 
Waikato.  
Ministry of Public Security (MPS). (2001). Population Statistics of the People’s 
Republic of China by County 2000 (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Quanguo Fenxianshi Renkou Tongji Ziliao 2000 Nian). Beijing: 
Qunzhong Press. 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). (2011). China City Statistical Yearbook 2011 
(Zhongguo Chengshi Tongji Nianjian 2011). Beijing: China Statistics 
Press. 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). (2012). Tabulation on the 2010 Population 
Census of the People’s Republic of China by County (Zhongguo 2010 
Nian Renkou Pucha Fenxian Ziliao). Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
 83 
 
 
 
Roberts, M., Deichmann, U., Fingleton, B., & Shi, T. (2012). Evaluating China's 
road to prosperity: A new economic geography approach. Regional 
Science and Urban Economics, 42(4), 580-594. 
Xu, Z. (2009). Productivity and agglomeration economies in Chinese cities. 
Comparative Economic Studies, 51(3), 284-301. 
 
 84 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Pareto’s Law and City Size in China: 
Only Very Large Cities Are Too Small! 
 
 
Chao Li‡ and John Gibson† 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‡ Department of Economics, Private Bag 3105, University of Waikato, Hamilton 3240 New 
Zealand (e-mail: cl95@students.waikato.ac.nz). 
 
† Department of Economics, Private Bag 3105, University of Waikato, Hamilton 3240 New 
Zealand (e-mail: jkgibson@waikato.ac.nz). Corresponding author: 64-7-838-4289 (ph), 64-7-838-
4331 (fax). 
  
 85 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements: 
 
We are grateful to Steven Lim, Susan Olivia, Jacques Poot, Harry Wu, and 
audience members at the WEAI Wellington conference for helpful discussions. 
All remaining errors are those of the authors.   
 
  
 86 
 
 
 
Pareto’s Law and City Size in China: 
Only Very Large Cities Are Too Small! 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Using Pareto’s Law as a benchmark, only the very largest cities in China have 
scope to absorb more migrants, contrary to the pro-small bias in urban policy. We 
use population census data from 2000 and 2010 to study the evolution of the size 
distribution of Chinese cities. Previous studies may mislead because they measure 
cities by how many people have hukou household registration for each place, and 
not by who actually lives there. Migrants without local hukou registration 
increasingly congregate in a few larger cities, so the count of hukou holders 
wrongly makes the city size distribution seem more even. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords:  Agglomeration, City Size, Hukou, Migration, Pareto’s Law, China 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
China’s urban population is forecast to be one billion by 2030; an increase of 350 
million from 2010 (MGI, 2009). This urban expansion may occur by existing big 
cities joining Shanghai as a mega-city but also by China’s central and local 
governments growing new cities in currently less urbanized areas. There may be 
quite different effects on house prices, wages and productivity, land and water 
use, food security, and environmental stress of taking one path versus the other. 
The scale of the required urban expansion, and China’s need for resources, may 
see these effects spilling into global markets. Consequently, there is much debate 
about whether small and medium-sized cities in China should be favored over 
expansion of big cities.  
 Efforts to limit China’s big cities have a long history. The 1990 ‘City 
Planning Law’ (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengshi Guihua Fa) mandated 
‘strictly controlling the size of large cities and developing medium-sized and 
small cities’ (Xu, 2009). New cities in this era were often just counties with new 
labels. This experiment of creating cities was ended in the late 1990s (Fan et al, 
2012). More even-handed policy followed, with the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-
2005) seeking balanced development of large, medium-sized, and small cities and 
the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) emphasizing development of 
metropolitan regions. In line with this balanced approach, the 1990 ‘City Planning 
Law’ was replaced in 2008 by a new ‘Urban and Rural Planning Law’ (Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Chengxiang Guihua Fa) and the key phrase “strictly 
controlling the size of large cities” was dropped from the law (Fan et al, 2012).  
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 The policy pendulum is now moving against the biggest cities. In 2014 
President Xi Jinping announced reforms to assist rural migrants into small towns 
but restrict access to bigger cities: “…the overall principle is to fully remove 
hukou restrictions in towns and small cities, gradually ease restrictions in 
medium-sized cities, set reasonable conditions for settling in big cities, and 
strictly control the population of megacities”. 32  Big city growth also may be 
limited by land use controls. Citing food security concerns, land on the outskirts 
of the biggest cities like Beijing and Shanghai is being classified as “permanent 
basic farmland” to be used only for cultivation. In announcing these controls the 
Minister for Land and Resources claimed that good farmland has been ‘eaten by 
steel and cement’.33 Conversely, land use controls for small urban areas are less 
strictly enforced and fiscal decentralization creates incentives for local officials to 
convert more farmland to industrial or residential use than is actually needed 
(Lichtenberg and Ding, 2009). 
 What is missing in this swing back to a pro-small bias is consideration of 
the evidence on China’s evolving urban system. In this paper we use Pareto’s Law 
as a benchmark, and find only the very largest cities in China have scope to 
absorb more migrants, contrary to the pro-small bias in urban policy. One of the 
most robust empirical facts about the relative size of cities in market economies is 
that they follow either Pareto’s or Zipf’s Law (Gabaix, 1999).34 This negative 
relationship between logarithms of city size and rank is used here to identify the 
                                                          
32
 A report on the speech is here:  
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0607/c90785-8738238.html. 
33
 Details are in Xinhua 2014-11-04:  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/03/c_133763130.htm  
34
 Zipf’s Law is a special case of the Pareto distribution, with a Pareto exponent equal to one. 
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cities hosting too many migrants and those with the potential to take more, in 
terms of having a city-size distribution that exactly follows Pareto’s Law. We use 
population census data from 2000 and 2010, while previous studies are misleading 
because they use annual data that measure cities by how many people have hukou 
household registration for each place, and not by who actually lives there.
35
  
The census counts show that migrants increasingly congregate in a few 
larger cities, so if cities are measured by the count of local hukou holders the size 
distribution wrongly seems more even. This error is like studying the size 
distribution of, say, cities in the United States with city size calculated only for 
citizens rather than for all residents; this would be biased since cities such as New 
York have a higher share of non-citizens than do other cities. This issue of de 
facto versus de jure measures of city size matters more for China than elsewhere, 
due to the scale of non-hukou migration, at over 200 million by 2010.
36
 Thus, 
prior studies that ignore non-hukou migrants (e.g. Song and Zhang, 2002; Xu and 
Zhu, 2009) and claim city sizes are becoming more evenly distributed over time 
misunderstand China’s evolving urban system. A key feature of this evolving 
system is that millions of non-hukou migrants, voting with their feet, seem to 
prefer large cities. For example, there are urban districts in each of China’s 287 
prefectures but just 27 districts are the destination for 71 million of the 
117 million non-hukou migrants residing in urban districts in the 2010 census. 
There is a potential mis-match between migrants funneling into a few large cities 
                                                          
35
 Examples include Anderson and Ge, 2005; Liang, 2010; Peng, 2010; Chen et al, 2013; Li and 
Sui, 2013. 
36
 Non-hukou migrants are people who move somewhere other than where their hukou registration 
is from without converting either their type of hukou (agricultural or non-agricultural) or their 
place of registration (hukou suozaidi). The problems for the interpretation of China’s statistics due 
to these migrants are discussed in Li and Gibson (2013). 
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and governments trying to steer them into smaller cities. One result of this mis-
match is ‘ghost towns’ where empty new housing units sit on recently converted 
farmland in small cities.
37
 
  Another problem with prior studies is that county-level cities (xianji shi) 
are often included in samples along with urban districts (shiqu). But some county-
level cities are just relabeled counties and do not differ from rural counties in 
economic performance (Li, 2011; Fan et al, 2012) or in lacking urbanization 
externalities (Li and Gibson, 2015). The rural nature of county-level cities is seen 
by a majority (54%) of their residents not having urban status in the 2010 census, 
while for urban districts just 28% of the population lack urban status. Thus a focus 
of some studies on the apparent growth of small cities (e.g. Anderson and Ge, 
2005) may be misplaced since many of these county-level cities are not big 
enough to be cities at all. Thus, it is important to exclude county-level cities when 
using Pareto’s Law in China, as is done in this study. 
 In the next section we describe our data and methods. We pay particular 
attention to the threshold for a city to be in the sample, since the fit of Pareto’s 
Law is sensitive to the sample truncation approach used (Li and Sui, 2013). In 
Section 3 we report several results: (i) measuring cities by how many hukou 
registrations they have makes cities seem more evenly sized; (ii) the city size 
distribution is becoming less even over time; (iii) it is moves away from the 
middle of the size distribution causing the divergence in city size; and, (iv) very 
                                                          
37
 For an example, see “Ghost Town” China Daily June 10, 2010 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-06/10/content_9958431.htm  
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large cities appear to have the most scope for absorbing more migrants. Our 
conclusions are in Section 4. 
4.2 DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
A review of data quality issues showed that the most reliable information on city 
size is from China’s Population Census in 2010 and 2000. The census counts 
residents of an area as those living there at least six months, giving a more 
realistic measure of a city’s size than the count of people whose hukou registration 
is from that place since many of them may live elsewhere. In contrast, existing 
studies rely on the China City Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 2011), whose English 
name varies but in Chinese is consistently Zhongguo Chengshi Tongji Nianjian. 
We do not rely on Yearbook data, which ignore non-hukou residents. When we 
need hukou counts, to contrast with results using counts of residents, we take them 
from the Ministry of Public Security (MPS, 2001, 2011). A further problem with 
Yearbook data is that they do not report on urban cores. In contrast, the census and 
MPS report on each individual district within a prefectural city, and contiguous 
districts are the best proxy for an urban core in China (Roberts et al, 2012).
38
 
 Our full sample is the urban cores of all 287 prefectural cities in the 2010 
census. These include 24 that were Leagues, Regions or Autonomous Prefectures 
in 2000, prior to an upgrade to prefectural city status. To maintain geographical 
coverage, these 24 are treated as if they were prefectural cities in 2000. This was 
easily done because each is a single district that had been either a county-level 
                                                          
38
 The urban core of a prefectural city is made up of adjacent districts (shiqu). The exceptions in 
our data are ten districts of Chongqing (Puling, Wansheng, Shuangqiao, Changshou, Jiangjin, 
Hechuan, Yongchuan, Nanchuan, Wanzhou and Qianjiang) that are excluded due to being largely 
non-urbanized and only recently upgraded from county-level city or county status, plus four 
districts of Wuhan (Caidian, Jianxia, Huangpi and Xinzhou) and one from Kunming (Dongchuan) 
that are similar to county-level cities or counties.   
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city or county in 2000. Moreover, the lower thresholds set on the estimation 
samples (see below) exclude 20 of these 24, so our inclusive approach to treating 
them as if they were cores of prefectural cities in 2000 should not cause bias. 
We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate:  
ln(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘) = 𝛼 − 𝛽 ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) + 𝜀                            (1) 
with ?̂? the Pareto exponent and  a random error. The special case of ?̂? = 1 is 
Zipf’s law.39 Prior studies for China mainly use this specification (e.g., Anderson 
and Ge, 2005; Liang, 2010; Li and Sui, 2013) or else a specification of Gabaix 
and Ibragimov (2006) that shifts city ranks by 0.5 but gives similar results (Xu 
and Zhu, 2009; Chen et al, 2013). We estimate equation (1) with four measures of 
city size and city rank: the non-agricultural hukou population (NA) and the urban 
resident population (U) for 2000, and for 2010. Comparing results for NA and U 
helps to assess possible bias in prior studies that only use NA to measure city size. 
Comparing 2000 and 2010 shows if the city size distribution is converging. 
A typical pattern if equation (1) is compared with a scatter plot is for the 
lower tail to be flatter, due to ‘cities’ too small to distinguish from rural areas 
(Brakman et al, 1999). Studies set various lower thresholds to exclude small cities 
(Giesen et al, 2010). For example, thresholds for China range from 80,000 (Xu 
and Zhu, 2009) or 100,000 (Anderson and Ge, 2005; Liang, 2010) to 200,000 and 
500,000 (Chen et al, 2013), and also use relative values such as the smallest city 
in the top 70% of cities (Li and Sui, 2013) and rolling sample approaches that 
constantly change the threshold (Peng, 2010). Thresholds such as 80,000 once 
                                                          
39
 Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) suggest Pareto exponents between 0.8 and 1.2 are consistent with 
Zipf’s law. 
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coincided with official city size definitions but are less relevant now due to 
growth in average city size. Our approach is to set a threshold for the indicator 
that most reliably measures city size (the urban resident count) and hold constant 
the proportion of cities below that threshold in the other samples. A threshold of 
0.3 million for U in 2010 excludes n=36 (one-eighth) of the total sample (only 2% 
of the urban population are in these small cities). In order to also drop the smallest 
one-eighth of cities for each of the other three samples, thresholds of 0.204 
million for urban residents in 2000, and 0.147 and 0.197 million for the non-
agricultural hukou counts in 2000 and 2010 are used. These four estimation 
samples, each of n=251, are used in the rest of this study. 
Comparing estimated Pareto exponents gives a general idea of dynamics in 
the city size distribution and if it is converging but does not show where change is 
occurring. Kernel density plots of relative city size can show this, and these are 
presented below for all four samples. The Markov transition matrix is another 
nonparametric approach that we use, dividing cities in each of our four samples 
into six groups defined by cut-points at 0.4, 0.6, 1.2, 2, and 4 times the population 
of the average city in a particular sample.
40
 The higher the Markov transition 
probability for moving into a new group between 2000 and 2010, the less stable 
are cities in the original size range.  
We also consider deviations of actual city size from the size predicted by 
Pareto’s Law, given a particular city rank: 
                                                          
40
 For the urban resident population (U) in the 2010 census, these relative cut-points correspond to 
0.56 million (m), 0.84m, 1.69m, 2.80m, and 5.63m. These ranges are quite similar to those 
announced by the State Council in 2014 for adjusting standards for categorizing city sizes; 0.5 
million, 1m, 3m, 5m, and 10 million except that the very small cities are divided into two groups 
with another threshold at 0.2 million in the State Council guidelines. 
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 𝑆𝑖𝑧?̂? = exp (
ln(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘)−?̂?
?̂?
) ⁡                                  (2) 
where equation (2) is applied to each of our four samples. These deviations show 
where, from the standpoint of Pareto’s Law, cities are made ‘too large’ or ‘too 
small’ by either policy (showing up when using the NA hukou count to measure 
cities) or by the choices of migrants (showing up when using the urban resident 
count). We then see where these ‘oversized’ or ‘undersized’ cities move in the 
distribution over time and consider what may cause these moves.  
For example, if the lowest ranked cities are made too large by pro-small 
policy biases, it should show up as deviations from Pareto’s law when using the 
NA hukou count, and the Kernel density and Markov transition matrix would 
show movement of small cities into the middle-sized groups. This would be a case 
of urban planning and other policy biases causing a more even city size 
distribution. Existing studies for China show this, with Pareto exponents rising 
over time, and authors attribute this either to the growth of small cities (e.g. 
Anderson and Ge, 2005; Xu and Zhu, 2009) or to restrictions on large cities (e.g. 
Chen et al, 2013; Li and Sui, 2013). But if this pattern is not apparent when using 
data on the urban resident population, it suggests a statistical artefact in previous 
studies, resulting from city size in China being measured in terms of hukou 
registration rather than by the count of how many people actually live in each city. 
The comparison between city sizes under planning and city sizes based on 
decisions of migrants can also be examined more directly. The number of non-
hukou migrants (M) in each city in 2010 can be calculated as: 
 𝑀⁡2010 = 𝑈⁡2010 − 𝑁𝐴⁡2010                 (3) 
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and we can compare the actual stock of incoming and outgoing migrants in 2010 
with the movement of people needed in order for the city size distribution to 
exactly follow Pareto’s Law. That is, we can use equation (2) to calculate the 
predicted size for each city in terms of both urban residents and non-agricultural 
hukou holders and then examine hypothetical flows based on the deviation of the 
two actual population series from these two predictions:
41
 
 𝑀⁡2010̂ = 𝑆𝑖𝑧?̂? − 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒                               (4) 
The comparison of the actual stock of migrants with the hypothetical number that 
would hold under Pareto’s Law can identify whether it is large or small cities that 
have already taken in enough migrants and what type of cities can take in more. 
4.3 RESULTS 
The results of estimating equation (1) on the four samples are reported in Table 1 
and the raw data and fitted trends are shown in Figure 1. The first notable finding 
is that measuring city size by the number of hukou registrations (NA) makes 
Pareto exponents significantly larger than if cities are measured by their number 
of residents.
42
 Larger Pareto exponents imply a more even distribution of city 
sizes (and a more steeply sloped trend line in Figure 1 since small changes in city 
size are associated with larger changes in rank). Intuitively, ignoring non-hukou 
residents, as existing studies have done, leads one to miss the fact that most 
migrants congregate into a few large cities, and being blind to this pattern wrongly 
implies a more even city size distribution.  
                                                          
41
 This comparison is restricted to the n=244 cities that are common to the NA 2010 and U 2010 
samples. 
42
 Equality of the Pareto exponents using NA versus U is rejected at p=0.000 for both 2000 and 
2010. 
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Figure 1. Rank-size Plot 
 
Notes: The number of observations is 251 for all four samples (NA 2000, U 2000, NA 2010 and U 2010) whose details are in Appendix Table 1. 
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Table 1. Rank-size Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Ln(Rank NA 2000) Ln(Rank U 2000) Ln(Rank NA 2010) Ln(Rank U 2010) 
Ln(NA 2000) 1.251    
 (0.011)***    
Ln(U 2000)  1.207   
  (0.011)***   
Ln(NA 2010)   1.169  
   (0.013)***  
Ln(U 2010)    1.147 
    (0.009)*** 
Constant 3.542 4.002 4.026 4.386 
 (0.012)*** (0.010)*** (0.012)*** (0.008)*** 
Observations 251 251 251 251 
Adjusted R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significantly different from 0 (constant) or 1 (for the Pareto exponent) at p=0.01 confidence level. NA is the non-agricultural 
hukou population and U is the urban resident population. See Appendix Table 1 for details. 
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Figure 2. Relative City Size Distribution  
Notes: City size is relative to the mean of each distribution, as described in Appendix Table 1. 
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But even with the smaller Pareto coefficients for city size measured in 
terms of residents, the null hypothesis of 1  is rejected and so Zipf’s Law does 
not hold. This confirms prior studies for China that find evidence against the 
parallel growth of cities (Chen et al, 2013). It is thus unlikely that city size growth 
processes in China follow Gibrat’s Law of a common expected growth rate and 
standard deviation (giving the Zipf’s Law pattern in the steady state). This may 
reflect the powerful force of central and local government in shaping the city size 
distribution.  
The second notable finding in Table 1 is that Pareto exponents fell 
significantly from 2000 to 2010, regardless of whether city size is from counting 
residents or from counting the number of non-agricultural hukou registrations. 
Thus, the city size distribution in China became less even over the decade; this 
divergence is not something noted in the prior literature. Indeed, some studies 
claim the reverse, of a convergence in the city size distribution (e.g. Anderson and 
Ge, 2005; Xu and Zhu, 2009). Regressions cannot show where the divergence in 
city size occurs but the kernel densities in Figure 2 give some clues, especially if 
using the urban resident population (we contend this is the most correct measure 
of city size). In particular, it seems that between 2000 and 2010 there has been a 
movement away from the middle of the distribution, with a fall in the proportion 
of cities that are from 0.4 to two times the mean size, and rises in the proportions 
that are either smaller than 0.4 of the mean or larger than twice the mean.
43
  
 
                                                          
43
 This contrasts with Anderson and Ge (2005) whose Kernel density plot shows a rise in the 
number of cities in the center of the distribution. But their sample mixes together county-level 
cities, which often are not very urbanized, with genuine urban cores (districts). 
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Table 2. Markov Transition Matrices for City Size Groups 
Using the Urban Resident Population Using the Non-agricultural hukou Population 
U 2010 
U 2000 
NA 2010 
NA 2000 
S SM M LM L VL S SM M LM L VL 
S 79.2% 41.9% 
    
S 78.5% 37.3% 
    
(89) (57)
a
 (26) 
    
(80) (51)
a
 (25)
a
 
    
SM 12.5% 46.8% 31.8% 
   
SM 12.3% 43.3% 17.1% 
   
(59) (9) (29) (21) 
   
(49) (8) (29) (12) 
   
M 
 
9.7% 65.2% 32.1% 
  
M 3.1% 13.4% 71.4% 24% 
  
(58) 
 
(6) (43) (9) 
  
(67) (2) (9) (50) (6) 
  
LM 
 
1.6% 1.5% 50% 
  
LM 1.5% 4.5% 10% 60% 29.4% 
 
(16) 
 
(1) (1) (14) 
  
(31) (1) (3) (7) (15) (5) 
 
L 
   
17.9% 85.7% 
 
L 
  
1.4% 12% 58.8% 
 
(17) 
   
(5) (12) 
 
(14) 
  
(1) (3) (10) 
 
VL 
  
1.5% 
 
14.3% 100% VL 
   
4% 11.8% 100% 
(12) 
  
(1) 
 
(2) (9) (10) 
   
(1) (2) (7) 
Total 91.7% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Total 95.4% 98.5% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(251) (72) (62) (66) (28) (14) (9) (251) (65) (67) (70) (25) (17) (7) 
Notes: Transition probability (in %) is calculated by dividing the number of cities that move to a size range in 2010 by the total of cities in the range they left in 2000. 
The number of cities in each cell is in ( ), with 251 cities in total. The abbreviations S, SM, M, LM, L, and VL stand for small, small medium, medium, large medium, large 
and very large, and are based on cut-points of 0.4, 0.6, 1.2, 2, and 4 times the mean city size (as measured by either U or NA, in either 2000 or 2010). 
a
 A city that was below the threshold size in 2000 occurs in this size range in 2010 or vice versa. These cities are counted in the column total, but not in the particular cell, to 
restrict attention to cities that were in the size categories considered here (above the threshold for sample inclusion) in both years. 
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Further evidence on dispersion away from the medium size range comes 
from the Markov transition matrices for city size groups reported in Table 2 
according to residents (left panel) or non-agricultural hukou holders (right panel). 
Cut-points of 0.4, 0.6, 1.2, 2, and 4 times mean city size define groups we label as 
‘small’, ‘small-medium’, ‘medium’, ‘large-medium’, ‘large’, and ‘very large’ in 
the table. The small-medium, medium, and large-medium cities have the lowest 
odds of staying in the same resident size range from 2000 to 2010, with 
probabilities from 47% to 65%. In contrast, 79% of small cities, and (100%) 86% 
of (very) large cities stay in the same size range between the two censuses. For 
cities starting in the middle size ranges and moving into a different group, usually 
it is a move downwards, indicating a fall in size relative to the mean. While 
upward moves are less common they do include the only instances of moves to 
non-adjacent groups, which are both from Guangdong province; Foshan went 
from medium size in 2000 to very large in 2010 and Huizhou went from small-
medium size to large-medium. The example of Foshan shows the error in using 
the count of non-agricultural hukou holders as a measure of city size; there were 
3.7 million people whose non-agricultural hukou registration in 2010 was from 
Foshan but the census reveals that the resident population of this city was almost 
twice as large, at 6.8 million. 
The risk of misunderstanding city size dynamics from using the count of 
local hukou holders as a measure of city size can be seen by comparing the two 
panels in Table 2. When the hukou count is used, instability in the middle of the 
size range is obscured; there is no clear pattern of lower transition probabilities 
along the main diagonal once one goes below the very large size group. In 
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contrast, when cities are classified according to their residents it is clear that for 
sizes from small-medium to large-medium there is a substantial chance of 
dispersion; cities in the middle of the main diagonal had much lower odds of 
staying in the same size groups between 2000 and 2010 than did cities who started 
in the tails of the distribution. The different patterns for the two matrices are due 
to the fact that the number of non-agricultural hukou holders for a city evolves 
only slowly over time, given that hukou status is inherited and hard to convert, 
and so misses the rapid changes in size that can come from migrants voting with 
their feet. 
The driving forces behind stability of relatively small to medium cities, 
and dispersion of medium to large cities, are likely to include both pro-small 
policy biases and choices made by migrants. Consider first restrictions that may 
make small cities bigger than one would expect from their rank in the city-size 
distribution (with expected size from the benchmark provided by Pareto’s Law, 
taken here as a proxy for what the city size distribution may have looked like if 
China had a market economy history). If those enlarged cities attract few migrants 
(they may be unattractive locations whose size reflects planning decisions rather 
than market outcomes) they eventually become relatively smaller if measured by 
the number of residents (which includes the non-hukou migrants). In other words, 
migrants who vote with their feet by not going to these destinations help return 
them back to a smaller relative size more in keeping with what is predicted by 
their rank under the Pareto distribution. This pattern describes the Markov 
transition matrix in the left panel of Table 2 that uses residents to classify cities; 
an average of 35% of the cities that were large-medium, medium, or small-
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medium in 2000 had fallen into the next lower size category by 2010. In contrast, 
when the size groupings are according to the hukou count, just 26% of cities in 
these size ranges, on average, had fallen into a lower size range by 2010 due to the 
slower evolution of the spatial pattern of hukou registrations. 
There are too few migrants to overcome the fact that the largest cities 
remain undersized, in terms of Pareto’s Law. Consider the top seven cities by 
urban resident population in 2010; all are well below the Figure 1 trend line 
showing the size needed to fit an exact Pareto distribution. The shift to the right 
needed to move data points for those seven cities on to the trend line is a crude 
indicator of how many more migrants are needed to produce cities of the right size 
for their rank. Why do these cities have too few migrants? One possibility is that 
potential migrants are deterred by extremely high housing costs that result from 
restrictions on urban land expansion for the largest cities. For example, Li and 
Gibson (2014) use a hedonic model to compare apartment prices across Chinese 
cities; for a city like Beijing (ranked 2
nd
 by size) the prices are 230% higher than 
for a city like Changsha (ranked 27
th
 by size). It may be that those wanting to 
move into very large Chinese cities are deterred by the high housing costs and 
instead go into large and large-medium cities like Changsha. In fact, most of the 
cities in Figure 1 for sizes between two million and five million residents 
(including Changsha) seem much larger than what the Pareto distribution would 
predict (so are above the trend line). The deviation above the trend line for this 
group of cities was much less apparent in 2000, when house prices were more 
equal. 
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Figure 3. Stock of non-hukou Migrants 2010 and Hypothetical Stock Needed for Exact Pareto Distributions Versus City Size 
Notes: Relative size is according to the mean city size by urban residents in 2010.  The stocks of actual and hypothetical migrants are based on equations (3) and (4). 
The number of observations is 244, which are the cities that are common to both the NA 2010 and U 2010 samples. 
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The destination choices of non-hukou migrants, and the scope for cities to 
absorb more, are shown by applying equations (3) and (4) and comparing the 
results to the size of each city. In Figure 3 this is done for all 244 cities that are 
common to the NA and U samples for 2010 (so the city is in the largest 87.5% of 
cities according to both counts). The stock of non-hukou migrants (from equation 
(3)) ranges from over seven million for Shanghai and Shenzhen (ranked 1
st
 and 3
rd
 
by residents) to -1.5 million for Shantou (ranked 18
th
 by residents, but 5
th
 in terms 
of non-agricultural hukou registrations), and these stocks are shown by the red 
squares in the figure. The hypothetical number of extra non-hukou migrants to 
give an exact Pareto distribution in terms of the number of residents is shown by 
the green triangle markers, and to give an exact Pareto distribution in terms of 
non-agricultural hukou registrations is shown by the blue circles. These 
hypothetical values come from equation (4) and they can be negative, which 
corresponds to cities that were larger in 2010 than what would be predicted from 
the rank of that city. 
This exercise suggests that the scope to absorb more non-hukou migrants 
is mainly limited to the very large cities, defined as those with four or more times 
the mean number of residents. The cut-points that give the six size groups (from 
“very large” to “small”) are shown by the vertical lines on Figure 3, and the 
tabulation of the results based on these size classes is in Table 3. Consider the 12 
cities in the “very large” size class; in 2010 these were the home to 47 million 
non-hukou migrants. For each of those cities their number of urban residents 
exceeded their non-agricultural hukou (so there are no net out-migrants). In the 
next class of cities, the migrants total 19 million and are funneled into 16 cities. 
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One city in this size range (Shantou) has 1.5 million out-migrants (that is, the 
number of urban residents is fewer than the number of people registered with non-
agricultural hukou from here). The large-medium and medium size classes each 
hold 14-15 million migrants while the small-medium and small size classes each 
hold 8-9 million migrants, and these are spread over many cities. The three 
smallest size classes also include 22 cities that are the source of 3.5 million out-
migrants (that is, the number of people with non-agricultural hukou from these 
cities exceeded their number of urban residents in the 2010 census). 
When attention shifts from the actual pattern of migration to the 
hypothetical pattern needed to produce exact Pareto distributions for city size and 
rank, the relevant values are shown in the last four columns of Table 3. Consider 
the results for urban residents in 2010; an extra 52.6 million migrants could go 
into ten of the very large cities while 0.6 million could leave the other two very 
large cities and the resulting size distribution would sit exactly on the trend line 
shown in Figure 1. The other main change to get an exact Pareto distribution is for 
the large and large-medium cities to have about ten million fewer migrants (by 
moving them into the very large size class). This result is just another way of 
noting the pattern from Figure 1; cities between 1.2 and 4 times the mean city size 
(in terms of residents these are cities of from two million to five million people in 
2010) seem larger than what would be predicted from their rank under an exact 
Pareto distribution while the very largest cities are smaller than what is predicted. 
For the three smallest size groups in Table 3, the extra inward or outward 
migration needed to get to an exact Pareto distribution never amounts to more 
than one million people per group. 
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Table 3. Stocks of non-hukou Migrants and Hypothetical Number Needed for Exact Pareto Distributions in 2010 
City Size Groups (based on 2010 resident 
count) 
  
Hypothetical Extra Migration to Give an Exact Pareto 
Distribution 
Actual Urban Residents 2010 Non-agricultural hukou 2010 
In Out In Out In Out 
Very Large 46.58 
 
52.63 -0.64 41.02 -0.07 
 
(12) 
 
(10) (2) (11) (1) 
Large 19.21 -1.52 0.42 -4.41 3.59 -0.71 
 
(16) (1) (3) (14) (9) (8) 
Large-Medium 13.63 
  
-6.26 0.05 -1.12 
 
(16) 
  
(16) (1) (15) 
Medium 15.12 -0.94 0.38 -0.98 0.02 -4.51 
 
(53) (5) (25) (33) (1) (57) 
Small-Medium 8.77 -1.74 0.03 -1.13 0.09 -2.75 
 
(52) (7) (8) (51) (10) (49) 
Small 8.28 -0.83 1.31 -0.38 1.92 -0.89 
 
(72) (10) (44) (38) (53) (29) 
Total 111.59 -5.04 54.77 -13.80 46.69 -10.05 
 
(221) (23) (90) (154) (85) (159) 
Notes: The number of actual and hypothetical migrants is in millions, with the number of cities in ( ). N= 244 based on cities common to the samples for NA 2010 and U 
2010. 
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The hypothetical migration needed for an exact Pareto distribution for the 
non-agricultural hukou population of each city is quite different. First the scale of 
required migration is much smaller, with a net influx of just 37 million (from 46.7 
million coming in and ten million going out). The measures of city size using the 
hukou registered population ignore existing non-hukou migrants so this 37 million 
should be compared with the sum of the actual number of non-hukou migrants 
(112 million) plus the 41 million net extra migrants needed to get to an exact 
Pareto distribution. In other words, if de jure city size is used rather than the 
correct de facto measure, it appears that only about one-quarter as many people 
have to move around to have cities that are the right size for their rank as is truly 
the case. There are two reasons for this; first, measuring cities by how many 
hukou registrations they have already starts out with a seemingly more even 
distribution since the funneling of most non-hukou migrants into just a few 
destination cities is ignored, and second, the Pareto distribution for the non-hukou 
count is more evenly spread than is the one for the resident count (Table 1 and 
Figure 1) so it takes less movement to get to this target. 
The second difference between using the hukou count and the resident 
count, in terms of the hypothetical migration to have cities that are the right size 
for their rank, is a lack of apparent ‘queuing’ for the very large cities. When cities 
are measured in terms of residents, the large and large-medium size groups seem 
to have ‘too many’ migrants; removing ten million of them and transferring them 
into the very large cities would give sizes more consistent with the Pareto 
distribution. One plausible explanation for this pattern is that potential migrants 
are deterred from moving to very large cities by extremely high housing costs that 
 109 
 
  
 
result from restrictions on urban land expansion and so they instead move to large 
and large-medium cities where housing costs may be less than half of those in the 
largest cities. But this pattern is not apparent when city size is measured by the 
hukou count, and it is the small-medium and medium sized cities that appear to be 
the most over-sized (for their rank). The number of people with non-agricultural 
hukou registration for a particular place does not reflect individual behavioral 
choices and instead reflects (past) planning decisions, so there is no obvious 
reason for why the hukou count for these types of cities appears too large for their 
rank.  
Despite these differences between the two sets of results for hypothetical 
migration, a key point from Table 3 is their similarity in showing that it is only the 
very large cities with scope to accept many more non-hukou migrants, from the 
standpoint of having city sizes that more closely follow a Pareto distribution. This 
finding is interesting because it contrasts with the views of leaders such as Xi 
Jinping and also because it potentially informs us about the nature of China’s 
evolving urban system. The limited capacity of small and medium sized cities to 
absorb migrants, either in terms of the actual stock in 2010 or the hypothetical 
number of extra migrants to get to an exact Pareto distribution, shows that an 
urbanization process of nearby rural-urban migrants going to live in small, local 
cities is unlikely to succeed in transforming China into a fully urbanized country. 
Instead, it is the agglomeration processes that not only absorb nearby rural-urban 
migrants but also take in inter-regional rural-urban and urban-urban migrants that 
are a key to China’s urban transition. Moreover, it is the very large cities, and not 
the small towns, that provide agglomeration-related productivity advantages. 
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These advantages appear to operate only in the tertiary sector and not in the 
secondary sector activities like construction and manufacturing that increasingly 
spread out of urban districts and into smaller towns between 2000 and 2010 (Li 
and Gibson, 2015). Thus, a focus on directing migrants into small cities will not 
put them into the places that they are likely to be the most productive, and this 
misallocation will be especially costly as China rebalances the economy by 
developing the under-sized services sector and reducing reliance on the over-sized 
manufacturing sector (Ghani, 2012). 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Starting from a positive standard, of how China’s urban system is evolving, we 
uncover two facts obscured by prior studies. First, measuring cities by their 
number of non-agricultural hukou registrations – as previous studies have done – 
causes Pareto exponents to seem larger than they actually are. These prior studies 
miss the funneling of non-hukou migrants into just a few large cities and once this 
fact is missed, statistical inquiries into Pareto and other distributions tend to find a 
more even city size distribution than truly exists. This bias is exacerbated by 
studies that include county-level cities in their samples, despite such ‘cities’ 
lacking an urban core (Roberts et al, 2012). The second fact that is not apparent 
from prior studies is that the city size distribution in China is becoming less even 
over time with movement out of the middle of the size distribution between 2000 
and 2010. In contrast, previous studies have highlighted an apparent move 
towards a more even distribution of city sizes in China. 
 Our analysis then adopts a normative standard, by using Pareto’s Law as a 
benchmark to evaluate China’s evolving urban system. Pareto’s Law holds well in 
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market economies, so the parts of China’s urban system that deviate from Pareto’s 
Law may be a legacy of the command economy era and both historic and current 
urban planning and land use policies. This normative analysis suggests that even 
though the largest cities look gigantic relative to other cities (for example, 
Shanghai with 20.2 million residents in 2010 is almost double the size of the 3
rd
 
largest city and triple the size of the 7
th
 largest) they actually are too small 
according to the size they ought to be as the top ranked cities in the urban 
hierarchy. Thus, it is the very large cities that appear too small and have the most 
scope for absorbing more migrants in order to become the right size for their rank. 
In contrast, when judging from the standpoint of a Pareto distribution, there is 
almost no scope for small to medium cities to absorb more migrants despite policy 
biases and statements from political leaders in favor of directing migrants towards 
these small cities.  
This result suggests that the focus of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-
2010) on the development of metropolitan regions was broadly appropriate, but 
the current swing towards a pro-small policy bias is not. For example, rather the 
recent policy to make land outside of the largest cities as “permanent basic 
farmland” a better focus for rules on urban land expansion might be to more 
strictly regulate farmland conversion by small and medium-sized Chinese cities. 
Also, reforms to governance and public finance that see less tax revenue 
transferred from local to central government or fewer responsibilities left for local 
government to fund from their own budgets may reduce the reliance of these 
smaller cities on revenue from land auctions.  
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Finally, we note that in using Pareto’s Law as a normative standard to 
judge China’s city size distribution we are relying on this as a proxy for what city 
sizes look like in societies with a less distorted urban past than China. Of course, 
there is debate in many countries about which distribution best fits the urban 
hierarchy, with some studies suggesting Pareto’s Law only fits the upper tail (e.g. 
Eeckhout 2004, 2009), and distributions such as the log-normal, q-exponential 
and double Pareto log-normal are often proposed (e.g. Anderson and Ge, 2005; 
Soo, 2007; Giesen et al, 2010). It would be an interesting question for future 
research to see if the normative result found here, that it is the very large cities in 
China that are best placed to accept more migrants, would also be found using 
these other distributions. 
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Appendix Table 1. Details on the Four Sub-Samples Used in the Estimation 
 
Sub-Sample Name 
 
NA 2000 U 2000 NA 2010 U 2010 
Share of population from districts in all prefectures, that are in sub-sample 97.8% 97.9% 98.0% 97.8% 
Actual City Size 
    
Minimum (threshold for inclusion in the sub-sample) 0.147 0.204 0.199 0.301 
Median  0.386 0.552 0.571 0.698 
Mean (used to divide cities into the six size classes in Tables 2 and 3) 0.666 0.975 0.979 1.407 
Maximum  9.382 13.460 12.286 20.218 
Predicted City Size (equation (2)) 
    
Minimum 0.205 0.283 0.277 0.370 
Median  0.356 0.501 0.500 0.676 
Mean 0.722 1.074 1.126 1.571 
Maximum  16.953 27.558 31.274 45.794 
Stock of non-hukou migrants in 2010 (equation (3)) 
    
Minimum 
  
-1.523 
Median  
  
0.166 
Mean 
  
0.437 
Maximum  
  
7.931 
Hypothetical extra migrants for exact Pareto distribution to hold according to NA or U 
   
Minimum 
  
-0.176 -0.613 
Median  
  
-0.037 -0.008 
Mean 
  
0.150 0.168 
Maximum  
  
18.988 25.576 
Notes: NA is the non-agricultural hukou registered population and U is the urban resident population. Each sub-sample has 251 observations, and represents the largest 87.5% 
of cities for each indicator and each year, except migration calculations that are based on the union of NA and U (n=244). Numbers are in millions. 
Sources: MPS (2001, 2011); NBS (2003, 2011, 2012).   
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Urbanization Economies in China: Nature, Location, and Effects 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The nature and location of urbanization economies and their effects on 
productivity per worker in China are examined. Unlike previous studies, more 
accurate resident-based measures of urban scale from the 2010 census are used. 
The size of urbanization economies is similar to those in other countries and they 
occur only in bigger cities and not in smaller towns, and operate only through 
tertiary sector activity. Efforts by government to disperse urbanization, through 
land use and migration restrictions, and by stimulating construction and 
manufacturing in China’s counties are unlikely to create beneficial agglomeration 
effects. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Spatial concentration of economic activity is an inherent feature of market 
economies (World Bank, 2009) and is socially beneficial since firms and workers 
are more productive in dense and populous urban areas (Puga, 2010). After three 
decades of market reforms in China, firms and workers are no longer trapped in 
place by either the central plan or by the hukou household registration system, 
allowing spatially concentrated patterns of development to emerge. This change is 
also reflected in the academic literature, with several recent studies estimating the 
size of agglomeration effects in China (e.g., Au and Henderson, 2006; Xu, 2009; 
Combes et al, 2015). These effects are the positive externalities due either to 
localization economies from firms being near to other firms in the same industry 
or to urbanization economies arising from the scale of an area and the diversity of 
its economy. 
 These existing studies rely on inappropriate measures of city scale, so 
findings need to be re-examined with better data. One problem is that sub-national 
population counts for China were not reliable before 2010 because they are for the 
population with local hukou registration (a de jure measure) and not the resident 
population (a de facto measure).
44
 For example, Xu (2009) uses the local hukou 
registered population for cities from 1990 to 1997, ignoring urban residents who 
had their hukou registration from elsewhere; at the time these non-hukou urban 
                                                          
44
 Li and Gibson (2013) discuss this data problem, which biases even simple descriptive claims. 
For example, Au and Henderson (2006: page 557) say China had nine cities over 3 million and 
125 of 1-3 million in 2000; a ratio of large to small cities (0.07) well below the global average of 
0.27. But measured by residents in the 2000 census, China had 20 cities over 3 million and 89 
cities of 1-3 million; a ratio of 0.23. The 2010 census has 38 cities with residents over 3 million 
versus 97 cities of 1-3 million, giving a large-to-small ratio of 0.39. Using the local hukou 
registered population rather than the resident population makes the ratio just 0.18. 
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residents numbered more than 100 million (Chan, 2012). Other statistical sources 
also are incomplete, perhaps because they continue to be collected and reported as 
they were when China was a state-run economy. For example, Au and Henderson 
(2006) measure city scale by employment but many private sector workers do not 
get counted in the data they use.
45
 Combes et al (2015) use urban density rather 
than employment or population counts, but their survey data are from a sample 
frame that excludes those urban residents whose hukou registration is from 
elsewhere.  
 In light of these data issues, this paper uses 2010 census of population data 
to study the nature, location, and magnitude of urbanization economies in China 
using more accurate measures of city scale. Another contrast with existing studies 
is that we test for urbanization economies over the entire hierarchy of urban units 
in China while previous studies tend to concentrate on one particular type of urban 
unit. Our results suggest positive effects of urban scale on productivity that are of 
similar size to those found in other countries, but these effects occur only for 
urban districts (containing the core of prefectural cities) and not for county-level 
cities and smaller towns, and operate only through tertiary sector activity. Census 
data from 2000 and 2010 show that tertiary sector activity is ever more 
concentrated in the urban districts while secondary sector activity – especially 
construction and manufacturing – is moving into counties. Hence, these results 
imply that efforts to disperse urbanization towards counties and county-level cities 
                                                          
45
 Au and Henderson use City Statistical Yearbook (CSY) data, where ‘private sector’ employment 
was titled as self-employed (with a very low share of the total) so employees are apparently 
excluded. Long-form census data on employment by sector in 2010 show that CSY substantially 
undercounts overall employment, with an average of only 43 percent of the employment for each 
city that the census reports in the same year. 
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will not generate beneficial agglomeration effects. 
 Understanding the nature of urbanization economies is one of the most 
policy-relevant research questions in China, where there is debate about whether 
small and medium-sized cities should be favored over expansion of existing 
mega-cities like Shanghai. Public policy in many places tries to foster 
agglomeration effects by luring mobile industry, by building clusters, or by 
attracting ‘talent’ (Combes et al 2011). But efforts to shape urban structure are 
especially salient in China. There is a long history of planning policies that affect 
city size and location and even in the early reform era policy aimed to limit 
growth of big cities and favor small ones. The 1990 ‘City Planning Law’ 
(Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengshi Guihua Fa) mandated ‘strictly 
controlling the size of large cities and developing medium-sized and small cities’ 
(Xu, 2009). Many new cities in this era were simply relabeled counties; this 
experiment of creating cities was deemed a failure and was ended in the late 
1990s (Fan et al, 2012). A period of more even-handed policy treatment followed, 
with the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) seeking balanced development of 
large, medium-sized, and small cities and the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-
2010) emphasizing development of metropolitan regions. In tune with this more 
even-handed approach, the 1990 ‘City Planning Law’ was replaced in 2008 by a 
new ‘Urban and Rural Planning Law’ (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengxiang 
Guihua Fa) and the key phrase “strictly controlling the size of large cities” was 
dropped from the law (Fan et al, 2012).  
 But the policy pendulum is again swinging against the biggest cities. In 
2014 President Xi Jinping announced hukou reforms to assist rural migrants into 
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small towns and county-level cities but restrict their access to bigger cities: “…the 
overall principle is to fully remove hukou restrictions in towns and small cities, 
gradually ease restrictions in medium-sized cities, set reasonable conditions for 
settling in big cities, and strictly control the population of megacities”. 46  In 
addition to ongoing hukou controls, big city growth also may be limited by land 
use controls. Citing food security concerns, land on the outskirts of the biggest 
cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou is being classified as “permanent 
basic farmland” to be used only for cultivation. In announcing these controls the 
Minister for Land and Resources, Jiang Daming, claimed that good farmland has 
been ‘eaten by steel and cement’.47 
 In spite of this pro-small policy bias, millions of non-hukou migrants 
voting with their feet seem to prefer large cities.
48
 Our analysis of the 2010 census 
of population reveals two population relocation processes: First, there is an 
agglomeration process where about 1400 locations lost people due to non-hukou 
migration and just over 400 locations gained people; three-quarters of the gain is 
from 43 cities with more than 0.5 million migrants each. The second process is 
urbanization without agglomeration, which sees migrants without non-agricultural 
hukou found in over 1000 dispersed urban locations.
49
 The strength of the 
agglomeration process is shown by there even being some cities that are losing 
                                                          
46
 A report on the speech is here:  
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0607/c90785-8738238.html. 
47
 Details are in Xinhua 2014-11-04: 
 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/03/c_133763130.htm  
48
 Non-hukou migrants are people who move somewhere other than where their hukou registration 
is from without converting either their type of hukou (agricultural or non-agricultural) or their 
place of registration (hukou suozaidi). 
49
 The number of urban migrants in each urban unit is calculated as urban residents in the 2010 
census minus the number with non-agricultural hukou registration for that place and totals 216 
million. 
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population, because increasingly mobile workers and firms judge these cities as 
unsuitable locations for realizing urbanization economies, contrary to what central 
planners might once have thought. Given this mis-match between where migrants 
go and where urban planning policy may try to direct them, research on the nature 
and location of urbanization economies in China may contribute to better policy 
settings.  
 The next section gives a brief review of prior studies of agglomeration 
effects in China. Section 3 discusses the data, paying attention to China’s different 
spatial units. Results from the 2010 census of population are used to describe the 
agglomeration and urbanization processes in Section 4, with changes in the 
economic structure of various spatial units examined using long form census data 
on sectors of employment in 2000 and 2010. The econometric specification and 
the empirical results for the elasticities of output with respect to urban scale are 
discussed in Section 5. These results include comparisons between economic 
sectors, and between types of spatial units. The conclusions are in Section 6. 
5.2 PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
In one of the first and most widely cited studies for China, Au and Henderson 
(2006) found that output per worker had an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
city size in data from 205 cities in the 1990s.
50
 The productivity cost of small 
cities (below the peak of the inverted U) exceeded that for oversized cities and 
these authors note that most Chinese cities were smaller than the peak point. This 
paper is the source of the often repeated claim that China has too many small 
cities, and foregoes agglomeration-based productivity gains as a result. But the 
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 Specifically they use data for urban districts within some prefectural cities. 
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data Au and Henderson (2006) use may not be the best for drawing these 
conclusions. They use city yearbooks that at the time only counted local hukou 
holders and did not include employees in private sector firms. But the GDP data 
reflected output of both private and state sector workers, and the consumption of 
both the locally registered hukou population and the city residents with hukou 
from elsewhere. Hence, the measured scale of cities should reflect both types of 
population and the employment denominator for GDP should cover all types of 
workers. 
 A similar miscounting problem likely affects results reported by Xu 
(2009), who finds positive effects of city population and density on productivity 
(GDP per worker) using city-level panel data for urban districts in 155 prefectural 
cities in the 1990s. City size is from the locally registered population rather than 
from the actual number of residents, so it greatly understates the size of cities with 
many non-hukou residents. The GDP per worker data also have problems since 
city yearbooks did not count all private sector employees. It is thus unclear if the 
estimate of peak productivity at a city size of four million people is valid, which 
may undermine Xu’s conclusion that most of China’s cities are too small to 
achieve this peak level of productivity. 
 One way to sidestep problems with the employment denominator is to use 
survey data on wages, which is the approach of Combes et al (2015). But findings 
in this study also may be distorted since the employment density variable is just 
for workers with local hukou, while the share of workers whose hukou is from 
elsewhere augments the ‘native’ density. The reason for separating these effects is 
unclear since non-hukou residents should be an intrinsic part of urbanization 
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economies, but it may reflect limitations in the Urban Household Survey, which 
excludes non-hukou residents from the sampling frame. Aside from this concern, 
an important contribution is made by Combes et al (2015) in showing that 
workers in China do not appear to sort across cities, in terms of variation in the 
measured productive qualities of workers in cities of various sizes.
51
 
Consequently, micro data are not needed to control for cross-city variation in 
worker characteristics when urbanization economies are being estimated. This is 
advantageous since most survey data in China have gaps in sample frames due to 
the exclusion of non-hukou urban residents. Using city-level data rather than 
worker- or firm-level data is common in the literature on urbanization economies, 
and in the meta-analysis of Melo et al (2009) the choice of data type is shown to 
have no influence on results. 
 In addition to these estimates of urbanization economies, a related 
literature describes the agglomeration process in China, concentrating on 
changing patterns of industrial location. For example, Ge (2009) estimates 
location regressions to explain the share that a locality has in national employment 
for each manufacturing sector. This analysis suggests that industrial 
agglomeration is driven by foreign trade and investment, and is centered on the 
east coast in places with easy access to foreign markets. Two concerns with this 
study are that the spatial units used (provinces) are quite broad and may miss finer 
scale patterns, and that there is no attention to the services sector. Yet services 
may have large urbanization economies because the proximity of service 
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 Even in developed countries there may be limited sorting of workers due to the complementarity 
of different labor types within local labor markets (Albouy, 2008). Eeckhout et al (2014) find both 
the very high and the very low skilled sort into the biggest U.S. cities and so effects on average 
skill levels by city size may cancel out. 
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providers to consumers in denser cities allows greater substitution away from 
home production due to a lower time cost of buying services (Murphy, 2013). In 
contrast, locations for the production and consumption of goods are more easily 
separated and so goods producers may not benefit as much from locating in a 
larger, denser, more diverse urban area. 
5.3 DATA DESCRIPTION 
The data are from China’s second and third administrative levels that are 
described in Appendix Table 1. In most of China the unit at the second 
administrative level is a prefectural city, diji shi. Every prefectural city has 
district(s), shiqu, and merging contiguous districts within a prefectural city gives 
urban cores that best correspond to a city proper (Roberts et al, 2012). Most 
prefectural cities also have counties that are largely rural (less than one-fifth of the 
registered population have non-agricultural hukou). Prefectural cities also may 
have county-level cities, which are closer in urbanization to counties than to 
districts. In parts of China, especially in the west and southwest, the equivalent to 
a prefectural city is a League, a Region, an Autonomous Prefecture or a 
Provincially Administered area; there are 76 of these compared to 287 prefectural 
cities. These other types of second-level units are distinguished by having no 
urban districts, and contribute only a small share of GDP (3%) and population 
(6%) so we ignore them in our analysis. Our estimation sample is the 287 (merged) 
districts, 321 county-level cities and 1262 counties. 
 The dependent variable for estimating urbanization economies is non-
agricultural GDP per worker in 2010, which we have for all districts, counties and 
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county-level cities. We also use breakdowns of GDP into the secondary sector 
(which is mainly manufacturing and construction) and the tertiary sector 
(services). The long form census given to 10% of all households provides details 
on industry of employment, for 20 industries in 2010 and 16 broader industries in 
2000. These industries and our concordances between the two years are defined in 
Appendix Table 2. The scale measure used to estimate urbanization economies is 
the urban resident population in the 2010 census. Summary statistics in Appendix 
Table 3 show that this averages 1.3 million people for (merged) districts and 0.2 
million for counties (including county-level cities). It is also notable that average 
GDP per worker in the secondary sector is twice as high as in the tertiary sector, 
while it is only 12% higher in districts than in counties. 
Several control variables also are included in the regressions, and are 
summarized in Appendix Table 3. These controls include the average years of 
schooling of residents in 2010, the employment rate, and proxies for the industrial 
structure of each urban area (the ratio of secondary sector to tertiary sector GDP 
and the share of the primary sector in GDP). The control variables also include 
measures of domestic market potential (using the Haversine formula to calculate 
average population-weighted distances to all other districts and counties in China) 
and foreign market access (population weighted distance to the ten largest ports).
 
52
 An instrumental variable for dealing with possible endogeneity in the urban 
scale of each county or district is also used, based on the count of people from 
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 These are Shanghai, Shenzhen, Ningbo-Zhoushan, Guangzhou, Qingdao, Tianjin, Xiamen, 
Dalian, Lianyungang, and Suzhou. 
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each area who had non-agricultural hukou registration ten years earlier.
53
 We rely 
on four main sources for these data: the city statistical yearbook (NBS, 2011a), the 
statistical yearbook for regional economy (NBS, 2011b), the yearbook on 
registered hukou population (MPS, 2001, 2011), and the population census 
tabulations (NBS, 2003, 2012a). 
5.4 CHINA’S AGGLOMERATION AND URBANIZATION PROCESSES 
The 2010 population census reveals a process of funneling migrants from many 
source areas into just a few urban destinations. This is shown in Table 1, which 
classifies areas according to the scale of their in-migrant or out-migrant stocks, 
initially for the total population, and then in the bottom panel for just the urban 
population. The number of non-hukou migrants is calculated as: 
 𝑀𝑖 = 𝑃𝑅𝑖 −𝐻𝑅𝑖 ⁡                                       (1) 
where PRi is the count of residents at location i in the 2010 census and HRi is the 
number with hukou registration from location i. The number of non-hukou urban 
migrants )( iUM  is: 
 𝑈𝑀𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖 − 𝑁𝐴𝑖 ⁡                                       (2) 
where Ui is the urban resident population for location i in the 2010 census and NAi 
is the number of people who had non-agricultural hukou registration from that 
place in 2010. The estimates of HRi and NAi come from the Ministry of Public 
Security (MPS, 2011). 
The funnelling noted above is seen in the top panel of Table 1; 110 million 
people came from over 1400 source areas to live in 460 destinations. This 
                                                          
53
 The justification for this variable, and its relationship to other identification strategies, is 
explained in Section 5. 
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relocation affects both agricultural and non-agricultural hukou holders since the 
type of hukou is not being considered; some of these migrants will have had non-
agricultural hukou and made urban-to-urban moves. Another view of the 
funnelling process is seen within rows in the top panel of the table; 84 million 
non-hukou out-migrants are registered in 1099 different counties yet as many in-
migrants are living in just 62 districts (focusing on those with at least 0.2 million 
migrants) and just seven districts are home to 41 million non-hukou migrants. 
Other evidence on spatial relocation of the population is shown by the fact that 
some urban areas are losing people, as shown in the right-hand columns in the 
bottom panel of Table 1. Specifically, there are almost 12 million fewer urban 
residents in some areas than the non-agricultural hukou counts for those places; 
these are cities that in some sense are in the ‘wrong’ place since already-urbanized 
people voted with their feet by moving out of them to find agglomeration benefits 
elsewhere.
54
 
 In contrast to the agglomeration process, once the focus is on just urban 
residents and the holders of non-agricultural hukou (bottom panel), the 
urbanization process is apparent. In this bottom panel the most numerous cell is 
for counties with from 0-0.2 million more urban residents than their number of 
non-agricultural hukou registrations. The people who urbanize by moving from a 
village to their county seat, or whose village is engulfed as the county seat 
expands are counted in this cell. We argue that this is a distinct process from the 
agglomeration process shown in the top panel where people have to, at the very 
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 For example, the number of people with non-agricultural hukou for districts of Shantou city is 
5.2 million but the urban resident population in 2010 was just 3.6 million, indicating a substantial 
out-migration. 
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least, leave their county to show up as a non-hukou migrant. Accounts of China’s 
urbanization note that China has over 200 million rural-urban migrant workers, 
and this is confirmed in Table 1 by the total of 216.4 million non-hukou urban 
migrants. But little attention is paid to the unequal spatial distribution that results 
from migrants voting with their feet, shown in the top panel of the table. A lack of 
spatial awareness may contribute to misguided policies that encourage people to 
move to small urban locations thinking that it is urbanization that matters more 
than agglomeration. 
  Another way to consider differences between the two processes is in terms 
of scale. If we set an arbitrary rule that sites of agglomeration are urban areas that 
at least half a million people chose to move to, 46 districts and nine counties 
qualify. An average of 1.8 million in-migrants live in those 46 districts. For the 
county-level cities and county the average is 0.67 million. In contrast, the 
urbanization process shown in the other cells in the lower left part of Table 1 
affects far more places – specifically, 1122 counties, 266 county-level cities and 
215 districts – but the scale for each destination is tiny, averaging just 0.08 million 
in-migrants. Collectively the urbanization process is bigger (just over 60% of the 
216 million non-hukou urban migrants are living outside the 46 districts we 
highlight as agglomeration locations) but far fewer people go to each of those 
small locations. Yet small places are the current target of China’s land use and 
urbanization policy, encouraging migrants to settle in these places with an easier 
process of hukou conversion and with lower house prices (due partly to fewer land 
use restrictions). 
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Table 1. Agglomeration and Urbanization Processes, as Revealed by Stocks of Non-hukou (Urban) Migrants in the 2010 Census 
 
In-Migrants  Out-Migrants 
 
 3mil  1mil  0.5mil  0.2mil  0mil Total   1mil  0.5mil  0.2mil  0mil Total 
 
Non-hukou Migrants 
District 40.9 27.6 9.3 7.1 10.5 95.4  
  
3.0 4.1 7.0 
 
(7) (20) (13) (22) (139) (201)  
  
(12) (74) (86) 
County-level City 
  
2.4 2.9 4.0 9.3  
  
7.7 11.4 19.1 
   
(3) (8) (86) (97)  
  
(26) (198) (224) 
County 
   
1.3 3.1 4.4  
 
1.9 27.4 55.1 84.4 
    
(4) (159) (163)  
 
(3) (94) (1002) (1099) 
 
Non-hukou Urban Migrants 
District 38.8 30.5 12.9 18.3 15.0 115.4  1.5 0.7 1.7 1.3 5.2 
 
(7) (20) (19) (61) (154) (261)  (1) (1) (5) (19) (26) 
County-level City 
  
5.4 10.7 17.5 33.6  
 
0.6 0.4 1.7 2.7 
   
(8) (34) (232) (274)  
 
(1) (2) (44) (47) 
County 
  
0.6 8.2 58.6 67.4  
   
3.7 3.7 
   
(1) (30) (1092) (1123)  
   
(139) (139) 
Notes: Non-hukou migrants are the resident population minus the registered population, calculated by Equation (1). Sums of non-hukou in-migrants and out-migrants do not 
balance because the ‘irregular’ prefectures such as Leagues and Provincially Administered areas are omitted from the table. The non-hukou urban migrants are the urban 
resident population minus the non-agricultural registered population, calculated by Equation (2). The table cells have the number of migrants, in millions, with the number of 
locations in ( ). 
Sources: MPS (2011), NBS (2011a, 2012a). 
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 The industrial composition of the workforce also shows the effects of 
public policy in encouraging urban growth in small places. In Table 2, long-form 
census employment data are used to compare 2000 and 2010. There was a 16.6 
percentage point fall in agriculture’s share of employment, with four industries 
increasing shares by about the same total amount. These industries, with 
percentage point increases in ( ), are: manufacturing (4.6%), construction (2.9%), 
transport (1.6%) and trade (5.5%). Some of these growing industries are moving 
away from possible agglomeration benefits; manufacturing and construction had 
declines in the shares of their employment in urban districts of about 10 
percentage points while employment in counties rose, especially for construction. 
Indeed, 41 percent of all construction employment was in counties in 2010, 
compared with only 28% in counties in the 2000 census. Government-directed 
efforts at growing new cities in less urbanized regions typically require urban 
infrastructure and housing to be built, which may explain this dispersion of 
employment in the construction sector. Similarly, efforts of local governments to 
attract footloose manufacturing factories may account for the rise in the share of 
manufacturing employment in counties. 
 In contrast to dispersed construction and manufacturing employment, most 
large service industries in Table 2 show concentration of employment into urban 
districts. This concentration confirms that it is harder to separate the location of 
production and consumption for services than it is for goods, making services 
better candidates for urbanization economies (as seen below). Since China 
currently has a smaller services sector and a larger manufacturing sector than 
would be predicted from income levels (Ghani 2012), it is likely that future 
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Table 2. Distribution of Employment by Industry and Location, 2000 and 2010 
 Employment Distribution by Industry  Distribution of Each Industry’s Employment Across Spatial Units 
     ---------------2010--------------- ---------------2000--------------- 
Industry 2010 2000 Change  District County-level City County District County-level City County 
Agricult 46.6% 63.2% -16.6%  15.1% 19.4% 65.5% 15.7% 19.9% 64.4% 
Mining 1.1% 1.1% 0.1%  41.9% 20.4% 37.7% 42.7% 22.7% 34.6% 
Manufact 17.8% 13.1% 4.6%  50.9% 22.5% 26.6% 59.4% 20.1% 20.6% 
Utilities 0.7% 0.6% 0.1%  57.9% 15.5% 26.7% 55.1% 16.6% 28.3% 
Construct 5.7% 2.8% 2.9%  40.8% 18.7% 40.6% 50.9% 20.7% 28.4% 
Transport 4.3% 2.6% 1.6%  55.5% 15.3% 29.2% 50.6% 18.6% 30.8% 
Trade 12.4% 6.9% 5.5%  55.2% 16.5% 28.3% 55.0% 17.2% 27.8% 
Finance 0.8% 0.6% 0.2%  70.1% 11.5% 18.4% 60.6% 13.7% 25.7% 
Property 0.7% 0.2% 0.5%  81.2% 8.8% 10.0% 86.2% 6.9% 6.9% 
Social Serv 2.7% 2.2% 0.5%  56.8% 15.9% 27.3% 64.5% 14.6% 20.9% 
Research 0.7% 0.4% 0.4%  74.2% 10.4% 15.4% 76.6% 9.0% 14.5% 
Welfare 4.0% 3.6% 0.3%  54.3% 14.8% 30.9% 46.5% 16.3% 37.2% 
Govt 2.5% 2.6% -0.1%  53.3% 14.2% 32.6% 46.4% 17.5% 36.1% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
 35.2% 18.8% 46.0% 30.3% 19.3% 50.4% 
Notes: Each industry is named and defined in Appendix Table 2, along with a concordance between the classifications in 2000 and 2010. Some industries are merged to allow 
the concordance; with ‘Transport’ being industries 6 & 7, ‘Trade’ being industries 8 & 9, ‘Social Serv’ being industries 12 & 15, ‘Research’ being industries 13 & 14, 
‘Welfare’ being industries 16, 17 & 18, and ‘Govt’ being industries 19 & 20 in Appendix Table 2. Other than that, ‘Agricult’, ‘Mining’, ‘Manufact’, ‘Utilities’, ‘Construct’, 
‘Finance’, ‘Property’ respectively refers to industries 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11 in Appendix Table 2. Employment is defined as the population aged 16 or older working and 
receiving income (NBS, 2012c).  
Sources: NBS (2003, 2012a). 
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employment growth will be greater for services than for manufacturing as China 
attempts to rebalance the structure of the economy. In some sense, therefore, the 
employment growth of the secondary sector in counties and county-level cities 
may reflect an anti-agglomeration urban planning approach that will not best 
exploit the urbanization economies that are estimated in the next section.  
5.5 ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES OF URBANIZATION ECONOMIES 
We use local area GDP estimates and the 2010 census counts to relate output per 
worker to the size of the local urban population, letting the relationship vary 
between the sub-sample of counties (including county-level cities) and of districts:  
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 𝑁𝑖⁄ )
𝑑 = 𝛼𝑑 + 𝛽𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑖
𝑑 + 𝜃𝑗
𝑑𝐶𝑗𝑖
𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑑  (3a) 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 𝑁𝑖⁄ )
𝑐 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛽𝑐𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑖
𝑐 + 𝜃𝑗
𝑐𝐶𝑗𝑖
𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑐   (3b) 
where superscripts indicate if variables and coefficients are from the model for 
districts (d) or for counties (c), 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 𝑁𝑖⁄  is non-agricultural GDP per worker for 
area i, and Ui is the urban resident population there.
55
 The parameter of interest is 
β, the elasticity of output per worker with respect to urban scale, which shows the 
urbanization economies.
56
 The regressions include a rich set of covariates to deal 
with omitted variable bias. The control variables in Cj include dummies for each 
province, average years of schooling (to control for labor quality differences), 
employment rates (to control for labor utilization), proxies for the industrial 
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 Studies of urbanization economies sometimes use wages to measure productivity, especially 
with micro data (e.g. Glaeser and Mare, 2001; Combes et al, 2010). Micro data for China typically 
omit the non-hukou migrants and city average wage data do not cover all private sector workers. 
We therefore use GDP per worker to measure productivity, and use urban resident population to 
proxy for city scale following studies such as Sveikauskas (1975) and Rosenthal and Strange 
(2004).       
56
 We do not follow Au and Henderson (2006) in using non-agricultural employment to proxy for 
city scale. While the right employment variable (from long form census counts, in our case) helps 
measure worker productivity, urbanization economies are really about the overall size of an urban 
area. A larger population may improve matches between workers and firms, and may let workers 
more narrowly specialize and raise their productivity (Puga, 2010).  
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structure of each area (msgdp and gdp1), and measures of domestic market 
potential and foreign market access. 
But even with control variables included, the literature has a concern that 
the error term, εi may correlate with Ui due to ‘endogenous quantity of labor bias’ 
(Combes et al, 2011). Rather than firms and workers becoming more productive 
in a more populous area, it may be that being more productive – for whatever 
reason – causes an urban area to grow. To deal with this, studies typically use 
historical population as an instrumental variable (IV). The idea is that what 
affected population location in the agrarian past is different to what affects it 
today, but location patterns persist due to durability of housing and urban 
infrastructure.
57
 China’s command economy era means one does not need the 
distant past to find causes for the patterns of population location that differ from 
current causes. Under central planning China was too rural and had too many 
people in the interior, with regional self-sufficiency upheld for military reasons 
and to simplify planning. Also, the early Soviet-style focus on heavy industry 
favoured the northeast region, which was poorly situated compared to the coastal 
southeast once an outward-oriented strategy was adopted in the reform era. The 
factors affecting the planned urban (‘non-agricultural’) population in a given 
location in the command economy era are less relevant to location decisions in the 
market era, so the exclusion restrictions needed by a valid instrumental variable 
are plausible. It is possible to observe the ‘echo’ of the planned economy urban 
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 Ciccone and Hall (1996), Combes et al (2008) and Mion and Nattichioni (2009) use long lags of 
population as instruments, while Rosenthal and Strange (2008) and Combes et al (2010) also use 
geological characteristics. All of these studies find almost no endogenous quantity of labor bias, 
with elasticities of urban scale hardly changing in the IV estimates (see summaries in Puga, 2010, 
page 207; Combes et al, 2011, page 261). 
 138 
 
  
 
structure in modern data, since hukou status is inherited. So based on this 
reasoning, our instrumental variable is the non-agricultural hukou population for 
each location, as of the year 2000. 
The main results of equations (3a) and (3b) are in Table 3, with more 
details in Appendix Table 4. In a pooled OLS regression the elasticity of output 
per worker with respect to urban scale is 0.09 (Table 3, column 1). But once we 
let coefficients differ between the sub-samples of districts and counties the effect 
of urban scale on productivity is seen to be almost three times as large for districts 
as for counties and county-level cities. The difference in coefficients between the 
county sub-sample and district sub-sample is statistically significant (p<0.01) 
according to a Chow test. The finding that urbanization economies are three times 
as large in districts as in counties persists when IV estimation is used (column (3)). 
The diagnostic tests for the IV models show that the number of people with non-
agricultural hukou registration for each area, ten years earlier, is a very strong 
instrumental variable (first-stage F=2432). Using this instrument slightly raises 
the urbanization elasticities, by between one-fifth and one-tenth.
58
 
In contrast to the small effect from using IV estimation, introducing the 
full set of control variables (in column (4)) reduces the elasticity of urban scale by 
one-half for districts, while for counties and county-level cities the elasticity 
becomes negative and statistically insignificant. The results for the control 
variables (in Appendix Table 4) suggest that the industrial structure of each urban 
area is a highly significant covariate, as are average school years and employment 
                                                          
58
 This corroborates the common finding in the literature that endogenous quantity of labor bias 
has minor effects. 
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Table 3. Effects of Urban Scale on 2010 GDP per Worker, for Different Spatial Units and Economic Sectors 
 Non-agricultural Sector  Secondary Sector  Tertiary Sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS IV IV  IV IV  IV IV 
U 0.090          
 (0.013)***          
U
d
 (districts)  0.149 0.181 0.088  0.142 -0.008  0.226 0.151 
  (0.037)*** (0.039)*** (0.038)**  (0.054)*** (0.052)  (0.031)*** (0.034)*** 
U
c
 (counties)  0.057 0.064 -0.028  0.025 -0.073  0.098 0.014 
  (0.019)*** (0.022)*** (0.019)  (0.031) (0.025)***  (0.018)*** (0.017) 
αd  4.506 5.218 -0.619  5.799 -4.131  4.232 0.583 
  (0.483)*** (0.326)*** (2.456)  (0.445)*** (3.375)  (0.258)*** (2.225) 
αc  4.673 4.707 -0.479  4.672 -3.498  4.756 0.974 
  (0.477)*** (0.472)*** (0.980)  (0.643)*** (1.346)***  (0.374)*** (0.888) 
Constant 4.423          
 (0.275)***          
Full controls    Yes   Yes   Yes 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.29 0.99         
IV F statistic   2432 2235  2432 2235  2432 2235 
Chow p-value  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Notes: U is (log) resident urban population for districts (d) or counties and county-level cities (c). All models include province fixed effects. Other controls include AYS, ER, 
msgdp, gdp1, DMP, and FMA (defined in Appendix Table 3) used for the models in columns (4), (6) and (8) with detailed results in Appendix Table 4. The IV models use the 
(log) non-agricultural hukou population in 2000 as an instrument for U, and the IV F statistic is the Cragg-Donald first-stage F statistic for the instrument. The Chow p-value 
is for testing the null hypothesis that coefficients for the county-level model are the same as for the district-level model. 
N=1870, with 287 districts and 1583 counties (1262 counties and 321 county-level cities). Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. 
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rates in counties, while domestic market potential in counties and district average 
school years are weakly associated with average output per worker. Controlling 
for all of these factors, the IV estimate of the elasticity of output per worker with 
respect to scale for urban districts is 0.088; as a reminder, these are the core of 
prefectural cities and average 1.3 million residents. In contrast, county-level cities 
and urban areas in counties average just 0.2 million urban residents and seem to 
provide no urbanization economies. Whatever else may be achieved by planners 
trying to steer rural migrants into these smaller urban areas, the results in Table 3 
give no reason to expect any increase in local non-agricultural productivity by 
making these non-core urban areas bigger.   
The output-scale elasticity of 0.088 for urban districts also has another 
implication, based on its similarity to findings in the literature for other countries. 
For example, Melo et al (2009) report an average elasticity of urban scale of 0.08, 
based on 264 estimates from 34 studies across the world. Similarly, an early study 
by Sveikauskas (1975) has an elasticity of output per worker with respect to local 
population of 0.06, while the Rosenthal and Strange (2004) survey puts the 
elasticity between 0.03-0.08. The (merged) districts of China’s prefectural cities 
best match the urbanized parts of the metropolitan statistical areas used in other 
countries (Au and Henderson, 2006) so the elasticity reported here may be 
comparable to these results. If urbanization economies for China are of similar 
size to those in countries where the city size distribution has been less distorted by 
mobility restrictions and planning policies, it suggests that China’s contemporary 
city size distribution may be less malformed and may cause smaller productivity 
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losses than is often claimed.
59
 Indeed, a related study suggests that most of 
China’s cities are close to their productivity-maximizing scale, with the number of 
workers in cities that are too small about the same as the number in cities that are 
too big (Li and Gibson, 2015). 
In addition to showing the location of urbanization economies, the results 
in Table 3 help to reveal something about the nature of these effects in China. 
When output per worker in the secondary sector is considered separately from the 
tertiary (services) sector, it is apparent that urbanization economies operate only 
through tertiary sector activity. In the models using the full set of controls, output 
per worker in the secondary sector has no relationship with urban scale for 
districts, and has a negative relationship (with an elasticity of -0.07) for counties 
(column (6)). In contrast, for output of the tertiary sector, the scale elasticity is 
0.15 for districts and is highly significant, while there is no significant effect of 
urban scale on tertiary sector productivity in counties and county-level cities 
(column (8)). Thus, to the extent that positive externalities due to urban scale exist 
in China, they appear to be a feature of the services sector only but even in that 
sector they only occur in the bigger urban areas that make up the core of 
prefectural cities.  
5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we contribute to the growing literature on agglomeration effects in 
China, using data that are more reliable than those available to previous studies.  It 
is only since China’s 2010 census that accurate estimates of the urban population 
                                                          
59
 For example, the urban scale elasticity from survey data on Chinese wages in Combes et al 
(2015) is about three times what is found with similar data in other countries. This large elasticity 
implies China is not yet fully exploiting available agglomeration benefits due to having too many 
undersized cities. 
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and of total employment are available. Since measures of local population scale 
are crucial for estimating urbanization economies, having these more reliable data 
makes it timely to re-examine previous results. Our data also are more 
comprehensive than those used in prior studies, covering the entire urban 
hierarchy, and coming from 287 prefectures that provide 97 percent of China’s 
GDP. Prior studies have used samples with more limited spatial coverage and 
focus on only one type of urban unit, or else use survey data that omit major 
population groups, such as the non-hukou urban residents. 
Our results show that effects of urbanization economies on China’s non-
agricultural GDP per worker are of similar size to what is found in other countries, 
with an elasticity of urban scale of about 0.09. The similarity to what is found 
elsewhere may count against the argument that a legacy of China’s command 
economy era, and especially its hukou restrictions on population mobility, is that it 
does not reap the full agglomeration benefits that it might with a different urban 
structure. Indeed, even the simple descriptive claim that China has too many small 
cities relative to large ones can be questioned, since this claim is based on 
incorrect measures of city scale that use the number of people with local hukou 
registration (a de jure measure) rather than the actual number of residents (a de 
facto measure).  
Our focus on the resident population shows that an important reshaping of 
China’s economic geography is under way, due in part to the effects of non-hukou 
migrants who have voted with their feet. The total of 216 million non-hukou urban 
migrants enumerated in the 2010 census represents two processes; a funnelling 
towards 46 urban districts that accounts for about two-fifths of the total, which we 
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argue is an agglomeration process, and a more dispersed urbanization towards 
1612 districts, counties, and county-level cities which we argue is not an 
agglomeration process. A comparison of 2010 and 2000 census employment by 
industry data suggest that the dispersed urbanization operates especially through 
the secondary sector, with increasing shares of construction and manufacturing 
employment located in counties. In contrast, the services sector increasingly 
concentrates into the larger urban districts. There may be a mismatch between 
people’s choices, as revealed by their funnelling into a few big cities, and a pro-
small bias in China’s urban planning policy that encourages migrants to settle in 
smaller, dispersed, urban areas through an easier process of hukou conversion and 
fewer land use restrictions. 
Notwithstanding this pro-small policy bias, the econometric evidence is 
that agglomeration effects in China occur only in urban districts (the urban core of 
prefectural cities) and do not occur in county-level cities or counties. Moreover, it 
is only in the tertiary (services) sector where there are positive agglomeration 
effects, with the secondary sector (manufacturing and construction) not showing a 
positive effect of urban scale on productivity. Specifically, our results suggest that 
a ten percent increase in scale for the urban districts of prefectural cities raises 
output per worker by 1.5 percent in the tertiary sector. In contrast, increases in 
urban scale for counties and county-level cities have no effect on output per 
worker in the tertiary sector and are associated with lower secondary sector output 
per worker. These patterns imply that the recent efforts of local and central 
government in China to encourage a dispersed form of urbanization, by 
stimulating construction and manufacturing activity in counties, is unlikely to 
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create beneficial agglomeration effects. A more even-handed urban planning 
approach that is not biased against the biggest cities is needed if China is to make 
the most of the potential productivity gains from its on-going urban 
transformation. 
 145 
 
  
 
References 
Albouy, D. (2008). Are big cities bad places to live? Estimating quality of life 
across metropolitan areas.  Working Paper No 14472, National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Au, C. and Henderson, V. (2006). Are Chinese cities too small? Review of 
Economic Studies 73(3): 549-576. 
Chan, K.W. (2012). Internal Labor Migration in China: Trends, Geography and 
Policies. In Population Distribution, Urbanization, Internal Migration and 
Development: An International Perspective, United Nations Population 
Division, New York: pp.81-102. 
Ciccone, A. and Hall, R. (1996). Productivity and the density of economic 
activities. American Economic Review, 86(1), 54-70. 
Combes, P. P., Duranton, G., and Gobillon, L. (2008). Spatial wage disparities: 
Sorting matters! Journal of Urban Economics, 63(2), 723-742. 
Combes, P. P., Duranton, G., Gobillon, L., and Roux. S. (2010). Estimating 
agglomeration effects with history, geology, and worker fixed-effects. In 
E. L. Glaeser (ed.), Agglomeration Economics. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Combes, P., Duranton, G., and Gobillon, L. (2011). The identification of 
agglomeration economies. Journal of Economic Geography 11(2), 253-
266. 
Combes, P., Démurger, S., & Li, S. (2015). Migration externalities in Chinese 
cities. European Economic Review, 76, 152-167. 
 146 
 
  
 
Eeckhout, J., Pinheiro, R., & Schmidheiny, K. (2014). Spatial sorting. Journal of 
Political Economy, 122(3), 554-620. 
Fan, S., Li, L., and Zhang, X. (2012). Challenges of creating cities in China: 
Lessons from a short-lived county-to-city upgrading policy. Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 40(3), 476-91. 
Ge, Y. (2009). Globalization and industry agglomeration in China. World 
Development 37(3): 550-559. 
Ghani, E. (2012). Are China and India converging?  
http://www.voxeu.org/article/are-china-and-india-converging 
Glaeser, E. and Maré, D. (2001). Cities and skills. Journal of Labor Economics 
19(3), 316-342. 
Li, C. and Gibson, J. (2013). Rising regional inequality in China: fact or artifact? 
World Development 47(1), 16-29. 
Li, C., & Gibson, J. (2015). City scale and productivity in China. Economics 
Letters, 131, 86-90. 
Melo, P., Graham, D., and Noland, R. (2009). A meta-analysis of estimates of 
urban agglomeration economies. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 
39(3), 332-342. 
Ministry of Public Security (MPS). (2001). Population Statistics of the People’s 
Republic of China by County 2000 (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Quanguo Fenxianshi Renkou Tongji Ziliao 2000 Nian). Beijing: 
Qunzhong Press. 
Ministry of Public Security (MPS). (2011). Population Statistics of the People’s 
Republic of China by County 2010 (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
 147 
 
  
 
Quanguo Fenxianshi Renkou Tongji Ziliao 2010 Nian). Beijing: 
Qunzhong Press. 
Mion, G., and Naticchioni, P. (2009). The spatial sorting and matching of skills 
and firms. Canadian Journal of Economics, 42(1), 28-55. 
Murphy, D. (2013). Urban density and the substitution of market purchases for 
home production. Mimeo, University of Michigan. 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). (2003). Tabulation on the 2000 Population 
Census of the People’s Republic of China by County (Zhongguo 2000 
Nian Renkou Pucha Fenxian Ziliao). Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). (2011a). China City Statistical Yearbook 
2011 (Zhongguo Chengshi Tongji Nianjian 2011). Beijing: China 
Statistics Press. 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). (2011b). China Statistical Yearbook for 
Regional Economy 2011 (Zhongguo Quyu Jingji Tongji Nianjian 2011). 
Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). (2011c). Provincial Statistical Yearbook 
2011 (individual issue for each of the 31 provinces). Beijing: China 
Statistics Press. 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). (2012a). Tabulation on the 2010 Population 
Census of the People’s Republic of China by County (Zhongguo 2010 
Nian Renkou Pucha Fenxian Ziliao). Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). (2012b). Tabulation on the 2010 Population 
Census of the People’s Republic of China (Zhongguo 2010 Nian Renkou 
Pucha Ziliao). Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
 148 
 
  
 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). (2012c). China Population and Employment 
Statistical Yearbook 2011 (Zhongguo Renkou he Jiuye Tongji Nianjian 
2011). Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
Puga, D. (2010). The magnitude and causes of agglomeration economies. Journal 
of Regional Science, 50(1), 203-219. 
Roberts, M., Deichmann, U., Fingleton, B., and Shi, T. (2012). Evaluating China's 
road to prosperity: A new economic geography approach. Regional 
Science and Urban Economics, 42(4), 580-594. 
Rosenthal, S., and Strange. W. (2004). Evidence on the nature and sources of 
agglomeration economies. In V. Henderson and Jacques-Francois Thisse 
(eds.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economies, Vol. 4. Amsterdam: 
North-Holland, pp. 2119-2171. 
Rosenthal, S., and Strange, W. (2008). The attenuation of human capital 
spillovers. Journal of Urban Economics, 64(3), 373-389. 
Sveikauskas, L. (1975). Productivity of cities. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
89(3), 393-413. 
World Bank (2009). World Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic 
Geography. The World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Xu, Z. (2009). Productivity and agglomeration economies in Chinese cities. 
Comparative Economic Studies, 51(3), 284-301. 
 
  
1
4
9
 
Appendix Table 1. Shares of Various Administrative Divisions in National Population and GDP, and Urbanization Rates,  2010 
Admin Level (Chinese Name) (Number) 
Registered 
Population 
Resident 
Population 
Non-agricultural 
Population 
Urban 
Population 
GDP 
Non-agricultural 
Rate 
Urban 
Rate 
Prefectural City (diji shi) (287) 
       
  District (shiqu) (287) 28.0% 34.8% 54.8% 53.9% 54.3% 66.7% 77.8% 
  County-level City (xianji shi) (321) 17.4% 16.8% 15.4% 15.1% 18.1% 30.0% 45.1% 
  County (xian) (1262) 47.1% 41.5% 24.9% 26.5% 24.2% 18.0% 32.2% 
League (meng) (3), Region (diqu) (17), 
Autonomous Prefecture (zizhi zhou) (30)        
  County-level City (49) 1.3% 1.4% 1.7% 1.5% 1.0% 42.4% 55.8% 
  County (358) 5.2% 4.7% 2.3% 2.3% 1.7% 15.0% 24.2% 
Provincially Administered (shengxia) (26) 
       
  County-level City (14) 0.7% 0.6% 0.8% 0.6% 0.5% 37.4% 46.5% 
  County (12) 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 31.5% 36.8% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  
  Prefectural city 92.5% 93.1% 95.0% 95.5% 96.7% 
  
  League, Region, Autonomous Prefecture 6.5% 6.1% 4.0% 3.8% 2.7% 
  
  Provincially Administered 1.0% 0.8% 1.0% 0.7% 0.6% 
  
Notes: Prefectural cities include Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing, which are at provincial level but are similar to prefectural cities (according to NBS, 2011a). A 
prefectural city's districts are contiguous areas, which collectively represent its city proper (Roberts et al, 2012). County-level cities here include Chongqing’s 10 districts 
(Puling, Wansheng, Shuangqiao, Changshou, Jiangjin, Hechuan, Yongchuan, Nanchuan, Wanzhou and Qianjiang), Wuhan's 4 districts (Caidian, Jiangxia, Huangpi and 
Xinzhou according to NBS, 2011a), and Kunming’s 1 district (Dongchuan). Counties here include banners (qi, 49), autonomous banners (zizhi qi, 3), and forestry area (1). 
There are 13 prefectural cities, Wuhai (Inner Mongolia), Xiamen (Fujian), Laiwu (Shandong), Ezhou (Hubei), Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Foshan, Dongguan and Zhongshan 
(Guangdong), Haikou and Sanya (Hainan), Jiayuguan (Gansu) and Karamay (Xinjiang) having neither county-level cities nor counties. Registered Population is from the 2010 
hukou household registration system administered by the Ministry of Public Security, in which a household is given either "agricultural" (nongye) or "non-agricultural" (fei 
nongye) hukou by the local police station at the place of hukou registration. Resident Population is the population in the 2010 Population Census conducted by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, of which Urban Population includes households residing in urban areas in districts, county-level cities and counties while Rural Population 
includes the rest (NBS, 2012b&c). Non-agricultural Rate is the ratio of the non-agriculture population to the registered population while the Urban Rate is the ratio of the 
urban population to the resident population. 
Sources: MPS (2011, noting that the reported registered population for districts and counties of five prefectural cities Fuyang, Suzhou, Bozhou, Liuan and Chaohu in Anhui 
province are incorrect and have been corrected by the authors according to NBS, 2011a,b&c), NBS (2011a,b&c, 2012a). 
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Appendix Table 2. Industry of Employment Definitions in 2010 and 2000 Long Form Census of Population 
ID 2010 2000 
1 Agriculture, Forestry, Farming, Fishery Agriculture, Forestry, Farming, Fishery 
2 Mining Mining 
3 Manufacturing Manufacturing 
4 Electricity, Gas, Water Provisions Electricity, Gas, Water Provisions 
5 Construction Construction 
6 Warehousing, Postal Services Transportation, Warehousing, Postal, Telecommunication Services 
7 Transportation, Computer, Software 
 
8 Information, Wholesale & Retail Trades Wholesale & Retail Trades, Accommodation & Food Services 
9 Accommodation & Food Services 
 
10 Finance Finance & Insurance 
11 Real Estate Real Estate 
12 Rental, Leasing, Business Services Social Services 
13 Scientific Research, Technical Services, Geological Survey Scientific Research, Technical Services 
14 Water Conservation, Environment, Public Facility Management Water Conservation, Geological Survey 
15 Resident Services 
 
16 Education Services Education, Culture, Arts, Sports, Radio, Film, Television 
17 Health Care, Social Security, Social Welfare Health Care, Sports, Social Welfare 
18 Culture, Sports, Entertainment 
 
19 Public Administration, Social Organizations State Agencies, Party Agencies, Social Organizations 
20 International Organizations Others 
Notes: The long form census is filled in by 10% of households. Compared to the usual census forms it has extra questions related to occupation, industry, marital status, 
family, and housing; ID is industry identification number. 
Sources: NBS (2003, 2012a). 
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Appendix Table 3. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition 
Districts  Counties 
Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables 
  
 
  
GDP/N Non-agricultural GDP per worker (thousand yuan) in 2010 110.6 49.5  98.6 67.8 
 
Secondary sector GDP per worker (thousand yuan) in 2010 163.9 95.4  154.5 165.2 
 
Tertiary sector GDP per worker (thousand yuan) in 2010 79.7 34.4  68.3 38.3 
Independent variables 
  
 
  
U Urban resident population (millions) in 2010 census 1.26 2.09  0.18 0.14 
AYS Average years of schooling of residents in 2010 9.86 0.94  8.36 0.68 
ER Employment rate (employed workers/residents aged 16+) in 2010 0.62 0.08  0.72 0.07 
msgdp Manufacturing to service ratio (secondary GDP/tertiary GDP) in 2010 1.43 0.91  1.70 1.15 
gdp1 Primary sector share in GDP (primary GDP/GDP) in 2010 0.07 0.07  0.21 0.11 
DMP Domestic market potential (distance to other districts/counties, kilometers) 1192 343  1154 313 
FMA Foreign market access (distance to 10 largest Chinese ports, kilometers) 1175 450  1165 405 
IV Instrument (non-agricultural hukou population in 2000, millions) 0.62 0.95  0.08 0.06 
Notes: There are 287 districts and 1583 counties (including 321 county-level cities). 
Sources: MPS (2001); NBS (2011a&b, 2012a). 
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Appendix Table 4. Detailed Results for Control Variables in Models Reported in Columns (4), (6) and (8) of Table 3 
 GDP/N 
 Non-agricultural Sector  Secondary Sector  Tertiary Sector 
 District County  District County  District County 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 IV IV  IV IV  IV IV 
U 0.088 -0.027  -0.007 -0.067  0.150 0.014 
 (0.027)*** (0.019)  (0.035) (0.027)**  (0.026)*** (0.017) 
AYS 0.506 1.087  1.154 1.334  0.106 0.937 
 (0.289)* (0.158)***  (0.377)*** (0.219)***  (0.275) (0.143)*** 
ER 0.019 0.756  -0.661 0.845  0.835 0.845 
 (0.314) (0.167)***  (0.409) (0.231)***  (0.299)*** (0.151)*** 
msgdp 0.192 0.130  0.265 0.249  -0.042 -0.113 
 (0.021)*** (0.010)***  (0.027)*** (0.014)***  (0.020)** (0.009)*** 
gdp1 -2.321 -1.967  -2.269 -1.725  -2.626 -2.103 
 (0.371)*** (0.126)***  (0.484)*** (0.174)***  (0.353)*** (0.114)*** 
DMP 0.146 0.282  -0.187 0.257  0.502 0.485 
 (0.269) (0.164)*  (0.351) (0.227)  (0.256)** (0.148)*** 
FMA 0.346 -0.093  0.549 -0.097  0.049 -0.258 
 (0.260) (0.162)  (0.340) (0.224)  (0.248) (0.146)* 
Observations 287 1583  287 1583  287 1583 
IV F statistic 1587 3751  1587 3751  1587 3751 
Notes: Variables in italics are in logarithms. Each regression also includes province-level fixed effects (30 for districts, 29 for counties and county-level cities). The IV is the 
(log) non-agricultural hukou population in 2000. IV F statistic is the Cragg-Donald first-stage F statistic for the instrument. The number of observations includes the 287 
districts and 1583 counties (1262 counties and 321 county-level cities). Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. Variable definitions and 
summary statistics are shown in Appendix Table 3. 
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Shining Light on Erroneous Use of China’s Sub-national Data 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper uses measures of city area derived from night lights as an arbiter to 
compare two different types of local population data for China; a de facto measure 
based on census counts of where people actually reside, and a de jure measure 
based on police records of where they are registered to live under China’s hukou 
system. One would conclude that expansion of urban areas is driven by income 
growth with no independent role played by local population growth, if the de jure 
population from the hukou registration data is used as a proxy measure for city-
level population. In contrast to this conclusion, which we consider to be an 
artefact, if the more appropriate de facto population measure based on census 
counts of where people actually reside is used, there is a strong effect of local 
population growth on urban expansion and no apparent effect of income growth.  
 
 
Keywords: China 
JEL: R12, O15 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Researchers who work with sub-national data for China face an important but 
largely ignored data problem. The most widely available population counts for 
provinces, prefectures, cities and counties are not counts of residents, as in most 
other countries. Instead they are counts of people whose address for their 
household registration (hukou suozaidi) is from within that locality. Many people 
now live thousands of miles away from their place of hukou registration so this is 
a de jure count of where people are legally registered to live rather than a de facto 
count of where they actually live. These counts are reported in annual yearbooks 
put out by China’s statistics office but are based on data from the Ministry of 
Public Security – China’s police force – since Chinese are meant to (but do not) 
stay registered at local police stations. 
 The “counting errors” from treating the de jure count of hukou holders as 
the de facto local population may substantially distort economic analysis since 
population counts are central to many branches of applied economics. In urban 
economics, the size of cities is important for understanding the scope for higher 
productivity due to agglomeration effects from workers and firms locating in 
larger, denser environments. In development and welfare economics, and in 
studies of inequality, interest is usually in income or output per capita since 
comparing totals for unequally populated areas is not informative. In this regard, 
there is a literature on the accuracy of China’s economic statistics (e.g. Holz, 
2004; Chow, 2006) but almost no attention is paid to the errors in the population 
denominator of per capita indicators.  
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 Yet for the first three decades of the reform era in China, local GDP was 
divided by the count of people with local hukou registration for a particular sub-
national area rather than by the count of local residents. It is not the de jure 
population whose production and consumption goes in to local GDP, so this was a 
biased measure, and the bias grew with the rising tide of migration as millions left 
their place of hukou registration. By 2010, the census counted over 220 million of 
these non-hukou migrants; one-third of China’s urban residents. A clear distortion 
from using these biased data is in regional inequality statistics, which seemed to 
rise from 1990 until 2004, when a fall coincided with China investing heavily in 
lagging regions (Fan et al, 2011). Both the apparent rise and the turning point are 
statistical artifacts due to provincial GDP figures initially being denominated by 
the count of people with hukou registration from each province and then switching 
to using the number of residents as a denominator (Li and Gibson, 2013).
60
 
 The risk of distorted analyses from erroneous use of China’s local 
population data goes well beyond studies of regional inequality. The bias from 
using the wrong population will vary with the level and growth of local GDP, 
since non-hukou migrants are attracted to richer, faster growing, areas, so time-
series of per capita variables for sub-national areas are affected. Such data are 
widely used, in part because China is unusual in reporting GDP statistics for the 
third sub-national level (counties and urban districts, which are below prefectures, 
which are below provinces). With sub-national GDP data so finely grained, they 
                                                          
60
 There was also a double-counting problem because some provinces switched before others, so 
someone may have been in the denominator of GDP per capita for two different places at the same 
time; as a resident of one province and in the hukou registered population of a province that was 
slow to switch to reporting output per resident. In some years up to 26 million people were double-
counted (Li and Gibson, 2013). 
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are increasingly used by researchers, even to validate proxy measures for local 
economic growth applied elsewhere (Storeygard, 2013). For example, of 464 
economics journal articles with ‘China’ and ‘city’ and ‘economic growth’ as 
keywords or in the title, 45% were published in the last four years.
61
 
 It is not just a denominator bias that results from the de jure population 
being treated as a de facto population. Any study that relies on how big are sub-
national units, in either population or employment terms, is likely to be biased. 
For example, the often repeated claim that China has too many small cities is an 
artifact of measuring cities by how many local hukou holders there are, rather than 
by how many residents they have.
62
 The employment size of cities is likewise 
biased since City Statistical Yearbook (CSY) data omit most private sector 
employees; long-form census data in 2010 show that CSY reports an average of 
only 43% of the employment for each city that the census counts (Li and Gibson, 
2015). While surveys are not inherently biased, since they can define residency by 
how long someone lives in a locality rather than just relying on their hukou status, 
China’s lack of a complete sample frame threatens survey validity. The main 
urban and rural household surveys by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 
are based on hukou registration rather than on the census and so non-hukou 
migrants are omitted from the sample frame. Hence, many surveys provide an 
incomplete picture of modern China. 
                                                          
61
 Specifically, a search of EconLit (May 11, 2015) reveals that there were 23 papers published in 
all of the 1990s, 74 published between 2000 and 2005, 159 from 2006 to 2010, and 208 from 2011 
to 2014. 
62
 Au and Henderson (2006, p.557) claim China had nine cities with over 3 million people and 125 
in the 1-3 million range in 2000. This ratio of large to small cities (0.07) was well below the global 
average of 0.27. But measuring cities by residents, as counted in the 2000 census, China had 20 
cities over 3 million and 89 cities of 1-3 million, giving a ratio of 0.23; more than three times 
higher than Au and Henderson report and just below the global average. 
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 To see how widespread is the failure to account for these features of 
China’s sub-national data, we surveyed empirical articles on China published in 
three groups of economics journals: ‘blue-ribbon’ journals, 63  development 
journals,
64
 and regional and urban journals.
65
 We studied articles published from 
2005, after the switch to reporting GDP per capita on a resident population basis. 
Since the NBS also reports total GDP for sub-national units, a researcher could, 
thereafter, derive a yearly average resident population for each locality from the 
ratio of the two numbers.
66
 In contrast, the most widely used population data are 
year-end counts of the number of people with hukou registration from each 
locality.  
 Of the 94 articles that we surveyed, just 15 correctly interpreted China’s 
sub-national data while the other 84% made various errors. The most common 
error was for sub-national areas to be measured with the wrong population or 
employment data, followed by using per capita data calculated with the wrong 
denominator for the interpretation placed on the variables. The results summarized 
in Appendix Table 1 show that there is a little better understanding in the 
development journals, but no trend for an improved interpretation of the data over 
time. The 79 articles that incorrectly interpreted the data are cited an average of 84 
times each (in Google Scholar) so any errors in the results they report may 
contribute to widespread misunderstanding of modern China. Given that we 
                                                          
63
 American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, and the Review of Economics and 
Statistics. 
64
 Journal of Development Economics, World Development, and the Journal of Comparative 
Economics. 
65
 Journal of Urban Economics, Regional Science and Urban Economics, and the Journal of 
Economic Geography. 
66
 However, such estimates are still not as reliable as the census counts of residents (see Section 2, 
below). 
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surveyed only nine journals, if we extrapolate to all economics journals it is likely 
that there are hundreds of articles that misinterpret China’s sub-national data. 
 Given the on-going problems in the literature on China, the goal of this 
paper is to shine more light on the erroneous use of China’s sub-national data. A 
few prior studies also cover some of the points that we make (e.g., Chan, 2007; Li 
and Gibson, 2013) but we go beyond just comparing results using resident 
population counts for local areas with results using the hukou registered 
population. Such comparisons shows inconsistencies, with results for the resident 
population counts presumed to be more correct, but have no independent arbiter of 
truth showing which data are right. In this paper we use satellite-detected 
luminosity as just such an independent measure. Night time lights also are used by 
Pinkovsky and Sala-i-Martin (2014) to sift between conflicting data (survey 
estimates of consumption versus consumption from the national accounts) so our 
paper builds on an existing approach to assessing data quality. 
 Specifically, we run a statistical ‘horse race’ between two models of the 
growth in urban area (as shown by night lights) for over 200 Chinese cities, 
between 2000 and 2010. One model uses the change in the hukou registered 
population for each city while the other uses the change in the urban resident 
population, as recorded by China’s population censuses. The focus is on urban 
area because an existing literature models this, and the key paper (Deng et al, 
2008) is the most cited article in our survey of regional and urban economics 
journals. That paper used a first differenced model of the change in urban area 
between 1995 and 2000 (as detected by Landsat) for 2200 counties and found that 
local GDP growth explained all of the urban expansion, with no independent 
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effect of local population growth. If population growth does not affect urban area, 
cities should be becoming denser rather than more sprawling were it not for the 
effects of income growth. Yet this densification is contrary to what is often 
asserted about China (e.g., World Bank, 2014), and is contrary to what is implied 
by trade-offs between food security and urbanization that China’s policy makers 
claim to face.
67
 
 The problem with the Deng et al (2008) study is it uses the hukou 
registered population for each county, as provided by the Ministry of Public 
Security, as the measure of local population. But there is no reason why urban 
area would expand when this de jure population rises, since more and more 
people live away from their place of hukou registration. Using the wrong 
population variable to measure how populous are sub-national areas is the most 
common error in our survey of the literature using China’s sub-national data. 
Thus, testing for distorted findings on this specific topic may inform about the 
potential for distorted analysis, more generally, from failure to recognize this data 
problem. 
 The next section briefly reviews “counting errors” in China’s sub-national 
statistics. The errors mean that it is only for census years (2000 and 2010) that 
researchers can be confident of population data (and therefore per capita 
variables) for sub-national areas. For other years, what is reported as a resident 
population will often be a registered population count, exaggerating the 
                                                          
67
 For example, China recently announced strict controls to stop big cities expanding on to 
farmland, with the Minister for Land and Resources, Jiang Daming, justifying these controls by 
claiming that good farmland has been ‘eaten by steel and cement’ (for details, see 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/03/c_133763130.htm). 
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population of migrant-sending areas and understating it for migrant-receiving 
areas. Section 3 describes the urban area estimates we use, and the population and 
GDP data. Results in Section 4 include non-nested tests comparing regression 
models of urban area that rely on the two types of population data. The 
conclusions are in Section 5. 
6.2 A REVIEW OF THE COUNTING ERRORS 
The main problems in China’s sub-national population and GDP per capita data 
can be seen by examining four time series; shown in Figure 1a for a migrant-
receiving province (Guangdong) and in Figure 1b for a migrant-sending province 
(Anhui). These series, in increasing order of complexity, are: 
 Registered population - the year-end registered population for each 
province, as reported in various editions of what is now called the China 
Population and Employment Yearbook but with the original source of the 
data being the Ministry of Public Security. 
 Resident (initial) population - the estimated year-end resident population, 
also reported in the China Population and Employment Yearbook. Most of 
these data come from the annual National Sample Survey on Population 
Changes (a 0.1% sample) except in years with a population census (1990, 
2000, 2010) or microcensus (2005; 1% national sample). 
 GDP implied population – the population values underlying reported GDP 
per capita, derived by dividing provincial GDP by provincial GDP per 
capita, where both series are published on the NBS website for each 
province. 
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 Resident (revised) population – in 2011 the NBS combined resident 
population counts from the 2010 census with economic census data, using 
a trend-deviation interpolation method to backdate estimates of GDP, the 
resident population, and GDP per capita on a resident population 
denominator basis. That exercise has not been carried forward, so the 
series only runs from 1990 to 2010, and the exercise was only carried out 
for provinces so similarly corrected data are not available for prefectures, 
counties, or urban districts. 
 The time series for the registered population grows fairly smoothly, since 
it reflects deaths and births (hukou status is inherited), and, rarely, some hukou 
conversions. From 1990 to 1999, what China’s statistical publications report as 
the resident population almost exactly tracks the hukou registered population in 
both provinces. But the (initial) resident population figures for 2000 show a sharp 
movement away from the time series of registered population. The census showed 
that Guangdong had 14 million more residents than was estimated the year before 
by the 0.1% National Sample Survey on Population Changes, while for Anhui the 
resident count was almost three million less. These census counts are plugged into 
the resident population time series by the NBS and the sharp peaks and troughs 
for the year 2000 do not reflect anything done by us to the data. The reported 
resident population for Anhui the year after the census fell back to the time series 
of registered population, which it tracks until the 2005 microcensus revealed 3.4 
million fewer people living in Anhui than was reported the year before. The 
patterns are reversed for Guangdong, although the resident population series never 
fully returned to the time series of registered population after the 2000 census (but 
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Figure 1: Four Time Series of Provincial Population Estimates 
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it still dropped by 8.4 million people from 2000 to 2001). The sharp jumps in the 
Guangdong population in 2005 (by 9 million) and 2010 (by 8 million) correspond 
to the extra residents found in years with a microcensus and a full census.  
 These volatile time series of what is reported as a resident population are 
repeated for all of China’s provinces, with migrant receivers having patterns like 
Guangdong and senders having patterns like Anhui. In years without a census or 
microcensus, the number of non-hukou migrants is inaccurately estimated by the 
National Sample Survey on Population Changes and statistical offices in some 
provinces appear to just use the number of registered hukou holders provided by 
the Ministry of Public Security as a proxy for the resident population. 
Consequently, research relying on estimates of how populous is each province is 
likely to be distorted unless it is limited to years with a microcensus or census. 
This problem is magnified when researchers use sub-provincial units like 
prefectures, urban districts, or counties because there are more non-hukou 
migrants for smaller units; a person migrating from the countryside to the capital 
city of their province is not defined as a non-hukou migrant at the provincial level, 
but is at the prefectural or county level. Moreover, there are no revised resident 
population estimates for sub-provincial areas, unlike the series created by the NBS 
in 2011 for backdating provincial resident population estimates from 2010 to 
1990. 
 The time series of the GDP implied population shows four problems that 
may bias results using GDP per capita data. First, the denominator is the hukou 
registered population, rather than the number of residents, up until 2001 
(Guangdong) or 2002 (Anhui). Accordingly, per capita GDP of migrant-sending 
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provinces was ever more understated, since the denominator was increasingly too 
large, while the reverse bias occurred for migrant-receiving provinces. Second, 
once provinces switch from using the number of hukou registrations as the 
denominator, the GDP per capita of migrant-senders rises since the denominator 
is now smaller, with a fall in GDP per capita (relative to trend) for migrant-
receivers since their population denominator increases. Lo and behold, inequality 
between the coast (migrant-receivers) and the interior (migrant-senders) appears 
to fall, but this may just be an artifact of the switch in the denominator. Third, 
there is scope for a double count, since some provinces stopped using the number 
of hukou registrations as a denominator before other provinces made this switch; 
in the intervening years a migrant might be in the denominator of GDP for two 
provinces at once and at the peak there were 26 million people in this double-
counted group. Finally, the fact that the GDP implied population still jumps in 
years with a census or microcensus (e.g., 2005 and 2010) suggests that the per 
capita GDP data are not yet accurately capturing the resident population in non-
census years. 
 The problems with local population data are even more complex for sub-
provincial areas, since there is variation in statistical practice between provinces. 
For example, some provinces do not report a time-series of resident population 
estimates for prefectures or counties, even for the period since 2005 when such 
estimates have been reported at the provincial level. The counting problems 
shown in Figure 1 also occur for these sub-provincial areas but two factors make 
the likely bias due to these problems worse at this finer spatial scale: first, there 
are no retrospective corrections to the resident population estimates, along the 
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lines of what the NBS did in 2011 for provinces (as shown in Figure 1 for the 
‘resident (revised)’ series). The second factor is that the switch to denominating 
GDP by the resident population rather than by the registered population entails 
proportionately much larger breaks in the time-series at the sub-provincial level.  
 We illustrate this point using population time-series for two counties from 
Chongqing in Figure 2, where the registered population, the resident (initial) 
population, and the GDP implied population are defined in the same way as for 
Figure 1. In 2003 the statistics yearbooks for Chongqing changed the denominator 
for reporting GDP per capita from a hukou registered population basis to a 
resident population basis, leading to apparent falls in population for these two 
counties of between 21% and 22%. In contrast, at the provincial level the largest 
drop in implied population from the switch in GDP denominator is for Sichuan, 
which seems to drop by only 7% (albeit, amounting to eight million people) 
between 2003 and 2004. 
 The sharp fall in apparent population (and rise in GDP per capita) for 
migrant-sending counties when provincial statistics offices switched their GDP 
denominators is clear in Figure 2. But even with the more appropriate resident-
based denominators used recently, a further problem is seen for Kai county (as an 
example of the same problem in many other counties). The resident population 
time series for Kai county varies by only 0.9% around its mean between 2003 and 
2013 and the mean is just 0.2% away from the census count for 2010. But the 
2003-2013 time series is 18% below the resident population count from the 2000 
census, and it is unlikely that the resident population would fall so sharply 
between 2000 and 2003 and then stabilize. In contrast, the resident population 
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Figure 2: Time Series of County Population Estimates 
 
 
 
Source: Chongqing Statistical Yearbooks.  
Note: No GDP per capita data is reported for 2010 for these counties. 
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time series for Youyang county appears more plausible, with a range over 2003-
13 that is 3.9% of its mean, where that mean is almost exactly equal to the 2010 
census count and is just 3.5% below the 2000 census count. The trend in the 
resident population time-series for Youyang county seems reasonably consistent 
with the change in the census counts, unlike for Kai county. 
 We have examined population time series for many other counties, and 
also for urban districts (‘cities’) and for prefectures, and we find similar examples 
of inconsistencies. This evidence suggests that for many sub-provincial areas the 
resident population counts outside of Census years cannot be considered accurate. 
These estimates come from a 0.1% sample as part of the National Sample Survey 
on Population Changes and the likelihood of this survey accurately counting non-
hukou residents is much less than what can be expected from the complete census 
enumeration. It would be a mistake, however, to use this evidence to advocate for 
using the registered population data, which do maintain a consistent definition 
over time; this de jure population series is not a sensible choice for economists to 
use since it does not correspond to the number of people who are consuming or 
producing local output. Instead, our review of the counting errors in China’s sub-
national population data leads us to advocate for restricting the scope of any 
analysis to relying on changes in local populations between censuses, which is 
what we do in the remainder of this paper for 2000 and 2010. 
6.3 DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The estimates of urban area in 2000 and 2010 are from Gibson, Li and Boe-
Gibson (2014) and are based on remotely-sensed night lights from the Defense 
Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System (DMSP/OLS). 
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The starting sample for the analysis by Gibson et al (2014) was 260 cities that had 
data available on built-up area, GDP, and registered population for at least 15 of 
the 20 years from 1993 to 2012.
68
 Towards the end of that sample period, the lit 
area for some of these administratively defined cities could not be distinguished 
from the lit area of their neighbors, for cities in larger agglomerations like the 
Pearl River delta and the Yangtze delta. To provide consistent time series, any 
cities whose night lights eventually join are merged for all years (1993–2012) and 
after this aggregation, the number of cities in the sample dropped to n=225 (but 
they continue to cover the same total area). The population and GDP data used in 
the current analysis are aggregated in the same way, for both 2000 and 2010. 
 Unlike other sources of remote sensing data, such as Landsat, estimates of 
urban area based on night lights require a threshold level of brightness to be set to 
exclude low-lit areas of sparse development. Cross-validation exercises by Gibson 
et al (2014) showed that thresholds of 50% and 65% of the maximum luminosity 
level were appropriate for China’s cities.69 When these thresholds are used a few 
dimly lit cities drop out of the sample, especially in earlier years when cities were 
smaller and less brightly lit, and especially for the higher threshold. Other 
deletions were of any cities whose lit area was less than one square kilometer, 
which is below the resolution of the most widely used night lights data from 
                                                          
68
 Specifically, these cities are districts (shiqu), which are the best proxy for an urban core in China 
(Roberts et al, 2012). Gibson et al (2014) show that estimates of built-up area reported in City 
Statistical Yearbooks understate trend expansion rates in urban area, most probably because local 
governments under-report land conversions (World Bank, 2014). Thus just the urban area 
estimates detected from night lights are used in the current study.  
69
 These thresholds correspond to DN values of 32 and 41. Although it is a semantic point, we 
prefer to talk about a fraction of the maximum luminosity that is recorded by DMSP/OLS 
(DN=63) to emphasize that these remote sensing observations give a relative rather than absolute 
measure of brightness, due especially to lack of on-board recording of amplification changes and 
to inter-satellite differences. Any errors due to these features are captured in the intercepts of our 
first-differenced models and so should not affect the analyses. 
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DMSP/OLS (for non-ephemeral lights). After these deletions, the sample sizes are 
221 cities if using the 50% light threshold to define contiguously lit areas as 
urban, and 203 cities if using the 65% threshold. City areas measured at these 
thresholds both correlate closely with Landsat estimates for the year 2000, with 
Pearson correlation coefficients of 0.86.
70
 Thus it is expected that using night 
lights derived measures of city area as an arbiter for comparing registered 
population and resident population should also be informative about likely bias in 
published results that rely on city areas as measured from Landsat data. It is also 
expected that by using two different luminosity thresholds to measure cities it 
should allow an assessment of the robustness of any inferences based on the test 
results. 
 The summary statistics in Table 1 show that city area in 2010 had 
approximately tripled compared with the year 2000, when either detection 
threshold is used. The summary statistics also show that average city-level GDP, 
as reported in the City Statistical Yearbooks, was roughly five times as high in 
2010 as in 2000. These are nominal GDP estimates and since the modelling uses 
first differenced models the intercept will capture the effects on nominal variables 
of changes in the general price level. The city-level population counts are the 
urban resident population from the censuses and the year-end non-agricultural 
hukou registered population from the Ministry of Public Security. In both years 
the resident population counts are over 40% higher, due to the non-hukou 
residents, and it is this difference between the two types of population estimates 
                                                          
70
 We thank Dr Xiangzheng Deng of the Chinese Academy of Sciences for providing us with these 
Landsat estimates of city area for the year 2000. Similar estimates have not yet been processed for 
2010. 
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Table 1. Variable Definition and Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
---------------2000--------------- 
NA Non-agricultural population (million) 225 0.74 1.61 0.09 20.07 
U Urban resident population (million) 225 1.08 2.64 0.13 29.42 
A65 Night light area at 65% threshold using satellite 15 (km
2
) 205
a
 155.32 636.10 0.77
c,d
 7609.59 
A50 Night light area at 50% threshold using satellite 15 (km
2
) 222
b
 194.46 768.76 0.75
c
 9383.45 
GDP Gross domestic product (billion yuan) 225 20.75 67.49 1.27 795.32 
---------------2010--------------- 
NA Non-agricultural population (million) 225 1.09 2.73 0.12 33.44 
U Urban resident population (million) 225 1.56 4.54 0.15 49.60 
A65 Night light area at 65% threshold using satellite 18 (km
2
) 225 441.61 1883.09 0.79
c,d
 24706.03 
A50 Night light area at 50% threshold using satellite 18 (km
2
) 225 577.96 2306.13 2.37 30320.72 
GDP Gross domestic product (billion yuan) 225 106.15 391.93 4.03 4442.01 
Notes: 
a 
20 observations with missing areas. 
b 
3 observations with missing areas. 
c 
1 observation with area <1 km
2
. 
d 
Different two observations. 
Sources: NBS (2001a, 2003, 2011a, 2012) and DMSP/OLS. 
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that is at the heart of our tests whose results are reported in the next section. 
6.4 RESULTS 
The first-differenced models of the change in urban area between 2000 and 2010 
are reported in Table 2. In columns (1) and (3) the results are for models that 
follow the approach of Deng et al (2008) in using a de jure population concept, 
which in this case is the number of non-agricultural hukou registrations from each 
city. These models give results that are quite similar to what is reported by Deng 
et al (2008), which is that local GDP growth explains the urban expansion, with 
no independent effect of local population growth. Specifically, the elasticity of 
urban expansion with respect to growth in local GDP is about 0.2, while the 
elasticity with respect to the change in local population is not significantly 
different from zero.  
The results are very different when the de facto urban resident population 
from the census counts is used as the measure of local population in the models 
(in columns (2) and (4) of Table 2). For these models, the elasticity of urban area 
with respect to population change ranges from 0.38 to 0.43, and these elasticities 
are precisely measured while there is no statistically significant effect of local 
GDP change on urban expansion. In other words, the expansion in the area of 
these cities between 2000 and 2010 can be explained by population growth with 
no independent effect of rising incomes, if the population whose growth is 
measured is the resident population rather than the de jure population provided by 
the hukou registration system. Thus the finding of Deng et al (2008) that urban 
expansion in China was due to income growth rather than population growth 
appears to be an artifact of using the wrong type of local population data for what  
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Table 2. Effects of Economic and Population Growth on Expansion of Urban Land Area in China 2000-2010 by First Difference Models 
 Dependent variable: ∆ln(A) 
 Night Light 65% Threshold Night Light 50% Threshold 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
∆ln(GDP) 0.190 0.064 0.191 0.031 
 (0.108)* (0.110) (0.103)* (0.104) 
∆ln(NA) -0.072  -0.161  
 (0.139)  (0.133)  
∆ln(U)  0.380  0.431 
  (0.186)**  (0.175)** 
Constant 1.054 1.122 0.983 1.061 
 (0.159)*** (0.158)*** (0.153)*** (0.151)*** 
Observations 203
a
 203
a
 221
b
 221
b
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.006
c
 0.025
c
 0.008
c
 0.028
c
 
F stat
d
 1.59 3.57** 1.84 4.17** 
Cox-Pesaran stat
e
 -11.41*** -7.13*** 
 H0:(1) / H1:(2) H0:(3) / H1:(4) 
Cox-Pesaran stat
e
 0.23 -0.41 
 H0:(2) / H1:(1) H0:(4) / H1:(3) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. 
a 
20 observations with missing areas and 2 observations with area <1 km
2
 are excluded. 
b 
3 observations with missing areas and 1 observation with area <1 km
2
 are excluded. 
c 
First-differences models have small adjusted R
2
, which is consistent with Deng et al 
(2008, Table 3, page 111). 
d 
Tests for the hypothesis that all coefficients (excluding the constant) are zero. 
e 
Tests for non-nested models. 
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the modeling task required. Notably, this is the most common type of mis-
interpretation of China’s sub-national data in our survey of the literature (see 
Appendix Table 1). 
 The reversal of results in Table 2 once the de facto resident population is 
used makes intuitive sense. There is no reason to believe that the number of 
people whose hukou registration is from a particular place is a suitable proxy 
measure for local population in modern China, given the massive and rising tide 
of non-hukou migration. The unsuitability of this proxy measure is especially 
apparent when seeking to explain urban area expansion, since the uncounted non-
hukou urban residents also need dwellings to live in, roads to drive on, and 
offices, shops and factories to work in. All of these activities by non-hukou 
residents require land being converted from agricultural use to urban use and so 
the de facto population is the one that should be expected to be related to the 
increase in city area.  
 However we also back up this intuitive reasoning with a more formal 
testing procedure, by using the Pesaran (1974) version of a Cox likelihood ratio 
test of the validity of one linear model, H0 as opposed to its non-nested alternative 
H1. The test can be described in general terms, as follows:  
H0: 000 ubxy   
H1: 111 ubxy   
where x0 and x1 are matrices of n observations on explanatory variables that are 
not linear combinations of one and other, b0 and b1 are corresponding parameter 
vectors, u0 and ul are random errors with zero mean and variance-covariance 
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matrices I20 and I
2
1 (I is an identity matrix of order n). Constructing the test 
statistic involves six steps, where in what follows we use the notation 
:1,0,)( 1   ixxxxIM iiiii  
(i) Regress y on x0 to form 00
ˆˆ bxy    
(ii) Regress the fitted values from (i), ,ˆ00bx  on x1 to form residuals:
001 bˆxM  
(iii) Calculate the sum of squared residuals from (ii), 00100
ˆˆ bxMxb   
(iv) Regress the residuals from (ii) on x0  
(v) Calculate the sum of squared residuals from (iv), 0010100
ˆˆ bxMMMxb   
(vi) Calculate the test statistic vsN ˆ  which is N(0,1) under H0, where:  
)]}ˆˆ)(1(ˆ[ˆln{)2( 00100
2
0
2
1 bxMxbnns    
2
00100
2
00010100
2
0 )
ˆˆˆ()ˆˆˆ(ˆ bxMxbbxMMMxbv    
and where 
2
1
2
0
ˆ,ˆ   are SSE0/n and SSE1/n, where SSE is sum of 
squared errors. 
The decision procedure for the test is to reject H0 for negative (since this is a 
lower tail test) values of vs ˆ  exceeding the critical value from the standard 
Normal tables. After testing H0 versus H1, the procedure is reversed with H1 
replacing H0 in the above steps. 
The results reported in the last rows of Table 2 provide strong support in 
favor of using the de facto resident population to explain the expansion of urban 
areas between 2000 and 2010. When the model that uses a de jure population 
 177 
 
  
 
concept (the number of local hukou holders) is used as H0
 
it is decisively rejected 
in favor of H1, the model based on the resident population (with the test statistic 
significant at p<0.01 regardless of whether using a 50% or 65% luminosity 
threshold). But when the test procedure is reversed, with the model using the de 
facto population as H0 the Cox-Pesaran statistics are insignificant, indicating that 
the de facto population model is not rejected against the de jure population 
alternative.       
6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper uses measures of city area derived from night lights as an arbiter to 
compare two different types of local population data for China; a de facto measure 
based on census counts of where people actually reside, and a de jure measure 
based on police records of where they are registered to live under China’s hukou 
system. Our review of the economics literature shows that it is the de jure measure 
that is most typically used in published studies, even when it would be more 
sensible to use the de facto measure that relates to the population who actually 
consume and produce local output. Treating the de jure measure as if it were a de 
facto local population constitutes what we have called a “counting error” and in 
the example we provide, this counting error substantially distorts the conclusions 
that are drawn from the data.  
Specifically, one would conclude that expansion of urban areas is driven 
by income growth with no independent role played by local population growth, if 
the de jure population from the hukou registration data is used as a proxy measure 
for city-level population. Indeed, this is the conclusion reached in the study by 
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Deng et al (2008), and this conclusion is likely to have influenced views about 
China since the Deng et al paper is the most highly cited of all the articles we 
surveyed within the urban and regional economics category. In contrast to this 
conclusion, which we consider to be an artefact, if the more appropriate de facto 
population measure based on census counts of where people actually reside is 
used, there is a strong effect of local population growth on urban expansion and 
no apparent effect of income growth. The outcome of non-nested tests strongly 
favours using the resident-based de facto population rather than the de jure 
population from the number of local hukou registrations. We offer these results as 
an example of the distorted inferences that are likely to result from the erroneous 
use of China’s sub-national population data.  
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Appendix Table 1. Number and Percentage of Papers with Wrong Interpretation 
Year Blue Ribbon Development Regional/Urban 
2005-2006 2
*
 11
****
 3 
 
100% 79%
d,e,e
 100% 
2007-2008 1 9
*
 2
*
 
 
100% 90%
d
 100% 
2009-2010 3 10
**
 2 
 
75%
c
 77%
d,e,e
 100% 
2011-2012 1 10
***
 4 
 
100% 91%
c
 80%
d
 
2013-2015 5
**
 12
*
 4 
 
83%
c
 75%
a,b,d,e
 100% 
Notes:  
1. Year is publication year. The starting year is set to be 2005 because NBS started to switch to use 
resident population to calculate GDP per capita in 2005. Detailed information on this NBS official 
switch can be found in Li and Gibson (2013). 
Blue Ribbon 3 journals include American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, and 
Review of Economics and Statistics.  
2. Development 3 journals include Journal of Development Economics, World Development, and 
Journal of Comparative Economics.  
3. Regional/Urban 3 journals include Journal of Urban Economics, Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, and Journal of Economic Geography.  
4. Papers with wrong interpretation are defined either as if they use unreliable historical 
population, employment, or GDP per capita data for provinces, prefectures, districts, county-level 
cities or counties from yearbooks, or as if they solely use NBS annual household survey data that 
only sample people with local hukou and therefore exclude non-hukou migrants unless they 
acknowledge this exclusion would bias their results. The total is 79. 
5. * denotes a paper with wrong interpretation solely using NBS annual household survey data 
without acknowledgement on the non-hukou migrants exclusion bias. The total is 15 (included in 
the 79).  
6. Papers solely use population census data (denoted by a if using census 2010; denoted by c if 
using census 2000 or earlier), NBS revised provincial historical GDP per capita based on census 
2010 (denoted by b), NBS annual household survey data with acknowledgement on the non-hukou 
migrants exclusion bias (denoted by d), or other data free of the NBS population/employment 
counting error e.g. from World Bank, other NBS firm-level surveys etc. (denoted by e) are treated 
as papers with correct interpretation, which is used to calculate the percentage of papers with 
wrong interpretation. The total is 15. There is only one paper using census 2010 (most reliable on 
population and employment), which is Li and Gibson (2013). 
7. The total of papers reviewed is 94. Detailed references and reviews in excel sheets are available 
from authors upon requests. The review is completed on 7
th
 May 2015. There are only 3 papers in 
2015, which all fall in the Development journal group (2 in World Development and 1 in Journal 
of Comparative Economics), and of which one is with correct interpretation (in World 
Development, denoted by e) while the other two are with wrong interpretation (in World 
Development and Journal of Comparative Economics, respectively using unreliable provincial 
historical employment and GDP per capita data from yearbooks). 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In the last two decades the internal migration of hundreds of millions of Chinese 
has dramatically reshaped China’s economic geography. However a complete 
understanding of this reshaping is currently lacking because China’s statistical 
system has not fully coped with this massive internal migration. While Chinese 
are meant to stay registered at local police stations under the hukou household 
registration system, many do not. Consequently data on the de jure population that 
is provided every year from Ministry of Public Security statistics becomes an 
increasingly poor guide to where Chinese actually live. Yet from an economic 
point of view it is important to know how many people live in each sub-national 
area, whether that be for provinces, prefectures, urban districts or counties, since it 
is the people who actually live in an area who produce and consume local output. 
This thesis is all about the “counting errors” that can result when de jure 
population estimates from the hukou registration system are wrongly treated as if 
they were de facto population counts for the size of each local area in China. The 
empirical research reported in the thesis is made possible by the availability of 
population census data every ten years, which can be contrasted with the annual 
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estimates of the local resident population, which in many cases are based on poor 
approximations from the registered population statistics. Since population data are 
widely used in economic analysis due to reliance on per capita variables, the error 
of mistaking statistics based the de jure population for estimates of the de facto 
population could show up in many parts of the economics literature.  
Indeed, as shown in chapters 2-6, when the most reliable local resident 
population and employment counts from China’s 2010 (and 2000) population 
census are used, the existing empirical evidence on five topics is extensively 
challenged. First, in Chapter 2, which is published as Li and Gibson (2013), much 
of the apparent increase in inter-provincial inequality in China from 1990 onwards 
disappears once local GDP per resident and resident population counts are used. 
Most prior studies used per capita GDP figures that initially were based on the 
hukou registered population for each province, which increasingly overstated the 
population (and understated the GDP per capita) of migrant sending provinces 
while causing the opposite for migrant receivers. A further distortion occurred as 
provinces switched to denominating GDP by the resident population, with the 
change in denominator causing an apparent turning point in the inequality 
statistics that corresponded with China’s investment in lagging regions. Thus, the 
common accounts of both the rising inequality and the turning point (e.g. Fan et 
al, 2011) may be nothing more than statistical artefacts.  
A second example is provided in Chapter 3, which is published as Li and 
Gibson (2015a). The use of more complete data on city-level employment, from 
the long form census given to ten percent of households in 2010, shows that 
Chinese cities are much closer to their peak scale and have much smaller losses in 
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net output per worker from being away from the peak point than is suggested by 
earlier studies. Amongst these earlier studies, the key paper is by Au and 
Henderson (2006), who use employment data in the city statistical yearbooks 
which appears to be incomplete because many private sector workers are not 
counted (and this error is likely related to the population counting errors since the 
non-hukou residents of cities are much more likely to work in the private sector). 
Thus, it may again be nothing more than a statistical artefact that China has too 
many small cities and foregoes agglomeration-based productivity gains as a result, 
despite this being an often repeated claim in the literature.  
A third example of a challenge to the existing literature is in Chapter 4, 
which is available as a working paper in Li and Gibson (2015b). Compared with 
what is estimated when using the local resident population count, if instead the 
local hukou population count is wrongly used as a measure of city size it makes 
the city size distribution in China seem more even, and gives larger exponents 
when a Pareto distribution is estimated. The reason is that non-hukou migrants 
increasingly congregate into a few larger cities and if cities are measured with a 
de jure population variable that ignores the non-hukou migrants this pattern is 
missed. Thus, the existing literature on the size distribution of cities in China, 
which argues that they are becoming more evenly sized over time (e.g. Anderson 
and Ge, 2005), may mislead because the measure of city size used (from the 
hukou registration statistics) does not correspond to where people actually live.  
A fourth challenge to the existing literature concerns the size of 
urbanization economies due to agglomeration effects in China. A variant of the 
claim that China has too many small cities is made by Combes et al (2015) who 
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argue that urbanization economies in China are three times higher than in Western 
countries which is a claimed consequence of the malformed city size distribution 
in China. But the China’s Urban Household Survey used in Combes et al (2015) 
excludes non-hukou urban residents from the sampling frame and so the results 
may not be reliable. In Chapter 5, which is published as a working paper by Li 
and Gibson (2015c), estimates of urbanization economies are made using census 
estimates of the size of each city (in terms of urban residents), and also using 
long-form census data on the industrial and spatial distribution of employment. 
These urbanization economies occur only for urban districts, and not for counties 
or county-level cities, and are only found for tertiary (services) sector activity and 
not for the secondary sector of manufacturing and construction. Notably, the 
urbanization economies are similar in magnitude to what is found in Western 
countries, which may count against the idea that China is foregoing 
agglomeration-related benefits due to having too many small cities. 
The fifth and final example of a challenge to the existing literature 
concerns the effect of local population change on the expansion of urban area, 
which is often termed sprawl. In Chapter 6, which is a working paper of Li and 
Gibson (2015d), it is shown that changes in the local hukou population between 
2000 and 2010 does not have any explanatory power when modelling local urban 
land area expansion in China at the city level, while local economic growth has all 
of the explanatory power. This pattern is exactly what is found in Deng et al 
(2008) who use county-level data and related urban area expansion from 1995 to 
2000 to county GDP growth and growth in the hukou registered population for 
each county. However, the exact reverse pattern is found once a more appropriate 
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measure of local population growth is calculated using the urban local resident 
population counts from the 2000 and 2010 census. Thus it is likely that the 
published finding about the non-importance of local population growth for 
explaining urban sprawl in China is also an artefact of relying on a de jure 
population variable rather than a de facto population variable.  
These five examples serve as a cornerstone in the small literature that 
reminds analysis on various other economic issues for China of the need for 
caution in use of local population and employment counts. For example, two 
recent papers published in World Development by Shi and Huang (2014) and by 
Elliott and Zhou (2015) respectively study infrastructure and wage issues topics 
related to China, but both incorporate exactly the interpretations of China’s sub-
national population and GDP per capita data that are suggested in Li and Gibson 
(2013). Indeed, Li and Gibson (2013) clearly show in detail at provincial level 
where and how big the error of sub-national population counts is in China’s 
statistical system. Relatedly, Li and Gibson (2015a) explicitly indicate that the 
incomplete local employment count reported in China’s statistical yearbook 
averages just 43% of the complete local employment count recorded for the same 
cities by the China’s population census. Even more specifically and at finer scales, 
Li and Gibson (2015c) explicitly show where and how big the stock of non-hukou 
urban residents is among all districts, count-level cities and counties in China. 
Those are all very helpful guides for future economic analysis on China.     
 While this thesis mainly aims to make a contribution to the economic 
literature on China, there also are important and timely policy implications of the 
five main papers. China’s urban population and its rate are forecasted to further 
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reach 1050 million and 76% by 2050 (UN World Urbanization Prospect 2014). 
This is an increase of 292 million and 22% on top of that in 2014. One way that 
China can undergo catch-up urbanization is for a few existing cities to join Beijing 
and Shanghai as mega-cities. But central and local governments may also try to 
foster the growth of new cities in currently less urbanized or laggard regions. The 
latter dispersed urbanization strategy is especially pertinent in China while it is 
also true elsewhere
71. Examples include initiatives such as the “county-to-city 
upgrading system” (see Li and Gibson, 2015b), the “new rural countryside 
program”, the “west China development project”, the “northeast China 
revitalization campaign”, and the “rise of central China plan” (see Li and Gibson, 
2013). A new effort in this dispersed strategy was launched in 2012 under the 
heading of ‘townification’ (chengzhenhua) which can be considered as in-situ 
urbanization where rural towns become urbanized. While it is also true 
elsewhere,
72
 China particularly is averse to a concentrated urbanization strategy 
given the long-standing and still ongoing pro-small bias in its urban policy (see Li 
and Gibson, 2015b). 
Despite that policy bias, the five main chapters in this thesis collectively 
give the mutual policy implication that China shall go for the concentrated 
urbanization strategy rather than the dispersed one. Some of the evidence which 
might be thought to oppose this recommendation is likely to be misleading since it 
is based on incorrect local population and employment counts. First, some studies 
                                                          
71
 Public policies in many countries try to foster new agglomeration economies by building 
clusters, by attracting ‘talent’ or by luring large industrial facilities (Combes et al, 2011) 
72
 Urban policies commonly attempt to limit the growth of large cities in many countries 
(particularly developing countries), which often take the form of barriers to labour mobility and 
zoning restrictions on new constructions (Duranton, 2008). 
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(e.g. Fan et al, 2011) suggest that the leveling off of regional inequality in China 
in the early 2000s reflects the good effects of massive state-led infrastructural 
investments in western China in the period. But an alternative explanation of Li 
and Gibson (2013) is that the apparent leveling off over those years is just a 
statistical artefact caused by the switch in population denominator for GDP from a 
registered population basis to a resident population basis. Thus, the active state 
intervention to close the apparent regional gaps, which cost hundreds of billions 
of dollars, may not have been effective after all and was perhaps not actually 
necessary. Second, as shown in Li and Gibson (2015a), the reshaping of China’s 
economic geography by the hundreds of millions of non-hukou urban residents 
evidently is producing an urban system that does not have productivity losses that 
are as large as previously reported in highly-cited studies such as Au and 
Henderson (2006). Thus, the suggestion in Au and Henderson (2006) that China 
shall actively foster the growth of small cities is not necessary at all. Indeed, the 
“county-to-city upgrading system” had failed to improve local economic 
performance of those relabeled counties and ended in the late 1990s. 
Third, in Chapter 4 when Pareto’s Law is used as a normative standard, 
only the very largest cities in China appear to have scope to absorb more non-
hukou urban residents. This contrasts sharply with the pro-small and anti-large 
bias in China’s urban policy. Indeed, the analysis in Chapter 4 finds that over 
time, Chinese cities are moving away from the middle of the city size range with 
many joining the bottom range while some joining the top range, which implies 
the divergence of city size distribution in China as opposed to the common 
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findings of convergence in extant city size distribution studies on China (e.g. 
Anderson and Ge, 2005).  
Further evidence in favour of a concentration urbanization strategy comes 
from Chapter 5, where it is shown that agglomeration effects in China occur only 
in already agglomerated areas, and operate mainly through economic sectors that 
require a large nearby market such as services. Thus, the dispersed urbanization 
strategy will entail a high opportunity cost in terms of foregone productivity in 
China. Yet, even with the much larger estimated agglomeration effects, Combes et 
al (2015) wrongly suggest that there are potentially high efficiency losses in China 
due to Chinese small and medium-sized cities being with too few people. Indeed, 
Li and Gibson (2015c) clearly show that the locations of agglomeration 
economies in China are only the very existing largest cities according to the 
choices of hundreds of millions of non-hukou urban residents in China. Thus, the 
policy implications in Combes et al (2015) and Au and Henderson (2006) may be 
misleading. In particular, the sharp increases of secondary sector employment in 
Chinese county-level cities and counties found between 2000 and 2010 (as 
reported in Li and Gibson (2015c)) is evidence of how China’s urban policy has 
been misguided in following a dispersed strategy, since there is no likelihood that 
sending manufacturing and construction out to rural counties and small county-
level cities will generate any useful agglomeration benefits.  
The fifth policy implication concerns urban land area expansion, which 
relates to food security and environmental concerns. The population densities of 
the very largest Chinese cities are lower than those of other mega-cities elsewhere 
in the world, and over time their relative density is falling further (Du et al, 2013). 
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As shown in Chapter 6, urban land area expansion of Chinese cities should be best 
modelled by using the de facto resident population and not the de jure registered 
population. So further study on this critical environmental and economic issue is 
likely to be misleading if it follows the strategy of the previous literature, of 
wrongly treating the hukou registered population as a measure of where people 
actually live. 
 
  
 192 
 
  
 
References 
Anderson, G., & Ge, Y. (2005). The size distribution of Chinese cities. Regional 
Science and Urban Economics, 35(6), 756-776. 
Au, C. & Henderson, V. (2006). Are Chinese cities too small? Review of 
Economic Studies 73(3): 549-576. 
Combes, P., Duranton, G., and Gobillon, L. (2011). The identification of 
agglomeration economies. Journal of Economic Geography 11(2): 253-
266. 
Combes, P., Démurger, S., & Li, S. (2015). Migration externalities in Chinese 
cities. European Economic Review, 76, 152-167. 
Deng, X., Huang, J., Rozelle, S., & Uchida, E. (2008). Growth, population and 
industrialization, and urban land expansion of China. Journal of Urban 
Economics, 63(1), 96-115. 
Du, S., Shi, P., & Van Rompaey, A. (2013). The relationship between urban 
sprawl and farmland displacement in the Pearl River Delta, China. Land, 
3(1), 34-51. 
Duranton, G. (2008). Viewpoint: from cities to productivity and growth in 
developing countries. Canadian Journal of Economics, 41(3), 689-736. 
Elliott, R. J., & Zhou, Y. (2015). Co-location and spatial wage spillovers in China: 
the role of foreign ownership and trade. World Development, 66, 629-644. 
Fan, S., Kanbur, R., and Zhang, X. (2011). China’s Regional Disparities: 
Experience and Policy. Review of Development Finance, 1(1): 47-56. 
Li, C. & Gibson, J. (2013). Rising regional inequality in China: fact or artifact? 
World Development 47(1): 16-29. 
 193 
 
  
 
Li, C., & Gibson, J. (2015a). City scale and productivity in China. Economics 
Letters, 131, 86-90. 
Li, C. & Gibson, J. (2015b). Pareto’s law and city size in China: only very large 
Chinese cities are too small! Working Paper 03/15. University of Waikato. 
Li, C. & Gibson, J. (2015c). Urbanization economies in China: nature, location 
and effects. Working Paper 03/15. Department of Economics, University 
of Waikato. 
Li, C. & Gibson, J. (2015d). Shining light on erroneous use of China’s sub-
national data. Working Paper 03/15. University of Waikato. 
Shi, H., & Huang, S. (2014). How much infrastructure is too much? a new 
approach and evidence from China. World Development, 56, 272-286. 
United Nations. (2014). World Urbanization Prospects. Retrieved from 
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf 
 
 194 
 
  
 
Appendix 1 
 
 
 
Spatial Price Differences and Inequality in the People’s Republic 
of China: Housing Market Evidence 
 
 
Chao Li‡ and John Gibson† 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‡ Department of Economics, Private Bag 3105, University of Waikato, Hamilton 3240 New 
Zealand (e-mail: cl95@students.waikato.ac.nz). 
 
† Department of Economics, Private Bag 3105, University of Waikato, Hamilton 3240 New 
Zealand (e-mail: jkgibson@waikato.ac.nz). Corresponding author: 64-7-838-4289 (ph), 64-7-838-
4331 (fax). 
  
 195 
 
  
 
Acknowledgements: 
 
We are grateful to Geua Boe-Gibson, Yun Liang, Scott Rozelle, Niny Khor, an 
anonymous referee and participants at the ADR conference for assistance and 
helpful suggestions.   
 
  
 196 
 
  
 
Spatial Price Differences and Inequality in the People’s Republic 
of China: Housing Market Evidence 
 
Abstract 
The large literature on regional inequality in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) is hampered by incomplete evidence on price dispersion across space, 
making it hard to distinguish real and nominal inequality. The two main methods 
used to calculate spatial deflators have been to price a national basket of goods 
and services across different regions in the country or else to estimate a food 
Engel curve and define the deflator as that needed for nominally similar 
households to have the same food budget shares in all regions. Neither approach is 
convincing with the data available. Moreover, a focus on tradable goods such as 
food may be misplaced because of the emerging literature on the rapid 
convergence of traded goods prices within the PRC that contrasts with earlier 
claims of fragmented internal markets. In a setting where traded goods prices 
converge rapidly, the main source of price dispersion across space should come 
from nontraded items, and especially from housing given the fixity of land. In this 
paper we use newly available data on dwelling sales in urban PRC to develop 
spatially-disaggregated indices of house prices which are then used as spatial 
deflators for both provinces and core urban districts. These new deflators 
complement existing approaches that have relied more on traded goods prices and 
are used to re-examine the evidence on the level of regional inequality. Around 
one-quarter of the apparent spatial inequality disappears once account is taken of 
cost-of-living differences. 
Keywords:  Housing, inequality, prices, spatial, People’s Republic of China 
JEL: E31, O15, R31  
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A1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The large literature on regional inequality in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) is hampered by the limited evidence on price dispersion across space, 
which makes it difficult to distinguish real inequality from nominal inequality. 
Like statistical agencies in most countries, the PRC’s National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) does not publish a spatial price index that allows cost-of-living 
comparisons over space. Instead, the focus is on the temporal Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), which is reported at both the national and the provincial level. There 
are also separate CPIs for rural and urban areas at both national and provincial 
levels. These indices allow rates of change in the consumer price level to be 
compared across different locations but do not allow comparisons of absolute 
price levels or of the cost of living between locations. 
 However, there are good reasons to suspect that price levels and the cost of  
living vary over space. A higher price level is expected in more productive, richer 
economies (Balassa 1964, Samuelson 1964). The same pattern likely holds within 
countries because typically productivity growth is stronger in the traded sector 
than in the nontraded sector. If wages in the traded sector rise with productivity 
while nontraded sector wages are pegged to those in the traded sector (both 
sectors compete for workers in the same labor market), then prices of nontraded 
items will grow faster than productivity and will rise in real terms. The overall 
price level is an average of traded and nontraded prices so that in the context of 
regions of the PRC, one can expect a higher overall price level in export-oriented, 
coastal provinces in which nominal income is higher, such as Guangdong, than in 
poorer, inland provinces such as Yunnan.  
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The implications of this pattern are worth emphasizing in the PRC where 
there is substantial debate about the impacts of economic reform on inequality. A 
common claim in the literature is that spatial inequality rose in the reform era, 
especially when policy neglected the rural sector (Fan, Kanbur, and Zhang 2011). 
This claim has fuelled initiatives to help seemingly laggard regions catch up to 
seemingly advanced regions, including the West China Development Project (Lai 
2002), the Northeast China Revitalization Campaign (Zhang 2008), and the Rise 
of Central China Plan (Lai 2007). Just a subset of these initiatives saw more than 
one trillion yuan ($180 billion) of state-led infrastructural investment directed to 
western region of the country (Yao, 2009). But without reliable measures of 
spatial price differences, it is not clear how much of the reported spatial inequality 
(and its claimed increase) is simply due to regional price variation and how much 
reflects differences in real incomes. 
In this paper, we use newly available data on dwelling sales in urban PRC 
to develop spatially-disaggregated indices of house prices which are used as 
spatial deflators for provinces, urban prefectures, and urban core districts. Since 
we account for only one source of cost-of-living variation over space, the impacts 
on inequality that we find when using these deflators should be considered a 
conservative, lower bound. Our approach contrasts with the two main methods 
previously used to calculate spatial deflators in the PRC where either a national 
basket of goods and services has been priced in different regions or a food Engel 
curve has been estimated and a deflator derived as that which is needed for 
nominally similar households to have the same food budget shares in all regions. 
Neither approach is convincing with the data available in the PRC, as we explain 
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below. Moreover, a focus on traded goods such as food may be misplaced because 
of the emerging literature on the rapid convergence of prices within the PRC that 
contrasts with earlier claims of fragmented internal markets.  
It is increasingly reasonable to expect integrated goods markets in the 
PRC, and for goods prices to obey the law of one price (net of transport costs), but 
the same is not true of housing services. Because of the fixity of land supply, 
accounting for regional differences in housing service prices is fundamental to the 
calculation of spatial differences in the cost of living. While other services are 
also considered nontradable, the long-run supply of their dominant factor of 
production can spatially adjust to reduce interregional price differences. For 
example, if haircuts are relatively more expensive in urban areas of the Pearl 
River Delta, hairdressers might be expected to migrate to that region to increase 
the supply and reduce the regional price premium. There is no similar migration 
possibility for land—the presence of abundant land (relative to the population) in 
western regions and consequently relatively low house prices can do nothing to 
moderate the high cost of housing in Beijing. 
Our focus on housing costs as the main driver of spatial cost-of-living 
differences is supported by previous studies in other countries. According to 
Moulton (1995, 181): “the cost of shelter is the single most important component 
of inter-area differences in the cost-of-living.” Similarly, Massari et al. (2010) 
find housing prices account for almost 70% of cost-of-living differences between 
northern and southern Italy. Our approach is perhaps most closely related to 
Jolliffe (2006) who examines how adjusting for cost-of-living differences between 
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas in the United States causes a complete 
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reversal of the poverty ranking of these areas. In order to measure poverty using 
spatially deflated data, Jolliffe (2006) uses the fair market rent (FMR) index 
which consists of just two components: housing expenses (with a weight of 0.44) 
and all other goods and services (weight of 0.56). This index assumes that cost-of-
living variation over space reflects variation in housing prices only and that there 
is no variation over space in the prices of all other goods and services.
73 
Although our results are most clearly relevant to scholars interested in the 
PRC, they also may have broader applicability. A growing international literature 
examines the impact of accounting for spatial price differences, especially those 
generated from urban housing markets, on apparent trends in nominal outcomes. 
For example, Moretti (2013) finds a more rapid rise in the cost of living 
experienced by college graduates compared to high school graduates accounts for 
one-quarter of the 1980–2000 increase in the nominal college premium in the US. 
This cost differential occurs because college graduates have increasingly 
congregated in urban areas with expensive housing (using monthly rent as a proxy 
for the user cost of housing).
74
  
Similarly, Albouy (2012) shows how accounting for the higher real cost of 
living in US urban areas with more expensive housing provides revealed-
preference estimates of the quality of life that are more consistent with popular 
“livability” rankings and stated preferences. The same effect is present in Russia, 
where Berger, Blomquist, and Peter (2008) estimate housing value and wage 
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 Specifically, the FMR is based on housing prices for the poor, defined as the cost of gross rent 
(including utilities) at the 40th percentile for standard quality housing.  
74
 In a related paper using the same housing cost data, Moretti (2010, 4) notes that empirical results 
are not sensitive to measuring housing costs by using the price of owner-occupied homes instead 
of using rental costs. 
 201 
 
  
 
equations to impute implicit prices for city amenities. In their study, house values 
and nominal incomes are correlated over space and the implied quality of life 
rankings generated by the housing and labor markets are consistent with observed 
internal migration flows. The importance of housing markets for measured 
inequality and quality of life is emphasized by this literature.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the 
literature in three areas that help to inform this study: spatial deflation studies, 
market integration studies, and housing market studies. Section III describes the 
data that we use to create housing-related spatial deflators for the PRC. One 
concern with using dwelling prices as an indicator of cost-of-living differences is 
that dwelling quality may vary systematically across space, so that in Section IV 
we discuss the nature of real estate development in the PRC and provide some 
empirical evidence on the importance of location effects relative to dwelling 
characteristics in determining housing prices. Another concern is that dwelling 
prices may capture more than just the costs of shelter, hence we also contrast our 
approach with studies that rely on rental costs and describe recent trends in tenure 
patterns in urban areas of the PRC. The calculation of the deflators is described in 
Section V and the results are contrasted with other spatial deflators for the PRC. 
The impact of using the deflators when measuring spatial inequality is discussed 
in Section VII, while the conclusions are discussed in Section VII. 
A1.2 PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
The approach we use here, of constructing spatially real income by deflating only 
for housing costs, relies on literature for the PRC that is drawn from three distinct 
areas: spatial deflation studies, market integration studies, and housing market 
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studies. Our overall goal is to contribute to the literature on spatial inequality in 
the PRC by examining the impact of using various deflators on estimates of 
spatial inequality. We reviewed the spatial inequality literature in a recent study 
(Li and Gibson 2013), where the focus had been on the misunderstanding that 
results from ignoring the fact that for most of the reform era, statistical authorities 
in the PRC denominated local GDP by the number of people with hukou 
household registration from each place rather than the number of people actually 
residing in each place (so that measured inequality mechanically increased as the 
number of non-hukou migrants rose). In the current study we use the adjustments 
to the population denominators created by Li and Gibson (2013) but otherwise do 
not address population issues and instead pay attention to the impact of adjusting 
for spatial cost-of-living differences. 
A1.2.1 Spatial Deflation Studies 
The most widely used spatial deflators for the PRC appear to be those of Brandt 
and Holz (2006).
75
 The authors use provincial price data from 1990 to calculate 
the cost of national rural and urban expenditure baskets (containing 40–60 items) 
and a population-weighted combined basket. The prices had originally been 
collected by statistical authorities for the purpose of calculating a temporal index 
(the CPI) for each province, so that they do not necessarily refer to the same 
quality of items across provinces. Rural prices were not available for all products 
consumed in rural areas, so provincial capital city prices were instead used for 
items constituting just over 40% of the average rural household budget. Since 
there were no prices for nontraded services, average labor wages in township and 
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 This paper has 152 Google Scholar citations as of March 2013. 
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village enterprises (TVE) were used as a proxy. Finally, the analysis lacked data 
on either rent, land prices, or real estate prices, therefore construction costs per 
square meter of rural household buildings were used in their place with the 
“quantity” of housing services in the basket set at 0.5625 m2—chosen to give an 
expenditure that was equivalent to nationwide per-capita rural household living 
expenditures on housing. 
Brandt and Holz (2006) then use the annual rate of change in the CPI for 
each province to form annual spatial deflators for each province from 1984 to 
2004. This time series is also used by other researchers studying inequality (e.g., 
by Sicular et al. 2007, Li and Gibson 2013) since it allows easy updating by just 
using published data on the annual rate of change in each province’s CPI. Despite 
the simplicity, there are potential problems in using a temporal index to update a 
spatial index so as to create a panel of deflators. An example of such bias comes 
from Russia: Gluschenko (2006) compares a spatial price index calculated for 
period t using spatial prices for the same period, with an index for period t that is 
extrapolated from a spatial price index for period t0 using local CPIs to update 
prices from t0 to t. The direct method gives a spatial price index for each province 
whose range is 44% of the national mean price level, but the indirect method gives 
a much wider range, of 72%.  
The example from Russia shows that CPI-updated price levels may not 
adequately proxy for cross-spatial price levels. More generally, it may not be 
possible to construct panel price indexes that are unbiased across both space and 
time (Hill 2004). The problem is that bilateral index formulas such as for the 
Laspeyres index used by Brandt and Holz (2006) are unlikely to give transitive 
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results when extended to a multilateral situation. For example, consider a price 
index calculated for three regions (Beijing, PB; other urban areas, PU; and rural 
areas, PR) with base weights that differ in each region. A direct comparison 
between the rural price level in period t2 and Beijing prices in period t0 will not 
give the same result as constructing an indirect comparison via the third region in 
an intermediate time period, t1.That is, 
0,11,20,2 BUURBR PPP   
Instead, transitivity requires use of a multilateral index method, such as the Geary-
Khamis (GK) method that underlies the Penn World Table or EKS (Eltetö, Köves, 
and Szulc) type methods.
76
 
Another issue with the deflator formed by Brandt and Holz is the use of a 
national basket rather than letting consumer responses to relative prices and other 
differences induce regional variation in the structure of consumption. While 
sensitivity to consumer responses is a claimed feature of the “no-price” Engel 
curve method described below (Gong and Meng 2008), it is not required that 
methods using disaggregated price data ignore variation in the structure of 
consumption. For example, Deaton and Dupriez (2011) use unit values from 
household surveys to calculate spatial price differences in two other large 
countries—India and Brazil—using multilateral Törnqvist indexes that are the 
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 These methods compare each country (or region) with an artificially constructed average 
country (or region). Typically they use the Paasche price index formula to make each of these 
bilateral comparisons with the artificial country as the base and tend to suffer from substitution 
bias because the price vector of the base artificial country (region) is not equally representative of 
the prices faced by all of the countries (regions) in the comparison. EKS methods impose 
transitivity in the following way: first, they make bilateral comparisons between all possible pairs 
of countries and then take the nth root of the product of all possible Fisher indices between n 
countries. Deaton and Dupriez (2011, 4) note that multilateral price indexes required for spatial 
work are typically not consistent with the inflation rates in local CPIs and so need to be calculated 
regularly, not just once, and updated by the local CPIs. 
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geometric average of price relativities between each region and the base region, 
weighted by the arithmetic average of the budget shares for the two regions. 
Hence, variation in the structure of consumption, as captured in budget shares for 
each region, is accounted for by this type of spatial price index. The results for 
these two countries show a 20% range in average food prices between the 
cheapest and most expensive regions in India, while in Brazil there is almost no 
price gradient, reflecting the higher incomes in Brazil and hence greater 
importance of processed foods which likely have much smaller price margins 
between regions than do unprocessed foods.
77
  
Gong and Meng (2008) use an Engel curve approach to estimate spatial 
price deflators for each province using data from the Urban Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey from 1986 to 2001.
78
 Their deflator is defined by what is 
needed for nominally similar households to have the same food budget shares in 
all regions following an idea first proposed by Hamilton (2001) for measuring 
bias in a temporal CPI. These authors find implied regional cost-of-living 
differences from the Engel curve that are considerably larger than those calculated 
from pricing a fixed basket using either provincial average prices or household-
level unit values. The difference from fixed basket results was most apparent 
during the mid- to late-1990s when social welfare reforms altered coverage and 
subsidies for public health, education, and housing. In terms of inequality, when 
no adjustment was made for spatial price differences, Gong and Meng (2008) find 
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 Relatedly, supermarkets are more important in Brazil (and also in the PRC) than in India, and 
the growth in the importance of supermarkets assists with spatial convergence in food prices 
(Reardon et al. 2003). 
78
 In contrast to the later work of Almås and Johnsen (2012), Gong and Meng (2008) do not create 
a panel price index of time–space deflators, and instead the food Engel curves are estimated 
separately for each year. 
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that the mid-1990s saw the most significant increase in regional income 
inequality, but after using the deflator derived from their Engel curve results, they 
find regional income inequality to actually increase the most in the late 1980s.  
Almås and Johnsen (2012) use a similar Engel curve approach with data 
from just 2 years (1995 and 2002) for rural areas in 19 (of 31) provinces and 
urban areas in 11 provinces. Rather than estimating a spatial cost-of-living index 
year by year, they attempt to make incomes comparable over both time and space 
using a single set of Engel curve estimates. They claim that the CPI understates 
price changes in rural areas and overstates them in urban areas: the deflator 
derived from the Engel curve suggests a 44% rise in the rural cost of living from 
1995 to 2002 and zero change in the urban cost of living compared to CPI 
increases of 8% and 11%, respectively. This closes the rural-urban gap in terms of 
price levels, with the rural cost of living rising from 60% of the urban level in 
1995 to 87% of the urban level by 2002. Thus, the real income figures calculated 
with their deflator show a greater rise in inequality and a more modest fall in 
poverty than is implied by making no spatial adjustment and using the CPI for 
temporal deflation. 
 The studies that use a food Engel curve to back out regional differences in 
the cost of living (or more generally the bias in any spatial or temporal deflator) 
are one strand in a broad literature that relies on observable proxies for well-being 
to calculate implicit compensation for people living in different circumstances 
(such as family size and structure, or location). For example, Timmins (2006) uses 
internal migration data from Brazil under the logic that moves reveal preferences 
over locations that differ in terms of nominal incomes and the cost of living and 
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can thereby reveal spatial differences in the cost of living. Lanjouw and Ravallion 
(1995) use child anthropometric indicators (stunting and wasting) in addition to 
food share to indicate well-being when anchoring their calculation of allowances 
for household size economies (effectively, the inverse of the compensation needed 
by people living in smaller households to be as well off as those in larger ones at 
the same per capita consumption). Subjective data on self-rated welfare can also 
be used. Krueger and Siskind (1998) and Gibson, Stillman, and Le (2008) use 
survey questions that compare feelings of being better off in the present or the 
past to adjust for possible biases in the CPI, and the same method could be used to 
make spatial comparisons. 
The problem with all of these approaches is that it is simply an assertion 
that the welfare indicator—whether food budget shares, anthropometrics, and so 
forth—does indeed identify people who are equally well off. At least since 
Nicholson (1976), a long literature has argued that food share is not a good 
indicator of well-being. Consider the example of using food share to calculate the 
exact amount of money needed for parents to maintain their consumption while 
providing for a child: Since child consumption is concentrated more on food than 
is adult consumption, food share would be higher even if exact compensation had 
been given, and this higher food share would wrongly indicate the need for further 
(over)compensation.  
In the context of the food Engel curve estimates for the PRC, there is a 
substantial difference between provinces and between urban and rural areas in the 
proportion of household members who are children. The data from the latest wave 
of the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) show 0–15 year old children 
 208 
 
  
 
comprise just 3% of the average household in urban areas of Liaoning province 
but comprise 16% of the average rural household in Guangxi. Food shares will 
thus be higher in Guangxi even if there were no differences in the cost of living, 
but the Engel method will not necessarily recognize this.
79
 Consequently there are 
reasons to doubt the reliability of spatial deflators produced by this method. 
A1.2.2 Market Integration Studies 
Many authors consider the PRC an example of a developing country with 
segmented markets and much less integration than developed countries (Gong and 
Meng 2008, Xu, 2002). In the early reform period, this description may have been 
apt since economic interaction between provinces had been minimized during the 
planned economy era, making the PRC more like a cluster of independent 
economies rather than a large, spatially integrated economy.  
But the surprising claim of some influential studies is that market 
integration declined even more during the reform period. According to Young 
(2000, 1128)  
(T)wenty years of economic reform … resulted in a fragmented 
internal market with fiefdoms controlled by local officials whose 
economic and political ties to protected industry resemble those of the 
Latin American economies of past decades. 
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 Adding demographic variables to the Engel curve regression may not help since there is no 
reason for these effects to operate as just intercept-shifters. The literature using food Engel curves 
to study bias in temporal deflators is more credible since it typically restricts attention to a 
particular household type (say, two adults with two children) and the change in household 
structure over a decade or so is much less than the differences over space, yet all of the regional 
differences are rolled into a catch-all term that is assumed to be due to just cost-of-living 
differences. 
 209 
 
  
 
The claimed reason for the seemingly perverse fragmentation of the 
internal market while the PRC opened up internationally is that devolution of 
powers saw local government revenue linked to local industry protection, leading 
to interregional trade wars. Apparent confirmation comes from Poncet (2005) who 
examined “border effects” between provinces by comparing volumes of 
intraprovincial and interprovincial trade. The trade-reducing impact of provincial 
borders appeared to increase between 1992 and 1997, from which the study 
concluded that the domestic economy was fragmented and that “rather than a 
single market, (the PRC) appears as a collection of separate regional economies 
protected by barriers” (Poncet 2005, 426). 
A critical reappraisal shows that the evidence from Young (2000) is not 
robust and that the PRC is comparable to the US in terms of being a relatively 
integrated, large economy (Holz 2009). For example, Young showed a rise in the 
(natural logarithm of the) interprovincial standard deviation of (the natural log of) 
prices of various consumer and agricultural goods, which was taken as evidence 
of trade barriers segmenting markets. But this calculation was neither robust to 
inflation nor to the growth in product variety in the reform period. Once Holz 
(2009) accounts for these factors there is no trend in interprovincial price 
dispersion, and the range of variation matches that in intercity data for products in 
the US. Similarly, Young found a convergence in the output structure of each 
province during the reform period, taken as evidence of provinces duplicating 
each other’s industries rather than allowing regional specialization. The degree of 
convergence in the composition of value-added across US states in the same 
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period was approximately the same as for provinces in the PRC, but there were no 
claims of rising interstate trade barriers in the US at that time. 
In keeping with the reappraisal by Holz (2009), a number of more recent 
studies find the PRC to be a relatively well integrated market economy. Fan and 
Wei (2006) apply panel unit root tests to data on monthly prices for a group of 93 
industrial products, agricultural goods, other consumer goods, and services in 36 
major Chinese cities, finding that prices do converge to the law of one price. 
Similarly, Ma, Oxley, and Gibson (2009) use spot energy prices in 35 major cities 
to test for convergence with their panel unit root tests indicating that the energy 
market is integrated in the PRC. Huang, Rozelle, and Chang (2004) examine 
prices for rice, maize, and soybeans from almost 50 locations in 15 provinces on 
the eve of the PRC’s accession to the WTO. These authors find most market pairs 
to be integrated (and this integration to extend down to village level) and market 
integration to be substantially higher than even 5 years earlier.
80
 A longer term 
perspective on grain prices found that on the eve of the industrial revolution, 
market integration in the PRC was as high as it was in most of the advanced areas 
of western Europe (Keller and Shiue 2007a), while contemporary markets are 
even more integrated. Keller and Shiue (2007, 107) conclude that for the PRC “in 
the late twentieth century local and national prices essentially move one-to-one.” 
Thus, it is mainly the central planning era that deviated from the pattern being a 
normal, relatively integrated, large economy. 
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 Rising integration is also apparent in the labor market. Since 1997, urban wages in China’s 
interior provinces have risen at a faster rate than in coastal regions—although the absolute wage 
gap continues to grow (Li et al. 2012). 
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Another way to examine market integration is to test how long it takes 
prices to converge following idiosyncratic shocks. For example, Parsley and Wei 
(1996) find convergence rates to purchasing power parity of 5 quarters for 
tradable goods and 15 quarters for services, for a sample of 48 cities in the US. 
When the comparable approach is used in the PRC, convergence rates appear to 
be much faster. Lan and Sylwester (2010) study the prices of 44 products in 36 
PRC cities and estimate half-life divergences from the law of one price that 
average just 2.4 months. This is approximately twice the speed of adjustment 
found in the US, leading these authors to conclude: “(O)ur findings suggest that 
prices within China converge to relative parity extremely quickly” (Lan and 
Sylwester 2010, 231). 
A recent review of product, labor, and capital market integration in the 
PRC summarizes the evidence as showing: “(P)roduct markets became more 
integrated over time, as regional trade increased and product prices were 
increasingly similar throughout the country” (Chen, Goh, Sun, and Xu 2011, 73). 
Given this similarity over space of the prices of tradable goods, the focus of many 
of the previous spatial deflation studies summarized above may be misplaced. In 
an environment where traded goods prices converge rapidly, the main source of 
price dispersion across space should come from the nontraded components of 
consumption and especially from housing, given the fixity of land. We therefore 
briefly review the literature on spatial variation in house prices before turning to 
the data that we use to develop housing-related deflators. 
A1.2.3 Housing Market Studies 
In the planned economy era, government agencies such as work units provided all 
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urban housing. Rents were low and the dwelling one was allocated depended on 
administrative criteria such as job rank (Bian et al. 1997). Housing reform was 
launched in 1988 with privatization and creation of an urban housing market as 
the aim (State Council 1988). Thereafter, commodity houses built by private 
developers could be bought on the housing market (Huang and Clark 2002). For 
the first decade of reform, a dual track system developed with large numbers of 
commodity houses bought by work units and then distributed to workers at 
discounted prices (Huang 2003). In 1998, the State Council abolished the old 
housing system completely, and thereafter any provision of subsidized housing by 
work units was strictly banned (State Council 1998, Huang 2003). Since then, the 
urban housing system has become totally market oriented. 
In contrast to the urban sector, rural houses were self-funded, self-built and 
self-renovated by residents, and remain so until now (Liu 2010). The right to use 
rural residential land (nongcun zhaijidi shiyongquan) is evenly distributed and 
free of charge for village collective members. Land is collectively owned by the 
village and the occupant is not allowed to mortgage or trade the land, although 
transfers within the village collective community are permitted. The occupant may 
build new houses or renovate old houses with their own funds for all kinds of 
needs such as marriage, tourism (nongjiale, akin to a motel, for urban tourists to 
taste rural life), family workshop, and handicraft production (Liu 2010). Thus, the 
rural housing system enables rural residents to satisfy their housing needs at much 
lower cost than is incurred by urban residents in the current era. Though rural self-
built houses are generally large and cheap, they are poor in quality relative to 
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urban housing in terms of housing attributes such as the energy source for 
cooking, bath facilities, and individual toilets (Logan et al. 2009). 
 The reforms have led to a large literature on urban housing in the PRC, 
with early studies on determinants of home ownership (Huang 2003, Pan, 2004). 
But after the full marketization of urban housing in 1998, the focus shifted to 
affordability due to the sharp increases in house prices. For example, the Shanghai 
Housing Price Index (SHHPI) of the China Real Estate Index System (CREIS) 
rose by 63% within 2 years from January 2001 (Hui and Yue 2006). Liu et al. 
(2008) document poor housing affordability in Beijing during the 2000s using the 
house price to income ratio (PIR) and the home affordability index (HAI). The 
PIR is defined as the ratio of the average market value of a typical dwelling to the 
average annual household income and the HAI measures the ability of a 
household with an average income to pay back a mortgage on a typical home. In a 
more comprehensive study, Xiang and Long (2007) calculate PIR and HAI 
indices for 34 major cities and find Beijing, Shanghai, Shenyang, Xiamen, and 
Haikou to have poor housing affordability, while the inland cities of Hohhot, 
Changsha, Chongqing, and Urumqi are relatively better.  
 In addition to affordability, the other focus of recent literature on the urban 
housing market is price determination. Zhang and Tian (2010) study sales of new 
dwellings in 35 major cities between 1995 and 2006, finding stable long-run 
intercity price relativities, which implies that the urban housing market in the PRC 
is segmented and that specific local economic characteristics matter. Deng et al. 
(2012) examine land auctions for 35 major cities from 2003 to 2011 to construct a 
model of land supply and also for use in a hedonic model of dwelling prices, 
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finding that house prices are driven by the land market rather than by construction 
costs. Zheng et al. (2009) estimate a hedonic house price regression for 35 major 
cities and find significant location effects in determining prices. Wu et al. (2012) 
use a similar model but examine the role of intracity locational factors (e.g., 
distance to city center). Overall, this research indicates the importance of location 
in determining dwelling prices in urban PRC, with the most plausible source of 
inter-area variation coming from land prices. 
A1.3 DATA 
For our main analysis, we use administrative data on the average selling price for 
new residential dwellings that real estate developers are required to report to the 
NBS. Specifically, every transaction for new housing sales is meant to be reported 
(both monthly and annually, directly to the NBS through an electronic portal). 
These are the most commonly used data for studies of the PRC urban housing 
market (Zheng et al. 2009). Since most of the housing market is new construction 
rather than repeat sales (Deng et al. 2012), an index derived from prices of new 
units is broadly representative. The average selling price is given for each 
province in the China Real Estate Statistics Yearbook (NBS 2011a), while for 
urban prefectures the statistic is found in the China Statistical Yearbook for 
Regional Economy (NBS 2011c). For urban core districts (which are more 
consistently urban than the prefecture they belong to), the numbers are reported 
for 2009 (but not 2010) in the China Urban Life and Price Yearbook (NBS 
2010).
81
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 Subsequent editions of the China Urban Life and Price Yearbook after 2010 do not report house 
price data for urban core districts, hence we use the 2009 values as reported in 2010. 
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We obtain data on average GDP for every province, every urban 
prefecture, and every urban core district from the China Statistical Yearbook for 
Regional Economy (NBS 2011c) and the China City Statistical Yearbook (NBS 
2011b). These same two sources provide information on the value of total urban 
real estate investments on residential assets (IRA). The data on the resident 
population, which are needed for correct calculation of per capita values (rather 
than using the misleading registered population figures), are year-end 2010 figures 
for provinces from NBS (2011c) and are 1st November 2010 figures for 
prefectures and districts as reported in the county-level tabulations of the 2010 
Census of Population (NBS 2012). 
 In addition to these data provided by the NBS, we gathered our own data 
on sales prices and attributes of new apartment units from www.Soufun.com, 
which is the largest real estate listing site in the PRC. In conjunction with the 
CREIS, Soufun.com co-publish the China Real Estate Statistical Yearbook. For 
the primary data collection, we only considered the dominant type of urban 
residence which is a private apartment in a complex. We did not consider 
subsidized public rental housing, economically affordable housing, and high-
grade apartments and villas, which are just minor components of the urban 
housing system. According to the China Real Estate Yearbook 2011, of 8.82 
million new urban housing units sold in 2010, just 2.5% were high-grade 
apartments or villas and 3.7% were economically affordable housing. The other 
94% were standard private apartments, and so our primary data collection 
concentrated on this dominant form of urban housing. 
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A1.4 THE PRC URBAN HOUSING MARKET 
AND PRICE DETERMINANTS 
If dwelling quality varies systematically over space, then it may interfere with 
using published average new dwelling selling prices as an indicator of 
standardized housing costs for urban areas. However, real estate development in 
the PRC is organized such that systematic quality differences between cities are 
unlikely, since many apartment complexes in different cities are developed by the 
same national-level real estate development companies (sometimes even using the 
same names for their complexes in each city). While each complex may have 
dozens of multistory towers, each containing more than 50 individual housing 
units, within a complex there are only a few (typically less than 10) floor plans 
available and the selling price in terms of yuan per square meter varies little 
across the individual units. But there is considerable variation in selling price 
between complexes in different areas, including between different districts of the 
same city. For example, Beijing has 16 city districts, and complexes in different 
Beijing districts may have prices that vary by up to CNY30,000 (US$4,800) per 
square meter. This variation is consistent with the finding of Deng et al. (2012) 
that variation in new dwelling prices is driven by the land market. 
In order to verify if dwelling quality varies systematically over space, we 
gathered data in February 2013 on sales prices for 150 new apartments in three 
cities. Each city is from a different level of the administrative hierarchy: (i) 
Beijing is a municipality-level city with an equivalent status to a province; (ii) 
Nanjing is the capital of Jiangsu province and is one of 15 subprovincial cities, 
which have much greater autonomy and higher status than prefecture-level cities; 
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while (iii) Changsha is a prefecture-level city and the capital of Hunan province. 
The data collection was restricted to these three cities because advertisements 
from most of the 323 cities in Soufun.com lack data on key attributes (both unit 
and complex characteristics). The majority of advertisements list only the average 
selling price of all units in a complex, but for the three selected cities, the unique 
price (per square meter) for every apartment in a complex is consistently listed. 
Furthermore, the advertisements always list the complex opening date, completion 
date, and the proportion of units sold to date (the sales ratio) only for these three 
cities, while for other cities these data are missing. Previous research has found 
that these factors play a significant role in determining new apartment prices 
because they represent changing pricing behaviour of the real estate developer at 
different stages to completion of an apartment complex (Wu et al. 2012). We 
sampled prices from 3 to 5 complexes for each of the 13 districts of Beijing, 5 to 8 
complexes from each of the nine districts of Nanjing, and 5 to 12 complexes from 
each of the five districts of Changsha. 
The data used for the hedonic apartment price regression are described in 
Appendix A.  For some characteristics, apartments in Nanjing and Changsha 
appear to have more desirable qualities than those in Beijing, with more green 
space and a higher proportion of the complex area being green space (despite the 
complexes in Nanjing and Changsha rising higher, on average, than those in 
Beijing). Also, the listings for Changsha are for slightly newer complexes than for 
Beijing, as seen from the fewer months elapsed since the complex was opened for 
sale and the greater number of months to completion of the complex. On the other 
hand, the apartments in Beijing in the sample are larger than those in Changsha, 
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which is likely to be a desirable characteristic showing up in higher prices even 
when we concentrate on the price per square meter. The apartment complexes 
from Beijing also have a higher car park ratio (the number of car parks per 
dwelling)—note that these are rented or sold separately, while most observations 
for Nanjing and Changsha leave this attribute blank so it is unclear if car parking 
is bundled with the price of the apartment in those cities. Overall, there is no clear 
sign that Beijing apartments have better quality relative to those in the other two 
cities. For example, the new trend in the real estate market in urban PRC of 
developers selling decorated new houses rather than unfinished ones is just as 
apparent in all three cities. 
The results of the hedonic house price regressions are shown in Table 1. 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the price (in thousands of yuan) per 
square meter so that the relative difference in prices is not directly shown by the 
regression coefficients on the dummy variables for each city. Instead, the 
coefficients must be transformed into percentage differences using 
,100)1(_
ˆ
 edifferencepercentage  which shows that the price per square 
meter is 84% higher in Nanjing than in Changsha, and 256% higher in Beijing 
without controlling for any attributes of the apartment (first column of Table 1). 
The results in the second column of the table use the attributes of each apartment 
but do not consider the location. Despite having 15 characteristics that are 
potentially related to selling prices, these explain slightly less of the variation in 
prices than just using location dummy variables.  
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Table 1: Effect of Location and Dwelling Characteristics on House Prices in Urban PRC 
 Natural log(price of apartment unit in CNY1,000 /m2) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Beijing=1, otherwise=0 1.270  1.190 
 (15.28)***  (13.85)*** 
Nanjing =1, otherwise=0 0.610  0.716 
 (7.34)***  (9.59)*** 
Unit characteristics    
Apartment area (m
2
)  0.005 0.002 
  (4.75)*** (2.60)** 
Number of bedrooms  -0.432 -0.191 
  (5.80)*** (3.82)*** 
Number of bathrooms  0.348 0.283 
  (4.38)*** (5.50)*** 
Number of living rooms  0.030 0.127 
  (0.29) (1.89)* 
Decorated=1, otherwise=0  0.337 0.256 
  (3.93)*** (4.71)*** 
Level (floor) in complex  -0.011 -0.005 
  (1.44) (0.97) 
Complex characteristics    
Land area (1,000 m
2
)  -0.002 -0.001 
  (2.13)** (1.62) 
Total number of floors  -0.002 0.003 
  (0.34) (0.83) 
Floor area ratio  -0.104 0.072 
  (2.57)** (2.51)** 
Green area (1,000 m
2
)  0.005 0.003 
  (2.07)** (1.56) 
Green area / total area  -3.035 -0.466 
  (4.18)*** (0.95) 
Car park ratio  0.006 0.018 
  (0.06) (0.29) 
Months after opening  -0.008 -0.012 
  (1.09) (2.48)** 
Months to completion  -0.017 -0.019 
  (2.79)*** (4.79)*** 
Sale ratio  0.043 0.060 
  (0.39) (0.70) 
Constant 1.945 4.039 1.584 
 (33.08)*** (11.04)*** (5.48)*** 
R-squared 0.61 0.59 0.84 
* = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1%, m2 = square meter. 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses for regressions where N = 150. The omitted 
location is Changsha. 
Source: Authors’ computations from data in housing sample collected by authors in February 2013 
from www.Soufun.com. 
 
When the location effects and characteristics are put together, the hedonic 
regression explains 84% of price variation, and after controlling for all of the 
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characteristics of the particular apartment and its complex, the relative price 
differences are fairly similar to what they were without the controls. Specifically, 
the (conditional) price per square meter is 105% higher in Nanjing than in 
Changsha and 229% higher in Beijing. While the price premium is slightly 
smaller for Beijing than when using the raw data, it is somewhat larger for 
Nanjing and this reflects the fact that, at least for these three cities, there is no 
systematic quality gradient whereby apartments in cities with higher priced real 
estate have more desirable attributes of either the unit or the apartment complex. 
In the absence of the sort of apartment-specific data that we used in the regression, 
we proceed to use raw data on average selling prices for all cities and we treat the 
spatial variation in these raw prices as mainly reflecting the fixity of land supply 
rather than systematic variation in quality. 
A1.4.1 Rental Equivalence Approach 
Before turning to the evidence on average selling prices of new dwellings, we 
discuss an alternative approach to forming standardized housing costs—the rental 
equivalence method. In some OECD countries, temporal price indices for the 
services provided by owner-occupied dwellings are based on the imputed value of 
shelter for owners that are calculated as equivalent to what they forgo by not 
renting out their homes. In the case of the CPI for the US, this measure was 
adopted in 1983 in place of the previous measure based on house prices, since it 
was argued that prices did not accurately reflect the costs of shelter since they also 
include the use of a house as an asset. There is no guarantee that the rental 
equivalence method produces lower costs than do price methods, and indeed in 
the US between 1983 and 2007, the monthly principal and interest payment 
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needed to purchase a median-priced existing home increased by only one-half as 
much as the increase in shelter prices indicated by the rental equivalence 
method.
82
 But to maintain consistency with temporal deflators, many spatial cost-
of-living studies in the US rely on rents rather than on house sales prices (e.g., 
Moretti 2013). 
 Despite the arguments for the rental equivalence approach, three reasons 
lie behind our decision to use the selling prices of new dwellings. First, we note 
that in some OECD countries (e.g., New Zealand) the price of housing services 
for owner-occupiers in the CPI is based on new housing sales, with the value of 
the net increase in the stock of owner-occupied housing during the reference 
period providing the expenditure weights. These components reflect the change in 
the price of housing acquired by the owner-occupier segment of the household 
sector, which is analogous to the approach that we use below and is particularly 
applicable to the situation in urban areas of the PRC since so much of the market 
is supplied by new housing rather than resale of existing dwellings.
83
 Second, 
observed rents in urban areas of the PRC may not be an appropriate basis for 
pricing the rental equivalence of owner-occupied dwellings because of the low 
share of rented dwellings (Ahmad 2008). Finally, in contrast to the situation for 
prices of new dwellings, there are no comprehensive statistics on rents reported by 
the NBS on a spatially disaggregated basis so that any attempt to implement the 
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 These figures come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics online publication “Common 
Misconceptions about the Consumer Price Index: Questions and Answers” available at: 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpiqa.htm.  
83
 Even urban dwellings built as recently as the 1979–1999 period are being dismantled to make 
way for new development because they do not meet the standards of modern urban affluence in the 
PRC (since they are either too small or lack desirable facilities). See “Most Homes to be 
Demolished in 20 Years,” China Daily, 7 August 2010. Available at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-08/07/content_11113982.htm.  
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rental equivalence approach would be limited in scope and so could not inform 
national-level estimates of inequality. Moreover, when considering variation in 
house prices and rents over space, the same fundamental driver—land prices—
affects both, whereas for the temporal variation studied by much of the literature, 
factors such as interest rates may create a wedge between house prices and rents.  
A1.4.2 Trends in Urban Tenure 
To help put our choice of using selling prices rather than rents in context, we 
describe here the trends in urban tenure based on data from the “long form” 
population census (answered by 10% of the population, which we gross up to total 
population counts). The available data are reported at county or district level so 
we categorize according to the urban population as a percentage of the county or 
district population and restrict attention to the most urbanized counties and 
districts (being 70% or more urban), distinguishing “highly urbanized” with 70%–
90% urban from “very highly urbanized” with  90% urbanized. In total, there 
were 71 million urban households in 2000 and 103 million in 2010 under these 
definitions. 
 The first trend is that the share of urban households living in self-built 
accommodation has fallen considerably, from over one-quarter of the total in 2000 
to just one-sixth by 2010 (Table 2). This trend is most apparent in very highly 
urbanized areas, where households in self-built dwellings declined by 3 million 
over 10 years and are now under 10% of the total (down from 19% in 2000). This 
pattern most likely stems from rising land values—for example, Wu, Gyourko, 
and Deng (2012) calculate that real, constant quality land values in Beijing rose 
by 800% from 2003 to 2010. Under such land price pressures, self-built dwellings 
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are likely to be undercapitalized in the sense of being too small and having 
inadequate facilities relative to a new dwelling that would be appropriate for such 
land values. The flip side of the falling share of self-built dwellings is a rising 
share of purchased dwellings, which are the majority form of tenure (Table 2). 
Moreover, the rate of new construction, of approximately 8 million new standard 
private apartments each year, is equivalent to about one-sixth of the existing stock 
of purchased urban dwellings. The preponderance of new stock in the owner-
occupied portfolio means that our focus on the price of new apartments is 
appropriate.  
 
Table 2: Number of Urban Households of Various Tenure Types (millions) 
 Census 2000 (long form)  Census 2010 (long form) 
 
Dwelling 
Tenure Type 
Highly 
Urbanized 
Very 
Highly 
Urbanized 
 
Total 
 Highly 
Urbanized 
Very 
Highly 
Urbanized 
 
Total 
Self-built 9.3 9.0 18.3  12.1 5.9 18.0 
 (40.2%) (18.8%) (25.8%)  (28.2%) (9.9%) (17.5%) 
Purchased 8.1 23.0 31.0  17.8 33.2 51.0 
 (35.0%) (48.0%) (43.7%)  (41.5%) (55.4%) (49.6%) 
Rented 4.7 13.4 18.2  11.1 17.9 29.0 
 (20.4%) (28.1%) (25.6%)  (25.8%) (29.9%) (28.2%) 
Total 
Households 
23.1 47.8 70.9  42.8 60.0 102.8 
Note: “Highly urbanized” refers to counties or districts where more than 70%, but less than 90%, 
of the population are urban residents. “Very highly urbanized” refers to counties or districts where 
90% or more of the population are urban residents. There are 583 counties or districts in the 2000 
census in these categories and 596 in the 2010 census. The column total number of households 
includes “other tenure types” which are not reported in the table. 
Source: NBS (2003, 2012). 
 
 
 The final tenure category in Table 2 is renters, who have also seen a rise in 
numbers, although only half as large as the increase in the number of purchasers. 
However, what is not shown in Table 2 is that that rental sector in urban areas of 
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the PRC is quite different from the owner-occupied sector, mainly housing poor 
rural–urban migrant workers (Wu 2012) and youth (Zhu 2013, Ouyang, 2011) in 
dwellings that are older and of lower quality than the dwellings that are being 
purchased. For example, we gathered data on apartment rentals in Beijing from 
Soufun.com and found the listed dwellings to have an average age of 10 years, 
greater than the age of the dwellings that were for sale. 
A1.5 HOUSING PRICES AND ESTIMATED DEFLATORS 
Since there is tentative evidence that purchased new apartment quality does not 
vary systematically between cities, we go ahead and use data from the China Real 
Estate Statistics Yearbook (NBS 2011a), China Statistical Yearbook for Regional 
Economy (NBS, 2011c), and the China Urban Life and Price Yearbook (NBS 
2010) on the average selling price in 2010 (provinces and urban prefectures) and 
2009 (urban core districts) of new residential dwellings. We note that these data 
are for the urban sector, and our expectation is that these prices vary over space 
most especially because of intercity land price variation. For this reason we do not 
consider rural housing since rural residential land use rights are not determined by 
market forces and also because the data available for rural households are just the 
construction costs (building materials) which we consider to be traded goods and 
therefore less likely to vary over space than do urban house prices. The distinction 
between the urban and rural housing sectors is clearly seen in the way that the 
statistical system reports the relevant data—rural household expenditure on new 
dwelling construction is defined as consumption expenditure in the China Rural 
Statistical Yearbook 2011 (NBS 2011d) while urban household expenditure on 
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house purchases are defined as a separate category apart from consumption 
expenditure in the China Urban Life and Price Yearbook 2010 (NBS 2010).  
 
Figure 1: Provincial Average Prices for New Urban Housing, 2010 
 
Source: NBS (2011a). 
 
The average prices for new urban housing in 2010 are displayed in Figure 
1, at provincial scale. The highest prices are found in Beijing (CNY17,150 per 
square meter) and Shanghai (CNY14,290 per square meter). The next highest 
category of prices (CNY7,001–CNY9,400 per square meter) are only one-half as 
expensive as those in Beijing, and are found in Tianjin, Zhejiang, Guangdong, and 
Hainan. In general, the highest prices are found in a continuous belt of provinces 
along the coast between Jiangsu and Hainan and in the Gulf of Bohai. All of the 
 226 
 
  
 
remaining provinces fall into the lowest price category, which includes all interior 
provinces plus the coastal province of Shandong. 
 
Figure 2: Average Prices for New Housing in Urban Core Districts, 2009 
 
Source: NBS (2010). 
 
 There is considerable heterogeneity within provinces since many of them 
are as large and as populous as independent countries. Therefore, Figure 2 
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provides a finer-scale view of urban house prices, reporting the average value in 
2009 for each of the 288 core urban districts. These core districts lie within 
prefecture-level and subprovincial cities, but are more consistently urban than the 
full area of the prefecture, which often includes rural counties. In order to 
concentrate on the region where most core urban districts are located, the map 
truncates Xinjiang, Tibet, and Qinghai in western China. This region contains 
only two urban districts—Karamay and Urumqi (both in Xinjiang). It is apparent 
that there are a number of cities in interior provinces such as Chengdu, Harbin, 
Ji’nan, Taiyuan, and Wuhan with much higher prices than revealed by the 
provincial average.  Pu’er in Yunnan even falls into the highest price category 
shared by cities such as Guangzhou, Hangzhou, and Shenzhen, in addition to 
Beijing and Shanghai. Conversely, it is also apparent that there are cities in the 
coastal provinces with much lower prices than some cities in the interior. 
Consequently, the variation in the cost of living will be more accurately portrayed 
at subprovincial levels. 
In order to measure cost-of-living differences over space, we calculate a 
Törnqvist price index for each province (and also for each urban prefecture and 
urban core district): 
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where sij is the average share that item j has in consumption in region i, and skj is 
the average budget share in region k, which is the base region, while Pij and Pkj are 
the prices of item j in region i and in the base region. The Törnqvist index uses the 
arithmetic average of the budget shares in the base region and in region i to weight 
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the logarithm of the price relativities between those two regions. These weighted 
price relativities are then summed over all J items that comprise the budget.  
Our working assumption is that only house price variation contributes to 
cost-of-living differences, so as to form a lower bound for the impact of deflation 
on spatial inequality. Since it is assumed that prices do not vary spatially for all 
other components of the budget, the index formula reduces to the log house price 
relativity between Beijing (base region) and region i, weighted by the average 
importance of housing in Beijing and region i. There are no micro data on 
household budget shares on housing that can be disaggregated to subprovincial 
levels so we instead use national and regional accounts data. Spatially 
disaggregated annual investments in urban residential assets are published by the 
NBS, and since the urban housing market is dominated by new housing stock 
rather than repeat sales (Deng et al. 2012), this annual investment should be a 
good proxy for the component of regional income set aside for housing provision. 
However, one further adjustment is needed because of the famously low share of 
final consumption in GDP for the PRC, which varies across provinces because of 
differing intensities of net exports. We therefore use the ratio of annual 
investments in urban residential assets to final consumption expenditure as our 
proxy for the budget shares in the Törnqvist formula.
84
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 The share of final consumption expenditure in GDP is not available for prefectures and urban 
districts, so we use the share for the province that the prefecture or district is part of, as an 
approximation. 
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Table 3: Residential Investment, Final Consumption Expenditure, Average New House 
Prices, and Deflation Indices at Province Level, 2010 
Province FIRA FCON HP Tornqvist DINXB&H 
Beijing 0.11 0.56 17151 1.00 1.00 
Tianjin 0.06 0.38 7940 1.15 1.19 
Hebei 0.09 0.41 3442 1.40 1.52 
Shanxi 0.05 0.44 3338 1.29 1.28 
Inner Mongolia 0.07 0.39 2983 1.39 1.40 
Liaoning 0.13 0.40 4303 1.43 1.40 
Jilin 0.08 0.41 3495 1.36 1.42 
Heilongjiang 0.06 0.53 3492 1.28 1.38 
Shanghai 0.07 0.55 14290 1.03 0.99 
Jiangsu 0.08 0.42 5592 1.24 1.30 
Zhejiang 0.07 0.46 9332 1.11 1.34 
Anhui 0.13 0.50 3899 1.40 1.45 
Fujian 0.07 0.43 6077 1.21 1.37 
Jiangxi 0.06 0.47 2959 1.33 1.43 
Shandong 0.06 0.39 3809 1.30 1.42 
Henan 0.07 0.44 2856 1.37 1.50 
Hubei 0.07 0.46 3506 1.32 1.35 
Hunan 0.07 0.47 3014 1.35 1.24 
Guangdong 0.06 0.47 7004 1.16 1.12 
Guangxi 0.09 0.51 3382 1.35 1.35 
Hainan 0.20 0.46 8800 1.23 1.09 
Chongqing 0.14 0.48 4040 1.42 1.64 
Sichuan 0.09 0.50 3985 1.32 1.42 
Guizhou 0.07 0.63 3142 1.30 1.27 
Yunnan 0.09 0.59 2893 1.36 1.20 
Tibet 0.01 0.64 2761 1.21 1.22 
Shannxi 0.09 0.45 3668 1.36 1.26 
Gansu 0.05 0.59 2938 1.28 1.29 
Qinghai 0.06 0.53 2894 1.32 1.17 
Ningxia 0.11 0.49 3107 1.43 1.31 
Xinjiang 0.05 0.53 2872 1.30 1.29 
FIRA = investments in urban residential assets as a fraction of GDP, FCON = final consumption 
expenditure as a fraction of GDP, HP = average selling price of urban commercial new house units 
(yuan per square meter), Tornqvist = deflation index used by authors, DINXB&H = deflation 
index of Brandt and Holz (2006) updated to 2010. 
Sources: Authors’ computations from data in NBS (2011a and 2011c). 
 
 230 
 
  
 
Table 3 contains the provincial Törnqvist indexes calculated under these 
assumptions along with the input data used. The base region is Beijing and the 
index values are interpreted as the factor by which nominal GDP per capita in 
region i has to be multiplied to translate it into Beijing prices. On average, GDP 
per capita in provinces outside of Beijing has to be raised by 30% to make it 
comparable to GDP per capita at Beijing prices. The deflator ranges from 1.03 for 
Shanghai—whose residents face housing prices almost as high as in Beijing—to 
1.42 for Chongqing and 1.43 for Liaoning. It is notable that the lowest average 
housing prices do not always give the lowest calculated price index because the 
importance of housing also matters. For example, house prices are low in Gansu 
but the inflation factor is lower than average because of the relatively low 
importance of provision for residential housing in regional income. 
The last column of Table 3 reports the deflator from Brandt and Holz 
(2006) using the national basket, which is updated to 2010 using movements in 
each province’s CPI. The Brandt and Holz deflator is more variable than the 
Törnqvist index, with an unweighted coefficient of variation across provinces 
more than one-third higher than for the Törnqvist index. This pattern is consistent 
with Gluschenko (2006), who found that calculating a spatial deflator just once 
and updating it with the local CPIs can overstate the spatial variation in prices. 
Nevertheless, the overall level of adjustment needed to put GDP outside of 
Beijing into Beijing prices is quite similar, with an average inflation factor of 
32%. The cross-province patterns of the deflators also are quite similar, with a 
Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.71 and a rank-correlation of 0.63. 
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A1.6 IMPACTS OF DEFLATION ON SPATIAL INEQUALITY 
Our overall goal in carrying out the analysis reported here is to examine how 
much difference is made to estimates of spatial inequality in the PRC when using 
deflators derived just from variation in housing costs. The results are summarized 
in Table 4, which reports three measures of inequality—the Gini coefficient, the 
Theil index, and the weighted coefficient of variation (CoV)—for three levels of 
geography (province, urban prefecture, and the urban core districts within urban 
prefectures).
85
 The nominal values that are deflated are GDP per resident in 2010, 
which takes into account the various corrections to both GDP statistics and 
population denominators that are summarized in Li and Gibson (2013). We 
restrict attention to 2010 because of the need for census data to provide correct 
counts of the resident population (rather than the hukou-registered population) for 
subprovincial spatial units. 
If no account is taken of spatial variation in the cost of living, the level of 
spatial inequality is overstated by up to 35% (for interprovincial analysis, using 
the Theil index). This is two-thirds larger than the impact of spatial deflation 
found by Li and Gibson (2013) who use the deflator from Brandt and Holz 
(2006), updated to 2010 with the rise in each province’s CPI. Since the current 
analysis assumes that prices for all goods other than housing are set on perfectly 
integrated markets, it should provide a lower bound to the impact of spatial 
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deflation if a “full” deflator was used which considered all components of 
consumption. 
 
Table 4: Interregional Inequality in GDP per Capita with and without Spatial Deflation 
 
THEIL THEIL(D) CoV CoV(D) GINI GINI(D) 
Province 0.08323 0.06147 0.42332 0.35521 0.22672 0.19790 
Prefecture 0.17442 0.14105 0.62303 0.55361 0.33106 0.29865 
Districts 0.11026 0.08512 0.46545 0.40836 0.26059 0.22552 
THEIL = Theil index, GINI = Gini coefficient, CoV = population weighted coefficient of 
variation, (D) = inequality measure on GDP per resident with spatial housing cost deflation.  
Note: Results are for 31 provinces, 288 prefectures, and 288 prefecture-merged districts 
(prefecture urban cores). 
Source: Authors’ computations from data in NBS (2010; 2011a, b and c; 2012). 
 
The lowest proportionate overstatement from not deflating comes when 
studying urban prefectures. This most likely reflects the fact that these spatial 
units have the highest apparent level of inequality amongst the various levels of 
disaggregation presented in Table 4, due to their heterogeneity. An urban 
prefecture may contain rural counties and this lack of a consistently defined 
urbanity gives higher apparent inequality between these “urban” units, and so 
correcting for spatial price differences has less impact. The more defensible level 
of subprovincial analysis is the urban core district within an urban prefecture, 
since this excludes rural counties. At this level of geography, spatial inequality is 
overstated by 14% (using the weighted coefficient of variation) to 30% (using the 
Theil index) if differences in the urban cost of living are not taken into account.  
A1.7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we use newly available data on dwelling sales in urban PRC to 
develop spatially-disaggregated indices of house prices which are used as spatial 
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deflators for provinces, urban prefectures, and urban core districts. Since we 
account for only one source of cost-of-living variation over space, the impacts on 
inequality that we find when using these deflators should be considered a 
conservative, lower bound. Previous approaches to forming spatial deflators for 
the PRC have focused more on traded goods prices, but our interpretation of the 
recent evidence is that these adjust quickly to parity levels and so are unlikely to 
cause long-run cost-of-living differences between areas. In contrast, the fixity of 
land makes housing the most likely source of price dispersion across space. 
It would be ideal to generate regional components of house prices that 
hedonically adjust for all components of dwelling quality, but such data are not 
available beyond a limited number of cities. Nevertheless, our limited analysis 
suggests that systematic variation in the quality of new dwellings between cities is 
unlikely, making the published data on the average price of newly constructed 
urban dwellings a potentially useful source of information on spatial cost-of-living 
differences. When we use this information to adjust nominal GDP per resident we 
find that around one-quarter of the apparent spatial inequality disappears once 
account is taken of cost-of-living differences. Since there are good theoretical 
reasons for expecting a higher price level in nominally richer areas, our results 
provide a caveat to concerns about the degree of spatial inequality experienced in 
the PRC. 
Our results are consistent with literature from other countries which finds 
that apparent patterns in nominal outcomes may weaken or reverse once account 
is taken of spatial price differences emanating from urban housing markets. The 
current research may help compare spatial (real) inequality in the PRC to that in 
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other countries, but we believe that any altered inferences due to the deflation we 
propose are most relevant to temporal comparisons. The legacy of central 
planning and the hukou registration system meant that urbanization and urban 
housing development in the PRC were much less advanced at the beginning of the 
reform era than would be expected. Consequently, the spatial cost-of-living 
differentials now being caused by the urban housing market (reflecting the fixity 
of land) are likely to have grown from a very low base, making interpretation of 
trends in nominal inequality in the PRC atypically sensitive to assumptions about 
spatial and temporal differences in the cost of living. 
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Appendix A: Comparison of House Prices and Attributes (means) 
 
Beijing Nanjing Changsha 
Unit price  
(CNY1,000 /construction m
2
) 
29.93 13.93*** 7.13*** 
    
Unit characteristics    
Area (m
2
) 152.69 131.60 115.69*** 
Number of bedrooms 2.64 2.78 2.74 
Number of bathrooms 1.76 1.40** 1.54 
Number of living rooms 1.88 1.94 1.94 
Decorated=1, otherwise=0 0.36 0.26 0.32 
Level (floor) in complex 3.86 7.56*** 7.18*** 
    
Complex characteristics    
Land area (1,000 m
2
) 149.10 198.65 198.76 
Total number of floors 13.74 20.24*** 25.78*** 
Floor area ratio 2.42 2.28 3.51*** 
Green area (1,000 m
2
) 47.73 84.55 87.15** 
Green ratio 0.32 0.39*** 0.42*** 
Car park ratio 1.08 0.88** 0.97 
Months after opening 15.14 12.42 11.98** 
Months to completion 1.94 4.72 5.50** 
Sales ratio 0.23 0.78*** 0.45*** 
Observations 50 50 50 
CNY = yuan, * = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, and *** = significant at 1% for testing 
difference in mean compared with Beijing. 
Sources: Housing sample collected by authors in February 2013 from www.Soufun.com. 
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Economic Growth and Expansion of China’s Urban Land Area: 
Evidence from Administrative Data and Night Lights, 1993-2012 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The relationship between economic growth, expansion of urban land area, and the 
broader issue of cultivated land conversion in China has been closely examined 
for the late 1980s and 1990s. Much less is known about recent urban expansion 
and if effects of economic growth on this expansion have changed over time. This 
paper updates estimates of urban expansion for China and examines the 
relationship with city economic growth for 1993-2012. To see if patterns are 
robust to different types of evidence, administrative data on the area of 225 urban 
cores are compared to estimates of brightly lit area from remotely sensed night 
lights. The trend annual expansion rate in lit area is 8% and was significantly 
faster in the decade to 2002 than in the most recent decade. Expansion is slower 
according to administrative data, at just 5% per annum, with no change in 
unconditional expansion rates between decades while conditional expansion rates 
decline. The elasticity of area with respect to city economic output is about 0.3. 
Over time, expansion of urban land area is becoming less responsive to growth of 
the local non-agricultural population. 
 
Keywords:  Economic growth; Land conversion; Luminosity; Urbanization; 
China  
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A2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between economic growth, expansion of urban land area, and the 
broader issue of cultivated land conversion in China during the late 1980s and 
1990s has been examined in a series of national-level studies [1-3]. Urban land 
area expanded 3 percent for every 10 percent increase in local economic output 
(county Gross Domestic Product [GDP]) and GDP growth fully accounted for all 
urban expansion from 1995 to 2000. This income elasticity of urban area is less 
than that in a global sample of cities [4], indicating the dense nature of urban 
development in China.  
Yet despite these findings, recent policy discussion suggests that 
urbanization in China relies excessively on land conversion and land financing, 
causing inefficient urban sprawl [5]. Moreover, recent studies of particular regions 
argue that the urban form is becoming more dispersed [6] and urban sprawl has 
increased since the beginning of the 21
st
 century [7], which is after the period 
analyzed in the existing national-level studies. These more recent studies use the 
term ‘sprawl’ in the sense of Brueckner [8] as meaning the excessive spatial 
growth of cities.  
Understanding how the rate of urban expansion, and its driving forces, 
change over time matters to urban planners [3]. Competition for land between 
urban and other use is very important in China. Land for agricultural and forestry 
production is concentrated in monsoon-affected East China, where agricultural 
soils account for 30% of total land surface; more than 20% higher than in West 
China [9]. Since the most rapid economic and urban growth has also been in East 
 248 
 
  
 
China, there are concerns that rates of land conversion may be so high as to 
endanger aspects of sustainable development, such as food security [5]. 
The current study provides updated national-level evidence on urban 
expansion in China, and on the effects of local economic growth and population 
change on this expansion. The 1993-2012 period is examined. Tests are conducted 
to see if trend expansion rates and the relationship between local economic growth 
and city area change between the two decades studied. Two types of data are used 
to see if patterns are robust to different sources of evidence. The first is 
administrative data from various Yearbooks (documented more fully in Section 2 
below) that annually report area and various socio-economic indicators for all 
urban districts in China. There are doubts about Yearbook data on urban area 
supplied by local governments since land sales account for up to one quarter of 
their revenue and not all sales are sanctioned by upper levels of government. For 
example, in the secondary market an entity who obtains land use rights from a 
local government may rent or mortgage that land to others and this often involves 
a change in land use that is not registered with the authorities [10]. 
The second source of data is remotely sensed night lights. Artificial light is 
commonly present wherever urban areas occur, and even though night light 
provides a potentially less accurate measure than the Landsat data used by the 
prior national-level studies [1-3], lights have the advantage of being low-cost and 
up-to-date. Night lights should be especially useful for studying urban growth in 
China since almost all households were electrified by the start of the study period, 
with urban electrification rates of 94% in 1992 and 95% by 1999 (rural 
electrification rates were just as high) [11]. Thus it is not the case that lit areas 
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were catching up to the urban boundary due to rising electrification rates, as may 
have occurred in other developing countries such as India.  
In addition to the search for robustness from using two different sources of 
data on urban area, and the timeliness  of the current study, one other feature is 
worthy of mention. There are up to 20 years of annual data (and 32 satellite-year 
observations) for each city in the sample. Repeated information over time allows 
use of panel data to account for unobservable factors like environmental 
conditions (e.g., slope and soil) and local variation in the implementation of urban 
policy. Even though these factors may reflect the historical legacy of a city, and 
may be related to current land area, their omission from our study does not cause 
bias. With repeated information over time, one can use ‘fixed effects’ to control 
for unobserved factors, allowing unbiased estimation [3]. Also, panel data 
methods allow satellite fixed effects be used to ameliorate effects of random 
measurement error in estimates of urban area caused by various shortcomings of 
the DMPS-OLS sensors for urban mapping. Of the 11 shortcomings considered in 
the literature [12], the lack of on-board calibration and failure to record gain 
changes when the signal is amplified to enhance visual interpretation of clouds 
may introduce the largest temporal errors.  
A2.2 DATA AND METHODS 
This is a national-level analysis covering urban districts (shiqu) of almost all 
prefectural cities in China. In the 2010 census, China’s 287 prefectural cities had 
95% of the non-agricultural population, with the rest in other types of spatial 
units, such as Banners, Leagues, and Autonomous Regions.  The westernmost 
provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet had just three prefectural cities with urban 
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districts (Lhasa, Karamay, and Urumqi) and data for these cities is either absent in 
some official tabulations or reflects a skewed economic structure [13]. We 
therefore excluded areas west of Gansu when using national-level databases. The 
main sources for these databases were various issues of the City Statistical 
Yearbook [14], Hukou Yearbook [14], and 50 Years of Cities [16]. These data are 
referred to as coming from Yearbooks, to distinguish them from the estimates 
obtained from remote sensing. 
A prefectural city typically includes rural counties and county-level cities 
along with urban districts. The district (or adjacent districts for multi-district 
prefectures) best proxies for an urban core [17]. These urban cores will be referred 
to as ‘cities’ in what follows and in this usage it does not mean the entire 
prefectural city. Some districts had been upgraded from previously being Banners, 
Leagues, Regions or Autonomous Prefectures and did not always have a 
continuous time series of data. The Yearbooks provide estimates since 1993 and 
currently run to 2012, so a threshold was set that a city needed data for at least 15 
of these 20 years to be in the sample; this excluded 24 of the urban cores. Figure 1 
shows the 24 cities excluded, and the remaining 260 cities.  
In addition to Yearbook data, remotely sensed night lights from the 
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System 
(DMSP/OLS) are used. These are available for download from 
http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html for six satellites: 
F10 (1992-94), F12 (1994-99), F14 (1997-03), F15 (2000-07), F16 (2004-09), 
F18 (2010-12). There is a long history of using satellite-detected luminosity to 
measure urban area [see, for example, 17-25]. The data from DMSP/OLS are 
 251 
 
  
 
reported in relative brightness terms, as a 6-bit Digital Number (DN) ranging from 
0-63. A threshold level of brightness can be set to exclude low-lit areas of sparse 
development. The stable lights annual composite from DMSP/OLS covers 1992-
2012, but to match with the time-series of Yearbook data the sample is restricted 
to 1993-2012. Tests of whether expansion rates for 1993-2002 differ from those 
for 2003-2012 are conducted. 
Prior national-level studies of urban expansion and land conversion in 
China mostly rely on Landsat data [1-3]. In comparison to Landsat, the DMSP 
stable lights data tend to make agglomerations appear larger. The composites 
produced by averaging several overlapping input pixels are approximately 1000 
times larger than Landsat TM pixels, so sub-pixel light sources are attributed to an 
expanded area [22]. The reflectance of light from surrounding water and non-
urban land (e.g., due to snow or ice) gives a blooming effect [21]. Also, 
uncertainty in geo-location that gets compounded by averaging over multiple 
nights causes exaggeration [23]. But the proportionate effects are small for 
medium to large settlements [24]. The urban cores studied here had an average 
resident population of 1.6 million and a minimum population of 0.2 million in the 
2010 census, so errors for cities of this scale should be relatively small. Also, 
there is a strong linear trend between night lights and traditional measures of 
urban area in China [25]. The results reported below use both administrative data 
on urban area and night lights to indicate if the findings on urban expansion rates 
and their driving forces are robust. 
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Figure 1. Location of urban cores in the sample and urban cores excluded due 
to incomplete data 
 
 
A key decision with night lights is the brightness threshold to classify a 
pixel as urban. A lower detection threshold makes urban area seem larger and 
cities may merge if linked by built-up corridors along major transport routes. 
Figure 2 gives examples of this effect for some cities in Central China. In this 
figure, and the results below, the digital numbers are in percent of the maximum 
value (DN=63), to stress that they are relative rather than absolute values. In 
Figure 2 the thresholds are 90%, 60%, and 30%.  
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Figure 2. Examples of the effect of luminosity thresholds on apparent urbanized 
area and the number of distinct urban cores, from (a) Henan, and (b) Hunan, 
China (Satellite F18 2012) 
 
 
These thresholds work as follows: starting from the center of each city 
where lights are brightest and moving outwards, as the algorithm finds pixels less 
illuminated than the threshold it begins searching in a different direction. If the 
(a) 
(b) 
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algorithm finds no adjacent pixels lit above the threshold except those already 
scanned closer to the city center, it sets a boundary. Prior studies of night lights in 
China use specific DN thresholds that are as low as 5, 8 and 12 [24] and as high as 
27 to 62 [26]. The thresholds in Figure 2 correspond to DN values of 56, 37 and 
19. There is no consensus on the particular threshold to use, so criteria for 
choosing a threshold are considered below and two thresholds are chosen, to 
ensure results are not sensitive to the threshold used. 
In Figure 2a, nearby cities of Zhengzhou and Kaifeng (64 kilometers apart) 
form a single urban area if a lower luminosity threshold is used because a highly 
lit corridor about five kilometers wide joins them. At higher thresholds they 
shrink into separate ‘islands’ and at 90% even a city of 8 million like Zhengzhou 
has substantial areas not classified as urban. The example in Figure 2b has three 
nearby urban cores joined when a 30% luminosity threshold is used, but these 
become distinct cores at 60% (plus a small ‘island’ detaches from Changsha). A 
very high detection threshold causing some cities to disappear entirely is also 
illustrated; the city of Xiangtan has an apparent area of 200 km
2
 at a luminosity 
threshold of 60% but it disappears at 90% because its lights are not bright enough, 
even though it has a population of two million. 
The tradeoff between high and low thresholds is shown more generally in 
Figure 3. The total area for cities in the sample is on a log scale for 1993, 2002 
and 2012 at thresholds from 30% to 100%. The slope changes at about 90% but at 
lower thresholds each percentage (0.6 DN points) raises apparent urban area by 
3.8% in 1993 and 2.5% otherwise. The diamond-shaped markers in Figure 3a 
show total area according to the Yearbooks. In 1993, a luminosity threshold of 65% 
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gives the best match with Yearbook data, while in the later years the best match is 
at 85% and 90%. The rise in the threshold that best matches Yearbook data 
implies that Yearbook estimates of urban area rise slower than luminosity-based 
estimates. Specifically, between 1993 and 2012 the area estimates in the 
Yearbooks tripled, while lit area increased by a factor of 7.5 at a 65% luminosity 
threshold, and by more at higher thresholds. The likelihood is that Yearbook data 
on urban area are under-estimated due to the incentives facing local governments 
[10]. This under-estimate has been observed by the remote-sensing literature 
where it is suggested that the differences reflect limitations in the techniques used 
to gather the Yearbook data [26].  
Returning to the question of choice of luminosity threshold, anything 
above 65% gives a smaller area in 1993 than what the Yearbook data show. Local 
governments are unlikely to overstate urban area, given concerns from higher 
levels of government about converting farm land [10]. Thus, we do not use any 
luminosity thresholds above 65%, since these give a smaller urban area at the start 
of our study period than what the Yearbooks report. High thresholds also make 
less brightly-lit cities drop out of the sample (Figure 3b). But the number of 
observations also falls at low thresholds as nearby cities clump into single units. 
Luminosity thresholds from 50% to 65% maximise observations and give similar 
estimates of area at the start of the period to what Yearbook data show. To see if 
patterns are robust to different ways of measuring areas, the results use city area 
reported in Yearbooks, and also use area estimates from night light at luminosity 
thresholds of 50% and 65%. 
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Figure 3. The effect of varying luminosity thresholds for detecting urban 
boundaries on (a) apparent urban area, and (b) the number of cities separately 
distinguished 
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Figure 4. The joining of initially separate cities in the (a) Yangtze delta and (b) 
Pearl River delta 
 
 
When cities clump into a single unit the time series of lit area is 
interrupted. Figure 4 shows (a) the Yangtze delta and (b) the Pearl River delta. By 
2011 the separate cities in each delta had joined at a luminosity threshold of 50% 
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but several of them were separate in earlier years, as shown for 2005. To provide 
consistent time series, any cities that eventually join together at the 50% 
luminosity threshold are joined for all years (1993-2012) and for all three samples 
– the estimates from Yearbook data, and the lit area estimates from the 50% and 
65% thresholds. This gives consistent samples across years and data sources. 
After these merges, the number of cities in the sample drops from n=260 to n=225 
(but they continue to cover the same total area). 
The final modeling issue is how to deal with temporal measurement error 
in night light data. The DMSP/OLS sensors lack on-board calibration and no 
record is kept of gain changes (when the signal is amplified to help the US Air 
Force detect clouds). These features introduce temporal variability into the record 
from a given satellite. Also, in years that two satellites are in orbit (e.g., 1994 and 
1997-2007) a stable lights composite from one satellite’s passes over a given area 
during the year will not be the same as the composite for the same area from the 
other satellite. This ‘noise’ is undesirable but random error in a dependent variable 
does not cause estimator bias and is unlikely to overwhelm the ‘signal’ in the data 
from the true but unknown expansion of the urban area. 
One way to deal with inter-satellite variation is to average values in years 
with two satellites [27]. Another is inter-calibration, with regression adjustment to 
DN data prior to use in an analysis [28]. For the most widely used calibrated data, 
the F12 satellite in 1999 is treated as ‘truth’ because it has the highest DN values 
across years and satellites. Regressions of these 1999 DN values on a polynomial 
of DN values from other years and satellites for each pixel on the island of Sicily 
(which is assumed to be temporally stable) are used to generate sets of coefficients 
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[23]. The DN values from the other years and other satellites are then plugged into 
this regression to adjust the raw DN values to match the values from F12 in 1999. 
This calibration can also be done for a particular country or region and has been 
done for China [26]. But whether local or global, calibration relies on untested 
assumptions about temporal and spatial homogeneity. Moreover, subsequent 
analysis of adjusted values should take account of the fact that these are 
predictions from a regression, and so when they are treated as data, the standard 
errors should be adjusted for the two-stage estimation. 
In contrast to these methods, this study does not average and does not 
calibrate.  Instead, the (log) area of urban core i in year t, as measured by satellite 
s, is modeled with a fixed effects regression: 
 (1)  
where T is a time trend, Ds is a set of fixed effects for each satellite, Di is a set of 
fixed effects for each urban core, and its is a random error. The 1ˆ  gives the 
percentage change in area for a one unit increase in T, and so is the best estimate 
of the trend annual rate of expansion, after controlling for the characteristics of 
each city and the idiosyncratic characteristics of each satellite. Unlike averaging 
observations in years with two satellites, which gives equal weight to both, the 
regression approach uses data-determined weights (the size of the ).ˆs  The 
measurement errors in the Aits should be random, conditional on Ds, so they go 
into the residuals, itsˆ  and do not bias coefficient estimates (but do create 
heteroscedasticity, so robust variance estimators should be used).  
itsiissits DDTA   10ln
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Equation (1) can also be extended to test if the growth rate is changing 
over time, using either a quadratic trend model or a piecewise linear trend. A 
dummy variable for the second decade in the study period Dt can be interacted 
with the time variable to give a piecewise trend:  
itsiissttits DDDDTTA   )(ln 10  (1a)  
A test of the null hypothesis =0 is a test of whether the trend annual rate of 
expansion is changing over time, while the annual expansion rate for the second 
period is calculated as: .ˆˆ1    
The fixed effects regression can also be further extended to allow for time-
varying covariates. The two covariates considered here are city economic output 
(GDP) and non-agricultural population (POP).  
itsiissititits DDPOPGDPTA   lnlnln 3210  (2) 
With fixed effects for both cities and satellites included, the estimated elasticities 
from equation (2) are unlikely to be biased by the presence of unobserved factors 
that affect city area and correlate with local economic output or local population. 
In order to examine how these elasticities change over time, the dummy variable 
for the second decade in the observation period, Dt can be added to the model and 
interacted with the time-varying covariates and with the linear time trend. 
A2.3 RESULTS 
A2.3.1 Trend Expansion Rates for Urban Cores 
The results of estimating equation (1) are reported in Table 1. The main results 
use a luminosity threshold of 65%, and a sensitivity analysis uses a threshold of 
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50%. These cities are expanding at a trend annual rate of 8.3% at the preferred 
threshold for defining a pixel as part of the urban core. The expansion rate is 
slightly less (8.0%) if the 50% luminosity threshold is used, which is to be 
expected since the lower detection threshold gives a larger apparent urban area to 
start with and so subsequent growth rates are then lower. At these trend rates of 
expansion, China’s urban cores would be expected to double in area after 
nine years. However, the rate of city expansion appears to be slowing down, 
which is shown in Table 1 by the statistically significant negative coefficient on 
the squared term for a quadratic time trend (Panel B). This slowing of the 
expansion rate is also shown by the negative deviation term when a piecewise 
trend is estimated (Panel C). Specifically, allowing the time trend to differ from 
the first decade (1993-2002) to the second decade (2003-2012), there is a 
statistically significant fall in the annual rate of expansion of at least six 
percentage points between the periods. Thus, while the rate of area expansion for 
these cities in the first decade was around eleven percent per annum, in the second 
decade it was only around five percent per annum.  
The results in Table 1 control for fixed characteristics of cities and of 
satellites. Both sources of variation in the apparent area of a city-satellite-year cell 
matter, given the statistically significant F-test results for the joint hypotheses that 
each set of fixed effects can be excluded from the model. These results are in the 
columns headed “cities” and “satellites”. One sensitivity analysis that does not 
seem to matter is if sample values are weighted to reflect the fact that some 
observations represent more than one of the original urban cores (in cases where 
two or more cities merge into one as seen in Figure 4). Unreported results for 
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urban areas as defined at the 65% luminosity threshold that use weights are very 
similar to what is in Table 1; the linear trend is 8.4% rather than 8.3% and the two 
values for the piecewise trend are 11.5% and -7.3% rather than 11.6% and -7.5%. 
Table 1. Average trend expansion rates for urban cores in China, 1993-2012 
 65% 
threshold 
Fixed Effects = 0   50% 
threshold 
Yearbook 
data on area   Cities Satellites R
2 
 
Panel A: Linear 
Trend 
Trend Expansion 
Rate 
(% per annum) 
       
       
8.3% 583
***
 125
***
 0.908  8.0% 5.1% 
(25.1)
***
    (26.6)
***
 (29.6)
***
 
        
Panel B: 
Quadratic Trend 
Linear term  12.70 571
***
 122
***
 0.909 
 
8.65 -0.87 
 (6.69)
***
     (5.34)
***
 (1.26) 
        
        
Squared term  
100 
-0.32     -0.21 0.02 
(6.65)
***
     (5.29)
***
 (1.34) 
        
Panel C: 
Piecewise Trend 
Trend 1993-2002 11.6% 565
***
 152
***
 0.910 
 
10.9% 4.5% 
 (18.0)
***
     (19.6)
***
 (17.3)
***
 
        
        
Deviation 2003-
2012 
-7.5%     -5.7% 0.5% 
(8.4)
***
     (7.4)
***
 (1.4) 
        
Note: The trends are estimated from variants of equation (1), with the fixed effects for cities and 
satellites not reported. The t-statistics for the trends in ( ) and F-statistics for the joint tests of the 
fixed effects=0 are from robust standard errors. Statistical significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% 
level is denoted by 
*
, 
**
, 
***
. N=225 urban cores.  
 
While the results using the two luminosity thresholds are quite consistent 
with each other, they are rather different to the results obtained when using the 
Yearbook data on urban area.  The linear trend model suggests an annual rate of 
expansion in Yearbook-reported urban area for these 225 cities of just 5.1% rather 
than the trend annual increase of 8.3% that the luminosity data suggest. This 
slower growth rate implies a doubling time of 15 years rather than the nine years 
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that the night lights data show. The supposition in the literature is that local 
governments may have incentives to under-report land conversion to urban uses 
[10]. The empirical pattern that the Yearbook estimates of urban area are less than 
what remote sensing data indicate [26] is supported by our findings, since the rate 
of expansion is less when using the Yearbook data. In addition to the difference in 
the trend annual rates of expansion, when the Yearbook data are used with the 
quadratic and piecewise trend models, there is no evidence of a slowing in the 
growth rate of city land area in the later years of the observation period. However, 
it should be noted that this inconsistency, compared with the robust finding from 
the night light data of a slowdown in the expansion rate for the decade since 2002, 
is less apparent once other covariates are added to the models, as discussed in the 
next section. 
A2.3.2 The Elasticity of Urban Area With Respect to City Economic Output 
The area of these urban cores that is reported in Yearbook data increases by 2.7% 
for every ten percent rise in city GDP and by 3.7 percent for every ten percent rise 
in the non-agricultural hukou population of the city (Table 2, column 1). This 
sensitivity of urban area to growth in the local population is quite different to the 
existing results from national-level studies for China, where it appeared that local 
population growth had no impact on the rate of expansion [2,3]. If a time trend is 
included in the regression, it substantially reduces the elasticity of urban area with 
respect to city GDP but not with respect to the non-agricultural population of the 
city. As for changes in the elasticities over time, the results in columns (3) and (4) 
show that urban area was more elastic with respect to economic output and less 
elastic with respect to local population in the period after 2002 than before then. 
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The trend rate of urban expansion, conditional on population and local economic 
output also was significantly lower in this second decade of the observation 
period. This fall in the (conditional) expansion rate is in keeping with the main 
result of a slowing expansion rate that was found in Table 1 using night light 
derived measures of city area. 
Table 2. Effects of GDP and population on expansion of urban area in China, 
1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: ln (area, city i year t) from Yearbook data  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
ln (GDP for city i in year t) 0.266 0.175  0.160 0.085 
 (15.94)
***
 (5.38)
***
  (6.99)
***
 (2.07)
**
 
      
ln (non-agricultural population)it 0.367 0.366  0.431 0.432 
 (5.50)
***
 (5.65)
***
  (6.96)
***
 (7.27)
***
 
      
Time trend (t=1,2,3,…T)  0.014   0.019 
  (3.06)
***
   (3.89)
***
 
      
ln (GDP)it  Dt  [Dt =1 if 
year>2002] 
   0.122 0.160 
   (5.24)
***
 (4.91)
***
 
      
ln (non-agricultural population)it 
 Dt 
   -0.107 -0.144 
   (3.51)*** (3.71)*** 
      
Time trend  Dt     -0.013 
     (2.40)** 
R
2 
0.945 0.946  0.947 0.948 
Note: Fixed effects for cities and the overall intercept are not reported. The t-statistics in ( ) are 
from robust standard errors. Statistical significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level is denoted by 
*
, 
**
, 
***
. N=225 urban cores, and 3967 observations. 
 
The estimated elasticities and their change over time appear to be quite 
different when city area is measured using night lights rather than using 
administrative data. Specifically, there appears to be no effect of the locally 
registered non-agricultural population on urban area (Table 3, row 2). The 
elasticity of area with respect to city GDP is 0.37, with cities measured at a 
luminosity threshold of 65%, (Table 3, column 1). These economic output and 
local population elasticities are quite similar to those reported by Deng and 
colleagues [2] when using Landsat 5 data on urban areas in the 1990s.  
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Table 3. Effects of GDP and population on expansion of urban area in China, 
1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: ln (lit area, city i year t) with 65% 
threshold 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
ln (GDP for city i in year t) 0.373 0.109  0.307 0.154 
 (11.95)
***
 (2.38)
**
  (6.93)
***
 (3.08)
***
 
      
ln (non-agricultural population)it 0.094 0.100  0.168 0.157 
 (0.94) (0.90)  (1.57) (1.41) 
      
Time trend (t=1,2,3,…T)  0.062   0.093 
  (8.46)
***
   (11.60)
***
 
      
      
ln (GDP)it  Dt  [Dt =1 if 
year>2002] 
   0.033 0.113 
   (0.67) (2.24)
**
 
      
ln (non-agricultural population)it 
 Dt 
   -0.158 -0.237 
   (2.57)
**
 (3.80)
***
 
      
Time trend  Dt     -0.097 
     (9.11)
***
 
R
2 
0.904 0.907  0.907 0.912 
Note: Fixed effects for cities and satellites and the overall intercept are not reported. The t-
statistics in ( ) are from robust standard errors. Statistical significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% 
level is denoted by 
*
, 
**
, 
***
. For the N=225 urban cores there are 6229 city-satellite-year 
observations. 
 
When a dummy variable for the second decade is interacted with the other 
variables, there is no change over time in the elasticity of land area with respect to 
GDP but a statistically significant fall in the elasticity with respect to non-
agricultural population (Table 3, column 3). Once a piecewise time trend is added, 
the second decade shows significantly slower expansion rates than the first 
decade, conditional on GDP and population. This result is consistent with the 
finding in Table 1 of a slowdown in the expansion rates in the most recent period. 
The large fall in the elasticity of land area with respect to local population in the 
most recent period is still apparent with the time trend included, while the 
elasticity with respect to GDP appears to rise somewhat (but still is less than 0.3 
for 1993-2012). 
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Table 4. Sensitivity analysis for elasticities using urban core area with a 50% 
luminosity threshold  
 Dependent variable: ln (lit area, city i year t) with 50% 
threshold 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
ln (GDP for city i in year t) 0.324 0.093  0.259 0.095 
 (11.64)
***
 (2.25)
**
  (6.61)
***
 (2.06)
**
 
      
ln (non-agricultural population)it 0.115 0.120  0.186 0.183 
 (1.36) (1.28)  (2.01)
**
 (1.87)
*
 
      
Time trend (t=1,2,3,…T)  0.054   0.077 
  (8.84)
***
   (11.74)
***
 
      
      
ln (GDP)it  Dt  [Dt =1 if 
year>2002] 
   0.068 0.114 
   (1.59) (2.54)
**
 
      
ln (non-agricultural population)it 
 Dt 
   -0.145 -0.187 
   (2.72)
***
 (3.48)
***
 
      
Time trend  Dt     -0.058 
     (7.25)
***
 
R
2 
0.939 0.942  0.941 0.944 
Notes: See Table 3. For the N=225 urban cores there are 6357 city-satellite-year observations 
using the 50% threshold. 
 
The patterns of the estimated elasticities and their changes over time are 
very similar when urban areas are measured with a 50% luminosity threshold as a 
sensitivity analysis (Table 4). While the elasticity of land area with respect to 
local population is more precisely estimated in this sensitivity analysis, the 
magnitude is roughly the same as in Table 3 with urban expansion appearing 
relatively insensitive to growth in local population. The slowdown in the trend 
rate of expansion, conditional on population and GDP, remains apparent. Indeed, 
this significant slowdown in the trend rate of expansion in the second decade of 
our study is a common finding across Tables 2-4, and so it is a feature of both the 
night light data and Yearbook data. Other patterns from these two data sources are 
quite different; for example, in terms of the trend expansion rates. Thus, the fact 
that the slowdown in expansion over time is shown by both types of data is a 
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notable finding that is presumed to be more robust than if it was apparent only 
with one type of data. 
A2.4 DISSCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The cities studied in this paper are home to the majority of China’s urban 
population. The land area of these cities reflects the demand for living space of 
this urban population, along with land needs of commercial and urban industrial 
development. The increase in China’s urban population and the rising affluence of 
that population will see continued expansion of urban area. It is therefore 
important that agencies concerned with land use and land conversion are aware of 
the most recent and comprehensive patterns, rather than basing decisions on 
earlier evidence or more limited case studies.  
The current national-level analysis finds consistent evidence that the rate 
of spatial expansion for these cities is slowing down, and this pattern holds across 
several different ways of measuring urban area and of modeling expansion. 
Specifically, if one looks at the expansion of urban land area conditional on local 
economic output and local population, then all three measures of urban area 
studied here show a sharp fall in the expansion rate in the decade since 2002. If 
unconditional expansion rates are studied, then two out of the three indicators of 
city land area show this slowdown.  
This lower expansion rate in the most recent decade may reflect the effects 
of policy that aimed to direct urbanization elsewhere, such as to county-level 
cities. For example, the 1990 ‘City Planning Law’ (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Chengshi Guihua Fa) mandated ‘strictly controlling the size of large cities and 
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developing medium-sized and small cities’ and a short-lived county-to-city 
upgrading system was attempted [29]. This national-level policy, and possible 
effects of local competition for mobile industry, helped fuel rapid growth in the 
construction sector that was especially apparent outside of the core urban districts 
whose spatial expansion is analyzed here. For example, the share of the working 
age population employed in the construction sector doubled between the 2000 and 
2010 censuses. Where that construction sector employment was located also 
shifted [30]; for urban districts the contribution to total construction sector 
employment fell from 52% to 42%, while for counties it rose from 29% to 41%. 
With so much construction employment moving into counties over this decade, it 
is plausible that the rate of expansion of urban area in counties was increasing 
even as expansion rates slowed in the urban cores that house most of China’s 
urban residents. 
An additional factor that may have slowed expansion of urban core areas 
is the effects on China of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). At the provincial 
level, the GFC seems to have reduced inequality, with income growth in export-
oriented coastal areas slowing [31], and millions of workers moving back to their 
homes in interior provinces [32]. This demand shock in the middle of the second 
decade studied here may have reduced the rate of urban expansion in the rapidly 
growing coastal provinces and possibly shifted the location of expansion towards 
less urbanized areas in the interior.  
In keeping with the existing evidence [2-3], the econometric results 
reported here suggest that rising income is an important driving force for the 
expansion of urban areas in China. Nevertheless, the rate of response of land area 
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to local economic growth is fairly modest; the elasticity of 0.3 is well below the 
global average for the income elasticity of urban land area. Consequently, it 
remains true that urban areas in China are relatively densely populated when 
judged by the standards of the rest of the world. While there was some evidence 
of a more elastic response of land area to economic growth in the second decade 
of the period studied here, that change was from a low base and was most visible 
for the Yearbook data on built-up area, which exhibits different trends than the 
night lights derived measures of city area. Moreover, there are grounds for 
doubting the accuracy of Yearbook data, given the possible incentives for local 
officials to under-report land conversion. A continued monitoring of the response 
of urban land area to local economic growth would be a useful contribution of 
future research. 
The fall over time in the elasticity of urban land area with respect to local 
population is not a result that would be expected, based on recent discussions of 
urban policy in China [5] and recent case study evidence [6]. If rising city 
population is not translating into expanded city land area, it must be the case that 
the population density of cities is rising, rather than becoming more dispersed as 
is often asserted. A possible reason for this unexpected result is that the hukou 
registered non-agricultural population for each city is becoming a less reliable 
count of the actual number of city residents because of the growing number of 
non-hukou migrants [31]. The count of hukou holders is used in this study, and in 
the previous national-level studies [2-3] because it is the only city-level 
population count reported annually. It would be a useful topic for future research 
to form de facto measures of city size based on counting residents rather than the 
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de jure measures based on the hukou count, and to test which is the better 
predictor of city land area. It is helpful for urban planners to find the best way to 
count people for use in forecasting the future land needs for China’s growing 
urban population.  
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